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Uncertainty represents a robust threat that can amplify aversive experiences and 
exaggerate negative expectations about uncertain future outcomes. Mindfulness – an open and 
receptive attention to present moment experiences -- has been shown to facilitate adaptive 
regulation when faced with a variety of distinct emotional threats.  Reduced experiential 
avoidance and equanimity in the face of unpleasant emotional experiences have been theorized 
as central to these emotional regulatory benefits. The present study explored whether 
dispositional mindfulness would promote adaptive responses to uncertainty during the 
anticipation of, and after exposure to emotional stimuli, as indicated by self-reports and neural 
(event-related potential) markers of anticipation and appraisal.  Participants were exposed to 
stimulus cues that informed them about the valence of a subsequent emotional picture as neutral, 
aversive, or uncertain.  Consistent with past research, uncertainty during the anticipation of an 
  
 
 
emotional stimulus amplified unpleasant stimulus appraisals, and participants demonstrated 
biased expectations to associate uncertainty with aversiveness.  Dispositional mindfulness was 
associated with lower expectations for unpleasant stimuli, and was found to amplify the effect of 
uncertainty on a cortical marker of stimulus appraisal called the late positive potential (LPP).  
Traits that contrasted with mindfulness predicted opposite patterns of association with these 
measures.  However, these findings were directly the opposite of findings from past research.  A 
theoretically defensible explanation is discussed for these findings and suggestions were made 
for future research on the role of mindfulness on ERP variability. 
The results from the present study contribute to a growing body of evidence that suggests 
that uncertainty during the anticipation of potentially negative future outcomes can exert a potent 
downstream influence on emotional anticipation and appraisal processes.  Further research is 
needed to clarify the role of dispositional mindfulness during emotional stimulus anticipation and 
appraisal following uncertainty.  
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Present with an Uncertain Future: Dispositional Mindfulness, Covariation Bias, and Event-
Related Potential Responses to Emotional Stimuli in Uncertain Contexts 
We live in a world that is constantly changing and difficult to predict.  Uncertainty is 
ubiquitous, and resolving it is a primary human motivation (Kagan, 1972). Uncertainty about 
potential future threats can be debilitating because not having adequate information about a 
potentially negative future outcome can impair the ability to anticipate, prepare for, and regulate 
responses (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013).  Exaggerated attempts to resolve uncertainty are 
foundational to worry, and represent a central component of many anxiety disorders (Barlow, 
2002).  Psychologists (Baumeister, 1985; van den Bos, 2010) and existential philosophers 
(Camus, 1942; Heidegger, 1927; Sartre, 1937) have described the experience of confronting 
uncertainty as disorienting and unpleasant (Heidegger, 1927; Kierkegaard, 1983; Sartre, 1939).  
However, the existentialists note an important upside to this confrontation: in the very act of 
acknowledging the hard fact of uncertainty people make progress toward living an honest, 
authentic, and meaningful life. For example, Sartre (1939) found that in the process of coming to 
terms with uncertainty, he realized the basic opportunity for human freedom, creativity, and 
meaning.  As summarized by Grene (1984), a central point of existentialism is that human 
integrity grows from acknowledging the difficult truths of the world, including uncertainty, and 
being honest about them.   
This orientation of honesty toward the facts of experience characterizes mindfulness, 
which is commonly described as an open and receptive awareness to whatever is occurring in the 
present moment (Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007).  The Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta -- a primary 
discourse on mindfulness that has been a cornerstone of Buddhist contemplative practice for its 
2500 year history – suggests mindfulness is particularly beneficial when applied to precisely 
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those states considered dreadful by the existentialists, including uncertainty.  One reason for this 
is that mindfulness is theorized to promote a more equanimous, receptive awareness toward 
difficult experiences, such that a person is better able to see them clearly, “unadulterated by 
habitual reactions and projections” (Anālayo, 2003, p. 60).  The present study will empirically 
examine whether trait mindfulness promotes adaptive responses to aversive events under 
conditions of uncertainty as measured by self-reported and cortical measures of appraisal and 
anticipation. 
Past research has linked dispositional mindfulness with adaptive responses to a variety of 
emotional threats (for a review, see Goodman, Quaglia & Brown, in press). Uncertainty 
represents a robust threat to a considerable number of people, and evidence from several studies 
indicates that uncertainty can negatively influence processes involved during both emotional 
appraisal and anticipation. Appraisal responses include amplified perceptions of unpleasantness 
(Grupe & Nitschke, 2010; Sarinopoulos, Dixon, Short, Davidson, & Nitschke, 2006; Sanfey, 
2009) and states of negative affect (Hirsch & Inzlicht, 2008; Nader & Balleine, 2007).  This 
heightening of unpleasantness by uncertainty is theorized to result, at least in part, from changes 
during the anticipation of uncertain future outcomes, and specifically the tendency to expect that 
uncertainty will lead to aversive outcomes.  This tendency to associate uncertainty with 
aversiveness is a phenomenon known as covariation bias (Tomarken, Mineka and Cook, 1989), 
and it plays a central role in the amplification of unpleasant emotional responses to uncertainty 
(Grupe & Nitschke, 2013).  
The present research will first attempt to replicate effects from a past study (Grupe & 
Nitschke, 2011) that examined the influence of uncertainty on emotional anticipation and 
appraisal processes. This study provided evidence that uncertainty amplifies self-reported 
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unpleasant perceptions and negative affect.  In addition to these self-report measures, past 
research has provided peripheral nervous system (Grupe & Nitschke, 2011) and neuroimaging 
(Sarinopoulos et al., 2010) evidence that uncertainty amplifies unpleasant emotional appraisal 
processes. The present study attempts to extend this incipient body of evidence using cortical 
measures known as event-related potential (ERPs): patterns of electrical activity measured at the 
surface of the scalp that are time locked to the presentation of a stimulus.   Of interest to the 
present research is a widely-studied ERP component known as the Late Positive Potential (LPP), 
which is sensitive to differences in the valence and arousal inducing properties of an emotional 
stimulus (Carretie et al., 2001; 2004; Cuthbert et al., 2000; Schupp et al., 2003), as well as top-
down modulation of emotional stimulus appraisal and meaning (Hajcak et al., 2010; Hajcak & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2006; Olofsson et al., 2008). 
Another goal of the present study is to examine differences in anticipatory processing of 
emotional stimuli under conditions of uncertainty.  Past research using the experimental 
paradigm used in the present study found that participants demonstrated inflated expectations 
and post-experiment estimates that uncertainty leads to aversive outcomes (Grupe & Nitschke, 
2011). Additional research indicates that uncertainty modifies activity in neural regions during 
the anticipation of emotional stimuli (for a review, see Grupe & Nitschke, 2013).  The present 
study will extend this existing body of evidence by examining self-reported expectations during 
states of uncertainty, as well as a cortical measure of emotional anticipation known as the 
Stimulus Preceding Negativity (SPN).  The SPN is an event-related potential measure that is 
thought to reflect the anticipation and the intensity of motivational engagement toward a 
forthcoming emotional stimulus (Moser et al., 2009; Poli, Sarlo, Bortoletto, Buodo, & Palomba, 
2007; Takeuchi, Mochizuki, Masaki, Takasawa, and Yamazaki, 2005).  Similar to the LPP, the 
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SPN is sensitive to the valence and arousal inducing properties of a stimulus (Howard, 
Longmore, & Mason, 1992; Poli et al., 2007), and the top-down modulation of stimulus meaning 
(Moser et al., 2009; Thiruchselvam et al., 2011). 
Finally, the present study will explore dispositional mindfulness – the frequency with 
which people enter into states of open and receptive awareness to the present – as a 
psychological quality that modulates self-reported and cortical measures of emotional stimulus 
appraisal and anticipation under conditions of uncertainty. I expect that when participants are 
exposed to aversive stimuli under conditions of uncertainty, mindfulness will promote less 
unpleasant emotional appraisals of the stimuli, as indicated by lower self-reported unpleasant 
affect and picture ratings, and attenuated LPP responses to aversive emotional stimuli.  I also 
expect mindfulness will modulate processes involved during the anticipation of emotional 
stimuli.  Mindfulness is expected to promote lower levels of covariation bias, and I will explore 
the relation between mindfulness and the SPN during emotional stimulus anticipation under 
conditions of uncertainty.   
In sum, the present study has been designed to replicate and extend past research linking 
uncertainty to changes in stimulus appraisal and anticipation.  I will also explore the important 
role that mindfulness may play in ameliorating the influence of uncertainty on measures of 
emotional stimulus appraisal and anticipation.  In the sections that follow I will describe several 
distinct types of uncertainty discussed in the scholarly literature, and will specifically target 
informational uncertainty – a state in which information about the probability of a future 
outcome is restricted or absent – as the focus of the present study.  Then I will describe extant 
literature on the influence of uncertainty on stimulus appraisal processes, and how mindfulness 
might promote more adaptive appraisals of uncertainty-related stimuli.  Next, I will discuss the 
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literature on the effect of uncertainty during anticipation.  People are intrinsically motivated to 
resolve informational uncertainty (Kagan, 1972), and I will describe covariation assessment as a 
way people accomplish this. Then I will discuss evidence that prior expectations can distort 
covariation assessments and bias predictions about uncertain future outcomes.  When people 
develop the tendency to expect uncertainty will lead to aversive outcomes the experience of 
informational uncertainty can become highly aversive, and I will describe research that 
implicates covariation bias in the development of maladaptive cognitive and emotional responses 
to uncertainty.  After discussing the nature of uncertainty and anticipatory processes, I will 
outline my rationale for exploring the influence of mindfulness on anticipatory processing under 
conditions of uncertainty. 
Uncertainty 
Several types of uncertainty have been described in the literatures of psychology, 
economics, philosophy, and neuroscience and it is important to distinguish between them 
because they have unique influences on human experience (van den Bos & Lind, 2009).  For 
example, the philosophical concept of vagueness claims the very existence of everyday objects is 
uncertain (Unger, 1980).  This vagueness suggests that what we perceive as everyday objects 
(i.e., a desk) are fundamentally uncertain, insofar as their constituent elements/parts (i.e. drawers, 
legs, etc.) and the boundaries they share with other objects (i.e., a bolts, nails) are imprecise and 
uncertain (Unger, 1980; Horgan, 1995).  Another type of uncertainty known as personal 
uncertainty is similar to the construct of cognitive dissonance (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1957) and 
focuses on the uncomfortable feelings that arise when one is aware that something personal 
about the self is inconsistent or vague (Baumeister,1985; Van den Bos, 2010). Put simply, 
personal uncertainty is the uncomfortable affective experience that results from being uncertain 
  
6 
 
about the self or where one stands on important issues about the self (Van den Bos, 2010).  The 
Uncertainty Management Model (Van den Bos, 2010), a theoretical framework used to predict 
the effects of personal uncertainty, suggests that people are motivated to resolve the discomfort 
of personal uncertainty through worldview defense (van den Bos, Poortvliet, Maas, Midedema, 
& Vandenham, 2005; van den Bos, van Ameijde, & van Gorp, 2006), religious zealotry, and 
compensatory conviction  (Festinger, Riecken, & Schachter, 1956; McGregor, Haji, Nash, & 
Teper, 2008; McGregor & Marigold, 2003; McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001).  
Several other programs of research have examined individual differences in the way people 
relate to uncertainty about the self. According to Uncertainty Orientation Theory (Sorrentino and 
Roney, 1999) some individuals are positively oriented toward approaching and resolving 
uncertainty (uncertainty orientation), while others ignore and avoid it in favor of familiarity 
(certainty orientation).  Uncertainty Identity Theory (UIT; Hogg, 2007) is another psychological 
theory that regards the drive to resolve uncertainty as a motivating force.  An extension of Social 
Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986/2004), UIT explores uncertainty as a fundamental human 
motivation that causes people to identify with groups as a way to defend the self from feelings of 
personal uncertainty.  People who have high self-uncertainty are, for example, more likely to 
identify with extremist groups that have clearly defined boundaries and stable ideologies (Hogg, 
2007). 
While there are numerous psychological theories about uncertainty, the most basic and 
widely studied form has its roots in the scholarly work of economics, and is known as 
informational (or Knightian) uncertainty.  Research on informational uncertainty explores how 
people respond to situations where there is limited information about the probability of 
occurrence for a future outcome.  The primary distinction between informational and personal 
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uncertainty (and its close relatives) involves the restricted focus of personal uncertainty to 
negative affective states that result from uncertainty about the self.  Informational uncertainty, on 
the other hand, is a not restricted to the affective consequences stemming from uncertainty about 
self.  It is broader construct that involves cognitive and affective responses to situations in which 
the information needed to predict future outcomes is limited or completely unknown.   
Informational uncertainty has been widely studied in the context of decision making and 
economics, and can be further split into two different types: risk and ambiguity (Knight, 1921). 
The primary distinction between risk and ambiguity involves whether the probability of a future 
outcome occurring is known or unknown.   Under conditions of risk (also known as 
unambiguous probability; Ellsberg, 1961), the probability of an outcome occurring is known 
(Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs, Tranel & Camerer, 2005; Levy, Snell, Nelson, Rustichini, & Glimcher, 
2009).  For example, the option to select any spade from a deck of playing cards is less risky 
than the option to select any queen precisely because the relative probability of each outcome is 
known.  In contrast, ambiguity involves a complete lack of information about the probability of a 
particular outcome occurring (Camerer & Weber, 1992; Fox & Tversky, 1995; Knight, 1921).  
For example, if a person was asked to predict what kind of picture would be displayed without 
having any foreknowledge about them. 
Informational Uncertainty and Emotional Appraisal. 
Uncertainty increases the physiological arousal and intensity of emotional experience, 
and this is sometimes perceived positively (Critchley, Mathias, & Dolan, 2001; Sorrentino, Ye, 
& Szeto, 2009; Whalen, 2007).  For example, pleasant experiences are prolonged when they are 
followed by uncertain events, and people seem to intuitively leverage this as a way to increase 
excitement for pleasant experiences.  We wrap gifts, throw surprise parties, and seek dangerous 
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thrills like skydiving (Bar-Anan, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2009; Wilson, Centernar, Kermer & Gilbert, 
2005) in part because our excitement is amplified when what is to come is hidden and unknown.  
The experience of uncertainty has been shown to instigate introspection and contemplation 
(Sorrentino, Bobocel, Gitta, Olson, & Hewitt, 1988), and uncertainty about important future 
outcomes, such as performance on a test or at a sporting event, can evoke “facilitative anxiety” 
that leads people to prepare and perform on important tasks more effectively (Alpert and Haber, 
1960).     
While there are positive aspects to uncertainty, sometimes it can have deleterious 
consequences for mental health.  Uncertainty about important, potentially aversive future 
outcomes can impair performance and curtail the ability to plan for the future (Grupe & 
Nitschke, 2013).  When paired with a potentially aversive outcome, uncertainty is almost 
universally experienced as aversive (Grupe & Nitschke, 2011; Hirsch & Inzlicht, 2008; van den 
Bos, Poortvliet, Maas, Miedema, & Vandenham, 2005), and exposure to uncontrollable or 
unpredictable events has been linked to the manifestation of depression (Msetfi, Murphy, 
Simpson, & Kornbrot, 2005).  For example, people who are exposed to unpredictable patterns of 
shocks (vs. predictable patterns of shocks) show heightened baseline levels of anxiety (i.e., 
contextual fear) to the experimental context (Davis, 1998), and these differences in heighted 
baseline anxiety distinguish between clinically anxious and non-anxious people (Grillon, 
Morgan, Davis, & Southwick, 1998; Pole, Neylan, Best, Orr, & Marmar, 2003). 
Informational uncertainty and negative affect.  The distinction between ambiguity and 
risk has important consequences for decision making, and for the experience of felt uncertainty 
(Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982).  Risk has been shown to instigate aversive responses 
across several species, including chimpanzees, birds, fish, and bumblebees (Caraco, 1981; 
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Kacelnik & Bateson, 1996; Gilby and Wrangham, 2007). While risk varies in terms of its 
tolerability, ambiguity is almost universally experienced as aversive among human and non-
human animals. When given the option between making a decision that involves risk or 
ambiguity, people avoid ambiguity, even in situations where it has a considerably higher payoff 
than risk, a phenomenon known as ambiguity avoidance (Curley, Yates, & Abrams, 1986; 
Ellsburg, 1961; Camerer & Weber, 1992).   
Ambiguity is avoided even when the situation is clearly innocuous.  For example, both 
rats and humans prefer to receive a sequence of shocks that are predictable over an equivalent 
sequence that is unpredictable (Abbot, 1985; Abbot and Badia, 1979; Badia and Culbertson, 
1972; Miller, Marlin, & Berk, 1977; Mineka and Kihlstrom, 1978).  While predictable and 
unpredictable shocks elicit a clear fear response, only unpredictable shocks evoke states of 
contextual fear, a sustained state of fear in the experimental context (Davis, 1998).  Additionally, 
the unpredictability of a stimulus only evokes such negative reactions when paired with an 
aversive stimulus, and not with a neutral stimulus (Grillon, Baas, Lissek, Smith, & Milstein, 
2004).  The unpredictability of a forthcoming aversive stimulus has been shown to amplify levels 
of fear and aversion not only to the unpredictable stimulus, but to the situations in which 
uncertainty is experienced (Davis, 1998). 
Informational uncertainty and stimulus perception.  While evidence suggests 
uncertainty can amplify unpleasant affect, it can also amplify perceptions of a stimulus as 
unpleasant (Grupe & Nitschke, 2011). When people do not have adequate knowledge about the 
future, the ability to anticipate threats and how to best regulate responses to them is impaired 
(Nitschke & Grupe, 2013).  This impaired state can produce considerable anxiety because is 
suggests that one’s current mental representation of the situation/environment is not complete, or 
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is incorrect (Hirsch & Inzlicht, 2008; Peterson, 1999).   One way people attempt to update their 
mental representations and resolve uncertainty is through a process known as covariation 
assessment.  However, people are notoriously poor at covariation assessment, and exaggerated 
attempts to resolve uncertainty can lead to biased expectations that  serve not only to amplify 
negative affect in uncertain contexts, but to actually distort basic perceptual processes 
(Sarinopoulos, Dixon, Short, Davidson, & Nitschke, 2006; Kirk, Skov, Hulme, Christense, & 
Zeke, 2009; Sanfey, 2009).    
Specific aim 1.  Several studies have demonstrated that unpredictable threats are more 
anxiety provoking and elicit greater physiological responses than the same threats when they are 
predictable (Bar-Anan, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2009; Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004; Grupe & 
Nitschke, 2011; Hirsch & Inzlicht, 2008; Kimmel, 1967; Nader & Belleine, 2007; Sarinopoulos 
et al., 2010).  Moreover, when people associate uncertainty with aversive outcomes, these biased 
expectations can influence how unpleasant stimuli are actually perceived (Grupe & Nitschke, 
2011; Sarinopoulos, Dixon, Short, Davidson, & Nitschke, 2006).  The first aim of the present 
research was to replicate these findings by providing evidence of greater self-reported unpleasant 
affect and unpleasant stimulus ratings when participants were uncertain about the nature of a 
forthcoming emotional stimulus, compared to when they were certain (see Figure 1, Specific 
Aim 1).  The paradigm administered in the present study exposed participants to a cueing 
stimulus that provided information about the nature of the forthcoming emotional picture as 
either certain (aversive or neutral) or uncertain.  On half of the experimental trials, participants 
were asked to rate the valence of their affective state after being exposed to the emotional 
stimulus, and on the other half of trials, participants were asked to rate their perception of the 
valence of the image stimulus itself.  After checking to determine participants understood the 
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Figure 1.  Trial Events during the trial sequence of the cued image task and their relation to specific aims. 
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nature of the stimulus cues, I tested whether aversive and neutral images preceded by uncertainty 
cues elicited more self-reported negative appraisals (higher unpleasant affect and stimulus 
ratings) compared to aversive and neutral images preceded by certainty cues? Consistent with 
past research using this paradigm (Grupe & Nitschke, 2011), this aim was to replicate evidence 
that participants self-report affect and perceptions of the pictures as more unpleasant when 
experienced under uncertainty. 
Neural Correlates of Emotional Appraisal during Informational Uncertainty.  Considerable 
research has linked the amygdalae to learning and fear expression (LeDoux, 1996), and many 
studies suggest amygdalae activity is increased during the appraisal of uncertainty (Davis and 
Whalen, 2001; Phelps and LeDoux, 2005; Rosen and Donley, 2006; Rosen and Schulkin, 1998; 
Whalen, 1998).  Informational uncertainty increases states of fear and anxiety and increases 
amygdalae activity in human (Bornhovd et al., 2002) and nonhuman primates (Belova, Patton, 
Morrison, & Salzman, 2007).  For example, activity in the amygdalae increases in the mere 
presence of unpredictability in both mice and humans.  In an otherwise innocuous context an 
unpredictable pattern of sound pulses was found to increase activity in the amygdalae and 
instigate avoidance-related behaviors in mice (Herry et al., 2007).  Additionally, these authors 
found that these identical sound patterns were shown to increase amygdalae activation and 
heighten attention bias to emotional faces in humans, an indicator of anxious arousal.  Another 
study found that the magnitude of associated uncertainty with aversion predicted increased 
activity in the amygdalae during the anticipation of uncertain outcomes (Sarinopoulos et al., 
2010). Under more complex conditions, such as during gambling tasks where the probability of a 
particular outcome is variable, amygdalae activity is also increased by the degree of uncertainty 
(Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs, Tranel, & Camerer, 2005; Levy, Snell, Nelson, Rustichini, & Glimcher, 
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2010).  While findings linking uncertainty with amygdalar activation are compelling, it should be 
highlighted that heightened activity in the amygdalae does not directly translate to increases in 
negative emotions.  While sometimes amygdalar activity indicates overt experiences of fear and 
anxiety, the consequences of amygdalar activation on cognitive and affective experience are 
largely controlled by regions of the prefrontal cortex (Whalen, 2007).   
 A recent meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies found that decisions made under 
conditions of risk and ambiguity had similar activation profiles involving sub-regions of the 
ACC and orbitofrontal cortices (OFC; Krain, Wilson, Arbuckle, Castellanos, & Milham, 2006).  
The ACC is a limbic structure involved in error detection, reinforcement learning (Holroyd & 
Coles, 2002; Luu, Tucker, Derryberry, Reed, & Poulsen, 2003), and the capacity to regulate 
cognitive and emotion responses (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000).  Increased ACC activity is 
directly associated with higher levels of physiological arousal when emotional stimuli are 
presented under conditions of informational uncertainty (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013; Sarinopoulos 
et al., 2010).  Moreover, when participants make decisions that could lead to a reward, the level 
of risk involved is directly related to activity in the anterior cingulate and orbitofrontal cortices 
during the period after a participant’s behavioral response and before feedback about the 
outcome (Critchley, Mathias, & Dolan, 2001; Harris, Sheth, & Cohen, 2008).  Importantly, 
activity in the ACC and orbitofrontal cortex increases linearly as the risk becomes ambiguous 
(Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs, Tranel, & Camerer, 2005).  In summary, considerable evidence suggests 
that well-defined neural responses involved in stimulus appraisal are altered following 
manipulations of informational uncertainty.  
Cortical evidence.  While a variety of neuroimaging studies have provided experimental 
evidence that informational uncertainty elicits patterns of brain activity related to heightened 
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states of physiological arousal following exposure to unpleasant stimuli (Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs, 
Tranel, & Camerer, 2005; Levy, Snell, Nelson, Rustichini, & Glimcher, 2010; Sarinopoulos et 
al., 2010), brain-based evidence from studies capturing event-related potentials (ERPs) have 
shown analogous effects (Hirsh & Inzlicht, 2008; Tritt, Peterson, and Inzlicht, under review). Of 
primary interest to the present study is a component known as the Late Positive Potential (LPP), 
an ERP measured at the surface of the scalp that is time locked to the presentation of emotional 
stimuli.    
The Late Positive Potential.  The LPP is a positive-going slow wave that is maximal over 
the centro-parietal midline in the 400 – 2000 ms latency range (Cuthbert, Schupp, Bradley, 
Birbaumer, & Lang, 2000).  LPPs are present in some studies for the entire duration that 
emotional stimuli are presented (e.g., up to 6 seconds; Foti & Hajcak, 2008; Hajcak & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2006), and can even extend after stimulus offset (Hajcak & Olvet, 2008).  LPP 
amplitudes are theorized to reflect sustained attentional allocation and attentional narrowing 
induced by stimuli that carry motivational relevance (Ferrari, Bradley, Codispoti and Lang, 
2011; Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2013; Hajcak and Olvet, 2008; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 
1997; Schupp et al., 2000; Weinberg and Hajcak, 2011).  The LPP is also sensitive to 
manipulations of stimulus meaning and top-down regulation of emotional appraisal processes 
(Blechert, Sheppes, Di Tella, Williams, & Gross, 2012; Hajcak & Nieuwenhuis, 2006), and there 
is evidence to suggest that the early time window of the LPP may more closely related to the 
motivational relevance of a stimulus, while later time windows reflect perceptions and 
evaluations of stimulus meaning (Schupp, Flaisch, Stockburger, & Jundhofer, 2006).  
Decades of experimental studies have elucidated factors that influence the LPP.  For 
example, the LPP is influenced by the context in which an emotional stimulus is presented 
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(Cacioppo et al., 1993). When negative stimuli are embedded within a larger sequence of 
positive stimuli, LPP amplitudes are increased.  This finding suggests that LPP amplitudes are 
amplified by evaluative inconsistency (Cacioppo et al., 1993).  The LPP is particularly sensitive 
to manipulations of attention.  For example, distraction manipulations that divert participants’ 
attention away from the arousing properties of a stimulus attenuate LPP amplitudes, as does the 
presentation of emotional stimuli in unattended locations of the visual field.  LPP amplitudes are 
also influenced by meaning evaluation, such that LPP amplitudes are blunted when participants 
receive descriptions of emotional picture stimuli that frame them in a more positive way (Foti & 
Hajcak, 2008). This reduction of LPP amplitude is even sustained when participants are re-
exposed to the stimulus 30 minutes later (MacNamara, Oschner, & Hajcak, 2011), which 
suggests that LPP amplitudes may be particularly sensitive to changes in stimulus appraisal.    
Moser et al. (2009) demonstrated the sensitivity of the LPP to a top-down appraisal 
manipulation by providing participants with instructions to use specific emotion regulation 
strategies to modify their emotional experiences during anticipation of emotional pictures.  Three 
conditions were deployed in the study.  On some trials participants were cued to view the 
pictures “as if from a detached, third person perspective” (reappraisal), while on other trials they 
were cued to “imagine [they] were personally partaking in the pictured events” (self-focused), or 
to simply view the pictures and respond naturally.   Results indicated that instructions to decrease 
emotional responses by reappraising the picture content were associated with attenuated LPP 
amplitudes (Moser et al., 2009).  In a similar study, Thiruchselvam et al. (2011) examined the 
modulation of the LPP following cues to engage in top-down emotion regulation strategies.  In 
this study participants received a cue to either (1) simply attend to the picture as normal (view 
and watch), (2) to distract themselves by “generating thought unrelated to the image presented on 
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the screen” (distraction), or (3) to “adopt the perspective of a detached observer” (reappraisal).  
Results indicated that instructions to distract or reappraise negative emotional stimuli were 
associated with an attenuated LPP compared to normal viewing.  However, these authors 
extended the previous findings of Moser et al (2009) by examining when these effect occurring 
during the time-course of the LPP.  The process model of emotion regulation suggests that 
attention-centric emotion regulation strategies have earlier influences than top-down reappraisal 
strategies (Gross, 1998).  Consistent with this theory, when participants were instructed to 
distract themselves from the emotional content, the LPP was modulated at an early time (as early 
as 300 ms), whereas instructions to reappraise modulated the LPP much later after stimulus 
exposure (1500 ms).  
Simultaneous recording of EEG and fMRI has implicated a network of brain regions that 
differentially generate and modulate the LPP based on stimulus valence, including the visual 
cortices, temporal cortices, amygdalae, orbitofrontal cortex, insula, and posterior cingulate cortex 
(Liu, Huang, McGinnis-Deweese, Keil, & Ding, 2012).  LPP amplitude is modulated by beta-
adrenergic receptor activity in the amygdalae, which exerts downstream effects in visual cortical 
areas (de Rover et al., 2012). Other studies have suggested the LPP arises due to a global 
inhibition of activity in the visual cortex that has been linked to an extended processing duration 
for an emotional stimulus (Brown, van Steenbergen, Band, de Rover, & Nieuwenhuis, 2012). 
This is convergent with findings that increases in LPP amplitude are associated with slower 
reaction times during cognitive tasks and interference with attention-related ERPs on the 
subsequent trials (Weinberg and Hajcak, 2011). 
Substantial research has indicated that LPP amplitudes are modulated by motivationally 
salient emotional stimuli compared to neutral stimuli (Ferrari, Bradley, Codispoti and Lang, 
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2011; Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2013; Hajcak, Weinberg, MacNamara, & Foti, 2012; Keil et al., 
2001; Oolofsson, Nordin, Sequeira, & Polich, 2008).  LPP amplitudes are highest for affective 
stimuli that are directly related to biological imperatives, particularly threat and reproduction 
(Weinberg and Hajcak, 2010).  Several studies have indicated that LPP amplitudes are reduced 
by top-down control over attention and emotional responses, such as when participants are 
instructed to deliberately focus their attention to non-arousing features of a stimulus (Hajcak et 
al., 2001), or to engage in cognitive reappraisal or distraction in reference to emotionally charged 
images (Thiruchselvam, Blechert, Sheppes, Rydstrom, & Gross, 2011) or facial expressions 
(Blechert, Sheppes, Di Tella, Williams, & Gross, 2012; Hajcak and Nieuwenhuis, 2006; 
MacNamara, Ochsner, & Hajcak, 2011).  The LPP is also sensitive to cultural differences in 
emotional suppression (Murata, Moser, & Kitayama, 2012).  Additional evidence suggests the 
modulating influence of stimulus valence on the LPP reflects rapid processing driven specifically 
by a current focal stimulus, and are not influenced by the valence of stimuli presented on 
preceding trials (Schupp, Schmälzle, Flaisch, Weike, & Hamm, 2013).   
Of central importance to the present study, LPP amplitudes are increased when people 
confront a variety of distinct threats, including uncertainty, which further supports the LPP as a 
robust measure of stimulus appraisal.  For example, LPP amplitudes are increased when spider-
phobic individuals are presented with spider-related stimuli (Schienle, Schäfer, and Nauman, 
2008).  The experience of acute stress has been found to bias stimulus processing toward 
unpleasant cues, as measured by heightened LPP amplitude (Weymar, Schwabe Löw, & Hamm, 
2012).  LPP amplitudes are also amplified when participants engage in proximal defenses against 
existential threats, such as death (Klackl, Jonas, & Kronbichler, 2013). Most importantly, when 
participants’ are exposed to stimuli that increase uncertainty (e.g., ambiguous facial expressions), 
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LPP amplitude is increased compared to unambiguous positive and negative emotional stimuli 
(Tritt, Peterson, and Inzlicht, under review).   
Specific aim 2.  An incipient body of neuroimaging and ERP evidence indicates that 
uncertainty modulates neurological activity associated with the appraisal of aversive stimuli 
presented under conditions of uncertainty (Davis and Whalen, 2001; Phelps and LeDoux, 2005; 
Rosen and Donley, 2006; Rosen and Schulkin, 1998; Sarinopoulos et al., 2010; Whalen, 1998), 
including a post-stimulus marker of emotional appraisal known as the LPP (Tritt, Peterson, and 
Inzlicht, under review).  The second specific aim of the present study is to determine whether 
emotional appraisal as indexed by the LPP is largest for aversive stimuli presented following 
uncertainty about the nature of an emotional image stimulus, compared to when participants 
know that an upcoming emotional image stimulus will be aversive (see Figure 1, Specific Aim 
2).  After conducting a region of interest analysis to determine that the LPP is modulated by 
affective picture content at electrode locations consistent with past research, I will examine 
whether uncertainty about a forthcoming stimulus increases LPP amplitude following exposure 
to aversive and neutral image stimuli.   
Mindfulness and Emotional Appraisal 
Ancient Buddhist and contemporary Western descriptions of mindfulness highlight 
heightened attention and awareness of the present as a primary defining feature (Brown & Ryan, 
2003; Bodhi, 2011).  As a mode of attention deployment, mindfulness involves establishing open 
and receptive attention to internal and external experiences as they occur in the present moment 
(Anālayo, 2003; 2013; Bishop, 2002; Bodhi, 2011; Brown & Ryan, 2003; Dreyfus, 2011; Dunne, 
2011; Kabat-Zinn, 1994).  Said differently, mindfulness involves maintaining an “equanimous 
receptivity” to whatever occurs in present moment experience (Anālayo, 2003; 2014; Bodhi, 
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2011).  Rather than preferencing or evaluating certain experiences, mindfulness involves simply 
remaining aware of what occurs (Teasdale, 1999), including unpleasant experiences.  This is not 
to say that thoughts, appraisals, and judgments do not arise during states of mindfulness, or that 
pleasant and unpleasant experiences are avoided (or approached).  A characteristic that 
exemplifies the receptive nature of mindfulness involves allowing the stream of emotions, 
thoughts, and appraisals – whatever arises in awareness -- to take their course through awareness.   
This capacity to grant all experiences equal time on the stage of awareness promotes a more 
balanced, empirical perspective toward the data of immediate experience (Brown, Ryan, & 
Creswell, 2007), such that the full-range of experiences is allowed, including those experiences 
we are motivated to avoid, such as uncertainty.    This mindful orientation enables one to watch 
the unfolding of subjective states from the perspective of an observer, rather than getting carried 
away by the flow of thoughts and ongoing commentary about experience (Brown and Ryan, 
2003; Kabat-Zinn, 1990). 
Clinical perspectives on mindfulness propose that this heightened receptivity promotes 
psychological and behavioral flexibility such that clients are better able to stay with and witness 
aversive experiences, rather than avoid them, and thereby promotes more autonomous, skillful 
responses (Follette et al., 2006; Greeson et al., 2009).  Mindfulness has been incorporated into 
several evidence-based therapies to enhance the effective treatment of psychopathology due to 
these adaptive regulatory benefits (Didonna, 2009), including Mindfulness-Based Stress 
Reduction (MBSR; Kabat-Zinn, 1990), Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993), 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, 2005) and Mindfulness-Based Cognitive 
Therapy (MBCT; Segal et al., 2002).  A number of meta-analytic reviews support the efficacy of 
mindfulness-based therapies for the treatment of several psychological disorders, including those 
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that covary with maladaptive responses to uncertainty, such as generalized anxiety disorder and 
depression (Bohlmeijer, Prenger, Taal, & Cuijpers, 2010; Hofmann, Sawyer, Witt & Oh, 2010; 
Piet & Hougaard, 2011; Vollestad, Nielsen, & Nielsen, 2012).   
Mindfulness is theorized to promote greater receptivity to affective states, and as a 
consequence, heightened sensitivity to interoceptive cues that indicate the need to regulate 
emotions (Teper, Segal, & Inzlicht, 2013). The burgeoning scientific literature on mindfulness is 
beginning to provide behavioral evidence for these emotion regulatory outcomes.  For example, 
mindfulness training has been shown to improve the self-regulation of attention (Goldin et al., 
2009; Jha et al., 2007) and to promote a greater willingness to stay with and experience aversive 
emotional stimuli (Arch & Craske, 2006).  Dispositional mindfulness has been associated with 
adaptive responses to a variety of aversive emotional states, including social evaluative threat 
(Brown, Ryan, Creswell, & Niemiec, 2008; Brown, Weinstein, & Creswell, 2012), aversive 
socioemotional stimuli (Brown et al, 2013; Way et al., 2010; Taren, Creswell, and Gianaros, 
2013), and mortality salience (Kashdan, Afram, Brown, Birnbeck, & Drvoshanov, 2011; 
Niemiec et al., 2010).   
I theorize that mindfulness might also play a role in promoting adaptive emotional 
responses following uncertainty.  Anxious responses to uncertainty are perpetuated when people 
repetitively engage in future-oriented thinking about potentially negative uncertain outcomes 
(Grupe & Nitschke, 2013), and such exaggerated attempts to resolve uncertainty are antithetical 
to mindfulness.  Mindfulness is inherently present-oriented state during which affect is 
experienced in an open and receptive way, including negative affect (Arch & Craske, 2006).  
Dispositional mindfulness has been associated with lower levels of rumination, and lower levels 
of self-reported negative affect (Brown & Ryan, 2003).  Rather than attempting to change or 
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resolve uncertainty, a mindful approach involves confronting uncertainty receptively and 
observing the thoughts, feelings, and emotions that follow.  By dampening the tendency to 
manipulate and resolve uncertainty, mindfulness may promote more comfort with uncertainty 
and ameliorate the tendency for uncertainty to increase negative appraisals, indexed here by 
negative affect and picture ratings, following an uncertainty cue and subsequent exposure to 
aversive stimuli. 
Specific aim 3.   The third specific aim of the present study is to determine whether trait 
mindfulness will predict less unpleasant affect and stimulus ratings following the display of 
uncertain stimulus cues (see Figure 1, Specific Aim 3).  To address this aim I will test whether 
trait mindfulness lessens unpleasant affect after uncertain stimulus cues and aversive images.  I 
will also test whether trait mindfulness will predict less negative image ratings after uncertain 
stimulus cues and aversive images.  Additionally, to test the specificity of these questions 
concerning mindfulness, I will also examine whether traits that contrast with mindfulness, such 
as uncertainty distress and anxiety-related traits, will predict higher unpleasant affect and more 
negative image ratings following uncertainty stimulus cues and aversive images. 
Mindfulness and neural measures of emotional appraisal.  Evidence drawn from 
neuroimaging and ERP-related studies are consistent with behavioral studies by suggesting that 
mindfulness promotes adaptive responses to negative affective states.  Dispositional mindfulness 
as measured by the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003) has been 
associated with heightened activity in the prefrontal cortex and the down-regulation of 
amygdalae activity during states of rest (Way, Creswell, Eisenberger, & Lieberman., 2010), and 
following emotional threats (Creswell, Way, Eisenberger, & Lieberman, 2007; Frewen et al., 
2010; Modinos, Ormel, & Aleman, 2010), and has recently been associated with smaller right 
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amygdala volume (Taren et al., 2013).  Other studies have linked MAAS-measured dispositional 
mindfulness (Way et al., 2010) as well as mindfulness training (Hölzel et al., 2008) with neural 
activation in the orbitofrontal cortex, a brain region implicated in the processing of uncertainty 
(Hsu et al., 2005; Krain et al., 2006), emotional appraisal (Oschner & Gross, 2005; Davidson, 
2000), and the top-down regulation of amygdalae activity (Quirk and Beer, 2006).  Dispositional 
mindfulness has also been associated with cortical indicators that are thought to be generated in 
the ACC and are responsive to stimulus uncertainty, such as the Error-Related Negativity (Teper 
and Inzlicht, 2013) and Feedback Related Negativity (Teper and Inzlicht, in press).   
Mindfulness and the Late Positive Potential.  Mindfulness is theorized to reduce the 
influence of appetitive and defensive impulses on perceptions and thought (Davis and 
Thompson, in press; Anālayo, in press), and emerging studies on mindfulness and the LPP 
provide empirical support this perspective. Recent ERP evidence indicated that two measures of 
dispositional mindfulness – the MAAS and the FFMQ act with awareness subscale – predicted 
attenuated LPP responses elicited by highly arousing pleasant (e.g., erotica) and unpleasant (e.g., 
mutilations) motivationally salient emotional images (Brown, Goodman, & Inzlicht, 2013).  
Another study conducted by Sobolewski, Holt, Kublik, and Wrobel (2011) reported similar 
findings when comparing experienced meditators with meditation naïve participants.  That is, 
mindfulness practitioners showed reduced LPP deflections to unpleasant emotional stimuli 
compared to non-meditating controls.   
These dampening effects of mindfulness on LPP responses to aversive emotional stimuli 
can be observed as early as 400ms after stimulus contact, and this is particularly interesting in 
light of previous work on emotion regulation and the LPP.  As mentioned earlier (in the previous 
section on the LPP), studies have found that manipulations of attention (e.g., distraction) and 
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stimulus appraisal (e.g., taking a third person perspective) dampen LPP amplitudes to emotional 
picture content (Moser et al., 2009; Thiruchselvam et al., 2011).   When participants are 
instructed to distract themselves from the emotional content, the LPP is modulated at an early 
time (as early as 300 ms), whereas instructions to engage in top-down reappraisal of the 
emotional content modulated the LPP much later after stimulus exposure (1500 ms).  This is 
consistent with the process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998), which suggests that 
attention-related emotion regulation strategies have earlier influences than more effortful top-
down reappraisal strategies. That mindfulness has been shown to attenuate the LPP responses at 
such an early stage in the time-course of emotional processing suggests that this dampening 
effect is more likely the result of an attention-deployment strategy, rather than a more effortful, 
top-down emotion regulation strategy, and is consistent with the theoretical framework that the 
adaptive emotional responses to aversive stimuli result from a distinct way of deploying 
attention.    
  Specific aim 4.  This sensitivity of the LPP to uncertainty, emotional appraisal, and 
dispositional mindfulness suggests it is a viable window into the differences in emotional 
appraisal under conditions of uncertainty, as well as the moderation of this uncertainty 
amplification effect by dispositional mindfulness.  The fourth specific aim of the present study is 
to determine whether dispositional mindfulness is associated with attenuated LPP responses to 
aversive emotional stimuli under conditions of uncertainty (relative to certainty) during an early 
time window of the LPP (see Figure 1, Specific Aim 4).  To address this question I will test 
whether mindfulness is associated with lower deflections of the LPP following aversive images 
preceded by uncertainty relative to certainty cues across three time windows.  Additionally, to 
test the specificity of these questions concerning mindfulness, I will also examine whether traits 
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that contrast with mindfulness, such as uncertainty distress and anxiety-related traits, will predict 
higher LPP deflections elicited by aversive image uncertainty, relative to certainty stimulus cues. 
Informational Uncertainty and Emotional Anticipation. 
In the previous sections, evidence was reviewed that suggests that uncertainty can 
increase unpleasant affect and negative stimulus perceptions during the appraisal of aversive 
emotional stimuli (Grupe & Nitschke, 2010; Sarinopoulos, Dixon, Short, Davidson, & Nitschke, 
2006).  This heightening of unpleasantness by uncertainty is theorized to result, at least in part, 
from changes during the anticipation of uncertain future outcomes, and specifically the tendency 
to expect that uncertainty will lead to aversiveness (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013), a phenomenon 
known as covariation bias (Tomarken, Mineka and Cook, 1989).  In addition to replicating and 
extending past research on emotional appraisal following uncertainty, the present study will 
explore differences during anticipatory processing of emotional stimuli under conditions of 
uncertainty.   
Prior research using an identical experimental paradigm has provided evidence that 
suggests participants commonly demonstrate expectations for uncertainty to lead to aversive 
outcomes (Grupe & Nitschke, 2011).  Additional research indicates that uncertainty modifies 
activity in neural regions during the anticipation of emotional stimuli (for a review, see Grupe & 
Nitschke, 2013).  The present study will replicate and extend this existing body of evidence by 
examining self-reported expectations during states of uncertainty, as well as a cortical measure of 
emotional anticipation known as the Stimulus Preceding Negativity (SPN).  The SPN is an ERP 
measure thought to reflect the anticipation and the intensity of motivational engagement toward a 
forthcoming emotional stimulus (Moser et al., 2009; Poli, Sarlo, Bortoletto, Buodo, & Palomba, 
2007; Takeuchi, Mochizuki, Masaki, Takasawa, and Yamazaki, 2005).  Similar to the LPP, the 
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SPN is sensitive to the valence and arousal inducing properties of a stimulus (Howard, 
Longmore, & Mason, 1992; Poli et al., 2007), and the top-down modulation of stimulus 
meaning, or appraisal (Moser et al., 2009; Thiruchselvam et al., 2011). 
Finally, the present study will explore dispositional mindfulness as a psychological 
quality that moderates self-reported and cortical measures of emotional stimulus anticipation 
under conditions of uncertainty.  Mindfulness is expected to promote lower levels of covariation 
bias, and I will explore the relations between mindfulness and the SPN during emotional 
stimulus anticipation under conditions of uncertainty.  In the following section, I will discuss 
relevant scholarly literature on the relationship between uncertainty and worry, and will outline 
how prior expectations for uncertainty to lead to aversive outcomes can lead to maladaptive 
perceptual and affective responses to uncertainty.  After discussing the nature of uncertainty and 
anticipatory processes, I will outline my rationale for exploring the influence of mindfulness on 
anticipatory processing under conditions of uncertainty. 
Uncertainty and Worry.  The amplification of fear and aversion when faced with 
uncertainty can be debilitating, and can lead some people to worry excessively.  Uncertainty is 
considered a primary feature of worry, which is defined as a state of anxious concern focused on 
how uncertain future events will occur (Buhr and Dugas, 2002; MacLeod, Williams, & Bekerian, 
1991).  Worry about uncertainty future outcomes can become crippling when people have 
exaggerated expectations that uncertainty will lead to aversive outcomes, a phenomenon known 
as covariation bias (Grupe & Nitschke, 2010).  This heightened tendency to associate uncertainty 
with aversiveness commonly leads to maladaptive results in several life domains, such as health 
and finances (Camerer and Weber, 1992).   It is not surprising that uncertainty about potentially 
negative future outcomes can drive people to worry excessively.  Uncertainty signals that our 
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cognitive representations of the world are incomplete or inaccurate, and this can impair abilities 
to plan for and regulate responses to potentially negative future outcomes (Hirsh & Inzlicht, 
2008).  One way people detect and attempt to resolve uncertainty is through a process known as 
covariation assessment, and it is through this process that prior expectations and beliefs can 
begin to distort cognitive and affective responses to uncertainty in maladaptive ways. 
Covariation assessment.  People naturally develop elaborate cognitive representations to 
make sense of the world (Piaget, 1954), and these representations enable people to make the 
world seem coherent and meaningful (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006).  Our mental 
representations are particularly useful during anticipation, and allow for predictions and planning 
for potential future adversity when faced with uncertainty (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013).  When 
mental representations are recognized as lacking or inconsistent, people experience uncertainty 
and engage in various cognitive strategies to resolve it (Heine et al., 2006).  This exploration 
represents a major brick in the foundations of social psychology research conducted in the 
1950’s-1970’s.  For example, when people face uncertainty about their standing in relation to 
others, they become motivated to engage in social comparison to resolve their uncertainty 
(Festinger, 1958).  Similarly, when people are uncertain about the causes of others’ behavior 
they make causal attributions to understand the causes of their behavior (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 
1973).  When people simultaneously hold two conflicting ideas, they experience dissonance and 
become motivated to resolve the inconsistency (Festinger, 1957).  In each of these instances the 
source of uncertainty involves detecting and recognizing that our mental representations are 
lacking or inaccurate.   
Covariation assessment is a process used for detecting the relations between stimuli, 
behaviors, and outcomes (for reviews see Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984; Crocker, 1981).  This 
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capacity to anticipate the future clearly serves an adaptive function as a way to make sense of 
past events, control the present, prepare for the future, obtain goals, and avoid negative 
outcomes.   However, when people hold inaccurate beliefs or expectations about a situation, or 
how the future will unfold, this information can bias the outcome of covariation assessment 
processes and lead to predictions that are not in line with objective situational information. 
Biased expectations.  There is a substantial body of evidence that suggests people are 
notoriously poor at predicting future outcomes (Cordray & Shaw, 1978; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1973; Nisbett & Ross, 1980).  One common reason for such prediction errors is that the 
expectations people hold about a situation are heavily weighted and can distort perceptions of the 
situation.   When our expectations are in line with objective situational information our 
predictions about future outcomes are typically more accurate than when our expectations are 
divergent from objective situational information.  One reason for this is that our expectations can 
distort our covariation estimates, and any predictions we make based on those estimates will 
overwhelmingly reflect our preconceived notions and expectations, rather than the objective 
situation (Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984; Hastorf & Cantril, 1954; Nisbett & Ross, 1980).  For 
example, when participants are asked to estimate the covariation between two dichotomous 
variables, their covariation estimates indicate utilization of only the information that they 
personally deem important, even when information that would disconfirm the covariation is 
manipulated to be more salient (Arkes & Harkness, 1983).  This distorting influence of prior 
expectations becomes even more prominent under conditions of ambiguity.  When people are 
placed in ambiguous situations and have no objective information on which to base covariation 
judgments, predictions depend primarily on prior expectations.  That is, pre-existing beliefs and 
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expectations profoundly influence our predictions about future outcomes when faced with 
uncertainty and distort perceptions and affective states.  
The expectations we bring to bear on our experiences have important implications for 
perceptual, affective, and cognitive processes. For example, in a study by Nitschke et al. (2006), 
participants who were led to think a substance would taste better than they expected reported 
lower aversion than participants who received accurate information.  Expectations for more 
pleasant taste increased the activation of taste-related brain regions, and these changes in brain 
activation were corroborated with subjective reports of increased pleasantness.   This evidence 
suggests that very basic perceptual processes can be influenced by expectations (Nitschke et al., 
2006).  Other similar studies have found that manipulating participants’ expectancies can bias 
olfactory and gustatory stimuli (de Araujo, Rolls, Velazco, Margot, & Cayeux, 2005) and  
aesthetic judgments of art and wine (Kirk, Skov, Hulme, Christensen, & Zeke, 2009). The most 
robust evidence comes from the widely known placebo effect found in drug studies and the 
treatment of pain, in which participants’ expectations have been shown to influence perceptions 
of treatment outcome.  What is key about the findings from these studies is that expectations can 
exert a powerful influence on and distort perceptual processes.   
Covariation biases.  When uncertainty elicits expectations for unpleasantness, the 
anticipation and attempts to resolve uncertainty can become exaggerated, and become a potent 
source of anxiety (Grupe, Oathes, & Nitschke, 2011; Kagan, 1972).  Anxious responses under 
conditions of uncertainty can lead to heightened expectations for aversion and distort the process 
of covariation assessment.  The tendency to associate uncertainty with aversive outcomes is a 
type of covariation bias (Tomarken, Mineka and Cook, 1989), and research has implicated 
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covariation bias as a strong factor that contributes to the development of clinical anxiety 
disorders (Barlow, 2000; Borkovec, 2002).    
Human and non-human primates are biologically predisposed to selectively associate 
particular stimuli and situations with aversiveness (e.g., blood and injury; Cook and Mineka, 
1990; Pury and Mineka, 1997).  While most people selectively associate threatening stimuli with 
aversive outcomes (Cook and Mineka, 1990), these effects are exaggerated among people with 
heightened anxiety and fear (Davey and Dixon, 1995). When selective associations become 
exaggerated, such as when uncertainty evokes heightened levels of fear and anxiety, they can 
play a central role in the etiology and maintenance of anxiety. Covariation bias is central to this 
process (Davey, 1992; 1995).  A growing body of research has demonstrated that the presence of 
covariation bias can amplify the experience of fear (De Jong, Van den Hout, & Mercklebach, 
1995).  Exaggerated covariation assessments are thought to develop from experiencing a 
negative event that evokes anxiety, and the degree of anxiety elicited determines how strong the 
covariation bias will become (Pauli, Wiedemann, Dengler, & Kühlkamp, 2001).   
Three distinct types of covariation bias are commonly studied in literature on anxiety 
(and will be measured in the proposed research):  a priori covariation bias, online covariation 
bias, and a posteriori (or post-experiment) covariation bias.    
A priori covariation bias.  A priori covariation bias reflects a general baseline tendency 
to associate a stimulus with aversiveness prior at the outset of an experiment, when participants 
have no foreknowledge about the actual probability of co-occurrence between uncertainty and 
aversive outcomes.  Studies examining  a priori covariation bias have found that people with 
social phobia have a heightened a priori covariation bias to associate angry facial expressions 
with aversive experience, compared to non-phobics (Garner, Mogg, & Bradley, 2006; Hermann, 
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Ofer & Flor, 2004).  Additional research suggests a priori covariation biases may be the outcome 
of prior states of anxiety in the context of uncertainty (Wiedemann, Pauli, & Dengler, 2001).   
Online covariation bias.  A second type of distorted covariation assessment is known as 
online covariation bias or expectancy bias, which refers to heightened expectations that one will 
receive a threatened aversive stimulus (UCS; such as an electrical shock or startle probe), more 
frequently following the presentation of a threatening stimulus (CS) compared to an innocuous 
stimulus (Davey, 1992; 1995).   Exposure to fear-relevant stimuli has been found to increase 
online expectancy ratings and skin conductance responses, and a posteriori (post-experiment) 
estimates of covariation bias (Amin & Lovibond, 1997).  Across numerous studies, expectancy 
bias has been associated with trait anxiety (Chan and Lovilond, 1996).  It has been suggested that 
online expectancy bias is related to deficits in threat appraisal and may contribute to the non-
specific fear that is characteristic of anxiety disorders (Boddez et al., 2011).  Online expectancy 
bias has been associated with the persistence of PTSD symptoms among soldiers returning from 
Iraq (Engelhard, de Jong, van den Hout, & Overveld, 2009), and online expectancy ratings are 
resistant to extinction in phobics (de Jong and Merckelbach, 1993). 
A posteriori covariation bias.  The third type of covariation bias involves the tendency to 
hold inflated retrospective (post-experiment) estimates of the co-occurance between two stimuli, 
usually a negative stimulus and an aversive outcome (Chapman and Chapman, 1969; Tomarken, 
Mineka, & Cook, 1989).  However, the valence dimension of emotional stimuli may not be the 
primary stimulus dimension that drives the development of a posteriori covariation biases.  Using 
a fear potentiated startle paradigm, Witvliet and Vrana, (2000) found that the arousal inducing 
properties of a stimulus may be more important to the development of biased post-experiment 
estimates than the valence of the stimulus.   
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Pathological anxiety and phobias are strongly linked with biased post-experiment 
covariation estimates.  Contamination phobic individuals associate the co-occurance of 
contamination stimuli with aversive outcomes more than non-phobic individuals (Connolly, 
Lohr, Olatunji, Hahn, & Williams, 2009), and people with social phobia exhibit higher a 
posteriori covariation bias between social cues and negative outcomes (Herman, Ofer & Flor, 
2004).  Additionally, changes in the degree of covariation bias are an important indicator for 
psychological treatment.  For example, a posteriori covariation biases are reduced among 
phobics who undergo behavioral treatment (de Jong and Merkelbach, 1993), and people with 
higher levels of a posteriori covariation bias toward spiders immediately following treatment are 
more likely to relapse after treatment and continue experiencing exaggerated fear of spiders (de 
Jong, van den Hout, & Merckelbach, 1995).   
Specific aim 5.  A recent study by Grupe and Nitschke (2011) demonstrated a priori and 
online covariation biases in response to stimulus uncertainty using the same paradigm as in the 
present study.   Using a nearly identical paradigm, Sarinopoulos et. al (2010) found that 
uncertainty-related a posteriori covariation bias was associated with neural regions involved in 
the regulation of aversive experience.  More specifically, they discovered that unpleasant stimuli 
preceded by uncertainty cues induced greater amygdalae activation than unpleasant images 
preceded by certainty cues.  In line with other research described above, these studies suggest 
that covariation biases may predict the degree to which uncertainty amplifies unpleasant affect 
and unpleasant stimulus perceptions following aversive stimuli. 
The fifth aim of the present research was to replicate past research that demonstrates that 
a priori and online covariation bias amplify unpleasant affect and stimulus ratings following the 
display of unpleasant stimuli under conditions of uncertainty.  After checking whether 
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participants demonstrated significant a priori and online covariation biases, I examined the 
following two questions associated with specific aim 5 (see Figure 1, specific aim 5).  Do 
expectations to associate uncertain cues with an unpleasant outcome (a priori and online 
covariation bias) predict more unpleasant affect after image exposure?  Do expectations to 
associate uncertain cues with unpleasant outcomes (a priori and online covariation bias) predict 
more unpleasant image ratings after image exposure?  I also examined whether a posteriori 
expectations to associate uncertain cues with aversive outcomes would be related to more 
unpleasant affect and image ratings after image exposure.  In line with past research (Grupe & 
Nitschke, 2011), I did not expect that these a posteriori expectations would be associated with 
affect and image ratings. 
Informational Uncertainty and Neural Correlates of Anticipation.  A variety of 
neuroimaging studies provide experimental evidence that informational uncertainty elicits 
patterns of brain activity during anticipation that relates to downstream increases in physiological 
arousal during the anticipation of a reward/loss (Critchley, Mathias, & Dolan, 2001). In this 
study, Critchley et al. (2001) participants were presented with a playing card and asked to guess 
whether the next card would be higher or lower (S1) before receiving performance feedback 
indicating a monetary reward or loss (S2).  Neural activity in the ACC and orbitofrontal cortex 
was modulated by the degree of outcome uncertainty, and increases in ACC activity were 
directly related to higher autonomic arousal as measured by galvanic skin response.  These 
results are consistent with a recent meta-analysis that has associated the anticipation of 
performance feedback following decisions made under conditions of risk and ambiguity with the 
modulation of activity in the anterior cingulate and orbitofrontal cortices (Krain et al., 2006).  
Cortical measures of stimulus anticipation have also been identified that are sensitive to 
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manipulations of uncertainty (Brown, Seymour, Boyl, El-Deredy, & Jones, 2007) and emotional 
arousal (Moser et al., 2009; Poli, Sarlo, Bortoletto, Buodo, & Palomba, 2007; Takeuchi, 
Mochizuki, Masaki, Takasawa, and Yamazaki, 2005). 
The Stimulus Preceding Negativity.  The stimulus preceding negativity (SPN; also 
known as the non-motor contingent negative variation; Brunia & Damen, 1988) is a negative 
deflection of the stimulus-locked ERP that occurs during periods of emotional anticipation for a 
forthcoming stimulus (van Boxtel & Böcker, 2004).  It is typically elicited using an S1-S2 
paradigm, where S1 is a neutral cue that signals the display S2, which is commonly an emotional 
stimulus (Hajcak, Weinberg, MacNamara, & Foti, 2012).  When the duration between S1 and S2 
is sufficiently long (> 2s), the SPN can be divided into distinct subcomponents.  An early SPN 
that occurs within the first 1000 ms is commonly called the orienting wave, and is thought to 
reflect the processing of S1 (Connor and Lang, 1969). There is a later component that reaches its 
negative maximum just before the display of S2, called the anticipatory wave (Weerts and Lang, 
1973), and this component is thought to reflect heightened preparatory processing or attentional 
orienting toward an upcoming stimulus.  
 In paradigms where S2 would require some sort of motor response from the participant, 
the SPN reflects preparation for a motor response.  But when no motor response is required, the 
component is thought to reflect the anticipation and the intensity of motivational engagement 
toward a forthcoming emotional stimulus (Moser et al., 2009; Poli, Sarlo, Bortoletto, Buodo, & 
Palomba, 2007; Takeuchi, Mochizuki, Masaki, Takasawa, and Yamazaki, 2005).   Early studies 
of the SPN found significantly greater deflections during the anticipation of impending shock 
(Irwin et al., 1966; Rockstroh, Elbert, Sanavan, Lutzenberger, & Birbaumer, 1989), aversive 
noise (Regan & Howard, 1995) and unpleasant emotional pictures (Klorman & Ryan, 1980).  
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Furthermore, SPN amplitude has been correlated with other autonomic measures, such as heart 
rate and fear-potentiated startle (Baas et al., 2002) 
Similar to the LPP, the SPN has been consistently found to be larger during anticipation 
of emotionally evocative stimuli (Simons et al., 1979), with larger negative deflections of the 
wave preceding unpleasant, but not pleasant pictures.  Additional evidence has indicated the SPN 
is highly sensitive to the arousal inducing properties of the stimulus.  For instance, Poli et al. 
(2007) manipulated both stimulus valence and arousal dimensions, and found the SPN 
deflections were larger (more negative) for images with higher normative arousal ratings.  Also 
similar to the LPP, emerging evidence supports the theory that SPN deflections may reflect the 
motivational relevance of the picture content represented at S2, rather than the valence of an 
upcoming stimulus.  Evidence for this assertion comes from studies where the SPN is larger for 
positive emotional stimuli that are highly arousing and motivationally salient, such as erotica 
(Howard, Longmore, & Mason, 1992).    
One study of the SPN that is directly relevant to the present research was conducted to 
examine the influence of uncertainty and expectations on SPN amplitudes during the anticipation 
of pain induced by a heat stimulus (Brown, Seymour, Boyl, El-Deredy, & Jones, 2007).  
Expectancy ratings were found to influence SPN-measured anticipation, such that higher 
expectations of pain were associated with larger deflections of the SPN.  In addition, 
participants’ ratings of the pain were directly associated with their prior expectations. 
 More recent studies of the SPN during anticipation of emotional stimuli are beginning to 
emerge that examine how top-down influences on emotion modulate the component.  As already 
discussed, Moser et al. (2009) provided participants with instructions to use specific emotion 
regulation strategies to modify their emotional experiences during the anticipation of emotional 
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pictures.  Three conditions were deployed in the study.  On some trials participants were cued to 
view the pictures “as if from a detached, third person perspective” (reappraisal), while on other 
trials they were cued to “imagine [they] were personally partaking in the pictured events” (self-
focused), or to simply view the pictures and respond naturally.   Results indicated that 
instructions to decrease emotional responses by reappraising the picture content were associated 
with significantly larger (more negative) deflections of the SPN to unpleasant emotional stimuli, 
compared to viewing these unpleasant stimuli in a self-focused way.  The authors suggested that 
this finding reflects that attempts to down-regulate emotion through reappraisal was associated 
with enhanced orienting and less negative anticipation of the upcoming picture. 
In a related study, and as also discussed previously, Thiruchselvam et al. (2011) 
examined the modulation of SPN following cues to engage in top-down emotion regulation 
strategies.  In this study participants received a cue to either (1) simply attend to the picture as 
normal (view and watch), (2) to distract themselves by “generating thought unrelated to the 
image presented on the screen” (distraction), or (3) to “adopt the perspective of a detached 
observer” (reappraisal).  To determine whether participants were following the distraction 
instructions appropriately and not turning away from the emotional stimuli before it was 
presented, they examined the SPN, and found that cues to engage in distraction from the stimulus 
were associated with larger SPN amplitudes compared to the no-regulation instruction 
conditions. That participants had a higher SPN indicates that they were anticipating and orienting 
their attention towards the impending unpleasant stimulus before it was displayed 
(Thiruchselvam et al., 2011), and subsequently distracting themselves. 
Specific aim 6.  Research on the SPN suggests that the component reflects processes 
involved in the anticipation of motivationally relevant emotional stimuli, including the orienting 
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of attention toward the forthcoming stimulus.  Similar to the LPP, the SPN is reliability elicited 
in response to highly arousing unpleasant stimuli, and has been shown to be sensitive to 
manipulations of expectation under conditions of stimulus uncertainty. Taken together, this 
evidence suggests that the SPN may be a valuable cortical marker to assess the influence of 
uncertainty on emotional stimulus anticipation.  The sixth specific aim of the present study was 
to explore whether a cortical marker of pre-stimulus emotional anticipation known as the SPN 
increased following uncertain relative to certain-aversive and neutral stimulus cues (see Figure 1, 
specific aim 6).  To replicate past research that has found the SPN sensitive to cueing 
information about the nature of an upcoming emotional stimulus, I will examine whether neutral, 
aversive, and uncertain stimulus cues indicating a subsequent stimuli is aversive will increase 
deflections of the SPN compared to cues indicating the stimulus will be neutral.  I expect 
aversive and uncertainty cues to elicit higher SPN amplitudes than neutral cues, which would 
reflect heightened anticipation for the forthcoming emotional stimulus. 
Mindfulness and Anticipation. 
While I am aware of no existing evidence indicating that mindfulness would reduce 
covariation bias, the suggestion that mindfulness would attenuate covariation bias is consistent 
with current theoretical perspectives of the construct.  One reason mindfulness may reduce 
covariation bias is due to its empirical orientation toward the facts of present-moment 
experience.  Rather than engaging in thought about experiences, a mindful mode of processing is 
“similar to that of the objective scientist seeking accurate knowledge of some phenomenon” 
(Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007, pp. 214). From this perspective, mindfulness should promote a 
greater willingness to stay with experiences that people are frequently motivated to avoid, such 
as uncertainty.  In this way, mindfulness may function as a type of exposure (Arch & Craske, 
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2006). When people avoid uncertainty they are less likely to learn that uncertainty is not always 
associated with aversive outcomes.  By exposing oneself to the full experience of uncertainty, a 
person is more likely to learn that uncertainty does not always lead to unpleasantness, and could 
slow the development of online covariation bias, as well as weaken existing ones (a priori 
covariation bias). 
 Specific aim 7.  The seventh specific aim of the present study was to explore whether 
trait mindfulness will predict lower levels of a priori and online covariation bias.  To address this 
aim I ask the following research questions.  First, is trait mindfulness related to lower a priori 
expectations for uncertainty cues to be followed by aversive images (less a priori covariation 
bias)?  Second, is trait mindfulness associated with lower online expectations for uncertainty 
cues to be followed by aversive pictures (less online covariation bias)?  To increase confidence 
in any mindfulness-related findings, analogous tests will be conducted to explore whether traits 
that contrast with mindfulness – such as  measures of uncertainty distress, including intolerance 
for uncertainty and emotional responses to uncertainty, and  anxiety-related traits, including 
neuroticism, worry, and depression – will predict opposite associations with a priori and online 
covariation biases. 
 Mindfulness and the neural correlates of anticipation.  The majority of research on 
mindfulness and anticipatory processing to date comes from studies that have explored the 
influence of mindfulness on the perception of pain (Gard et al., 2012; Kingston et al., 2007; 
Grant and Rainville, 2009; Perlman et al., 2010; Zeidan et al., 2010; 2011).  While anticipation 
of pain and emotion are distinct, they both induce anticipatory arousal and modulate brain 
activity in similar regions, and it has been suggested that anticipation of pain and emotion have 
similar mechanisms of action (Wiech et al., 2008).  Gard et al. (2012) found that mindfulness 
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practitioners were able to reduce anxious arousal during anticipation of unpleasant electrical 
shock by 29% during a mindful state, and this reduction was associated with increased rostral 
anterior cingulate cortex activity.  A second study found that experienced meditators self-report 
the same pain intensity as controls, but less unpleasantness, and enhanced habituation in the 
amygdalae and the anterior mid-cingulate during the anticipation of pain (Lutz, McFarlin, 
Perlman, Salomans, & Davidson, 2012).One potential mechanism for this pain reduction 
involves differences in anticipatory processing.  Mindfulness is theorized to reduce the influence 
of expectations on pain due to decreased cognitive elaboration on sensory feedback (Zeidan et 
al., 2011).   
Specific aim 8.  While no research exists (to my knowledge) linking trait mindfulness 
with the modulation of SPN amplitude, past research has shown the SPN is sensitive to cue 
valence (Poli et al., 2007; Howard, Longmore, & Mason, 1992), attention deployment, and 
instructions to engage in top-down emotion regulation strategies (Moser et al., 2009; 
Thiruchselvam, 2011), as well as uncertainty (Brown, Seymour et al., 2007; Tritt, Peterson, & 
Inzlicht, under review).  Trait mindfulness has been show to decrease attention-related ERPs that 
are sensitive to emotional stimuli (Quaglia, Goodman, & Brown, under review).  Thus, the 
eighth and final aim of the present study was to explore the relation of trait mindfulness to 
emotional stimulus anticipation by examining SPN amplitudes elicited by each type of stimulus 
cue (see Figure 1, Specific Aim 8).   This investigation will be guided by two questions.  First, is 
trait mindfulness associated with attenuated SPN amplitudes following uncertain, aversive 
relative to neutral stimulus cues?  Second, to test the specificity of these questions concerning 
mindfulness, I will also examine whether traits that contrast with mindfulness (uncertainty 
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distress and anxiety-related traits) will predict larger SPN amplitudes elicited by uncertain and 
aversive cues, relative to neutral cues. 
The Present Research 
Uncertainty has been shown to amplify unpleasant experiences, and considerable 
evidence suggests anxiety is increased when emotional stimuli are preceded by uncertainty cues 
(Sarinopolous et al., 2010; Grupe et al., 2011).  Research conducted using an identical paradigm 
as in the present study has provided evidence for this uncertainty amplification using self-
reported expectations, stimulus ratings, peripheral nervous system (Grupe et al., 2011) and 
neuroimaging measures (Sarinopoulos et al., 2010).  The present research will attempt to 
replicate effects from Grupe & Nitschke (2011) by demonstrating the influence of uncertainty-
cues on self-reported emotional anticipation and appraisal.  Second, the present study will 
attempt to extend this past research by capturing cortical measures of stimulus appraisal (the 
LPP) and anticipation (the SPN) that past research has indicated are sensitive to motivational 
relevance of a stimulus (Carretie et al., 2001; 2004; Cuthbert et al., 2000; Moser et al., 2009; 
Poli, Sarlo, Bortoletto, Buodo, & Palomba, 2007; Schupp et al., 2003; Takeuchi, Mochizuki, 
Masaki, Takasawa, and Yamazaki, 2005) and manipulations of uncertainty (Tritt, Peterson, & 
Inzlicht, under review; Brown, Seymour et al., 2007).  Third, the present study will explore 
dispositional mindfulness as a psychological quality that dampens self-reported and cortical 
measures of negative emotional stimulus appraisal and anticipation under conditions of 
uncertainty.  
The specific aims of the present study and their associated events in the trial structure of 
the cued image task are depicted in Figure 1.  Participants observed one of three types of 
anticipatory cues [neutral (O), aversive (X), or uncertain (?)] before the presentation of an 
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aversive or neutral image.  In between the cue and the image stimulus, participants were asked to 
rate how much they expected the subsequent stimulus will be pleasant vs. unpleasant, and after 
the image was displayed they were asked to rate either the valence of the picture, or their 
emotional state on Likert scales. The experimental paradigm collected all three measures of 
covariation bias described above, namely a priori, online, and a posteriori covariation biases.  
Specific aim 1. Several studies have demonstrated that unpredictable threats are more 
anxiety provoking and elicit greater physiological responses than the same threats when they are 
predictable (Bar-Anan, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2009; Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004; Grupe & 
Nitschke, 2011; Hirsch & Inzlicht, 2008; Kimmel, 1967; Nader & Belleine, 2007; Sarinopoulos 
et al., 2010).  Moreover, when people associate uncertainty with aversive outcomes, these biased 
expectations can influence how unpleasant stimuli are appraised (Grupe & Nitschke, 2011; 
Sarinopoulos, Dixon, Short, Davidson, & Nitschke, 2006).  The first specific aim of the present 
study was to replicate the findings that stimuli presented under conditions of uncertainty elicit 
greater self-reported unpleasant affect and unpleasant stimulus ratings compared when the nature 
of the emotional stimulus is known.  After checking to determine participants understood the 
nature of the stimulus cues, I examined the following questions: 
 Question 1.1.  When aversive and neutral images are preceded by uncertainty cues 
do they elicit more negative appraisals (higher unpleasant affect) after exposure to 
the image than neutral and aversive images preceded by certainty cues? 
 Question 1.2.    When aversive and neutral images are preceded by uncertainty 
cues do they elicit more negative appraisals (higher unpleasant stimulus ratings) 
after exposure to the image than neutral and aversive images preceded by 
certainty cues? 
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Specific aim 2.  An emerging body of neuroscientific evidence indicates that uncertainty 
also modulates neurological activity involved during the appraisal of aversive stimuli presented 
under conditions of uncertainty (Davis and Whalen, 2001; Phelps and LeDoux, 2005; Rosen and 
Donley, 2006; Rosen and Schulkin, 1998; Sarinopoulos et al., 2010; Whalen, 1998), including a 
post-stimulus marker of attention and emotional appraisal known as the LPP (Tritt, Peterson, and 
Inzlicht, under review).  The second specific aim of the present study was to determine whether 
emotional appraisal as indexed by the LPP is largest for aversive and neutral stimuli presented 
following uncertainty cues, relative to certainty cues.  After conducting a region of interest 
analysis to determine that the LPP is modulated by affective picture content at electrode 
locations consistent with past research, I examined the following questions: 
 Question 2.1.  Do certain and uncertain aversive images elicit larger LPP 
amplitudes than certain and uncertain neutral images? 
 Question 2.2.  Do uncertainty-cued aversive and neutral images elicit larger LPP 
amplitudes than certainty-cued aversive and neutral stimuli? 
Specific aim 3.   The third specific aim of the present study was to determine whether 
trait mindfulness would predict more benign appraisals - less unpleasant affect and less 
unpleasant stimulus ratings - following the display of uncertain stimulus cues.  To address this 
aim I examined the following questions: 
 Question 3.1.  Does trait mindfulness predict lower unpleasant affect following 
uncertainty-cued aversive and neutral images compared to certainty-cued 
aversive and neutral images?  
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 Question 3.2.  Does trait mindfulness predict lower unpleasant stimulus ratings 
following uncertainty-cued aversive and neutral images compared to certainty-
cued aversive and neutral images? 
 Question 3.3.  Do traits that contrast with mindfulness (measures of uncertainty 
distress and anxiety-related traits) predict higher unpleasant affect following 
uncertainty-cued aversive and neutral images compared to certainty-cued 
aversive and neutral images?  
 Question 3.4.  Do traits that contrast with mindfulness predict higher unpleasant 
stimulus ratings following uncertainty-cued aversive and neutral images 
compared to certainty-cued aversive and neutral images?  
Specific aim 4.  The fourth specific aim of the present study was to determine whether 
dispositional mindfulness would predict attenuated LPP responses to aversive relative to neutral 
emotional stimuli under conditions of uncertainty and certainty, during an early time period 
(500-1000ms) of the LPP.  To address this aim I examined the following questions: 
 Question 4.1.  Is trait mindfulness associated with lower deflections of the LPP 
following aversive images relative to neutral images when preceded by 
uncertainty and certainty cues?   
 Question 4.2.  Do traits that contrast with mindfulness predict higher LPP 
deflections elicited by aversive images relative to neutral images when preceded 
by uncertainty and certainty cues? 
Specific aim 5.  Empirical evidence suggests that anticipatory, covariation biases may 
predict the degree to which uncertainty amplifies of unpleasant affect and unpleasant stimulus 
perceptions following aversive stimuli (Grupe & Nitschke, 2011; Sarinopoulos et al., 2010).  The 
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fifth aim of the present research was to replicate this past research by demonstrating a priori and 
online covariation biases amplify unpleasant affect and stimulus ratings following the display of 
unpleasant stimuli under conditions of uncertainty.  After checking whether participants 
demonstrated significant a priori and online covariation biases, I examined the following two 
questions:   
 Question 5.1.  Do anticipations or expectations to associate uncertain cues with 
unpleasant outcomes (a priori and online covariation bias) predict more 
unpleasant affect after neutral and aversive image exposure under conditions of 
uncertainty relative to certainty?   
 Question 5.2.  Do expectations to associate uncertain cues with unpleasant 
outcomes (a priori and online covariation bias) predict more unpleasant image 
ratings after neutral and aversive image exposure under conditions of uncertainty 
relative to certainty?   
Specific aim 6.  The sixth specific aim of the present study was to explore whether a 
cortical marker of pre-stimulus emotional anticipation known as the SPN was larger (less 
positive) following uncertain and certain-aversive stimulus cues compared to neutral stimulus 
cues.  After conducting a region of interest analysis to determine that the SPN was modulated by 
affective picture cues at electrode locations consistent with past research, I examined the 
following questions: 
 Question 6.1.  Do uncertain and certain-aversive stimulus cues elicit larger (less 
positive) deflections of the SPN compared to certain-neutral stimulus cues?  
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Specific aim 7.  The seventh specific aim of the present study was to explore whether 
trait mindfulness would predict lower levels of a priori and online covariation bias.  To address 
this aim I examined the following research questions.   
 Question 7.1.  Does trait mindfulness predict lower expectancies for the first 
uncertainty cue to be followed by an aversive image (less a priori covariation 
bias)?   
 Question 7.2.  Does trait mindfulness predict lower online expectations for 
aversive pictures to follow from uncertain and certain-aversive cues relative to 
neutral cues (less online covariation bias)?   
 Question 7.3.  Do traits that contrast with mindfulness predict higher expectancies 
for the first uncertainty cue to be followed by an aversive image (higher a priori 
covariation bias)?  
 Question 7.4.  Do traits that contrast with mindfulness predict higher online 
expectations for aversive pictures to follow from uncertain and certain-aversive 
cues relative to neutral cues (less online covariation bias)? 
Specific Aim 8.  The eighth aim of the present study was to explore whether trait mindfulness 
was associated with differences in the SPN amplitudes elicited by each type of stimulus cue.   
This investigation was guided by two questions:   
 Question 8.1.  Is trait mindfulness related to attenuated SPN amplitudes elicited 
by uncertain and aversive cues, compared to neutral cues?   
 Question 8.2.  Do traits that contrast with mindfulness predict higher SPN 
amplitudes following uncertain and aversive cues, relative to neutral cues? 
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Method 
Power Analysis 
 A previous study assessing mindfulness as a moderator of LPP amplitude (Brown, 
Goodman, & Inzlicht, 2013), yielded a medium (ds = .63 to .70) effect size.  A repeated 
measures MLM-based power analysis was conducted using Optimal Design Software 
(Raudenbush et al., 2011).  Assuming medium effect size, a sample of N = 60 participants was 
considered sufficient to achieve a power of .80 when is set at .05. 
Participants 
 Participants consisted of 64 undergraduate students at a mid-Atlantic university who were 
right-handed and volunteered to partially fulfill a course requirement for their Introductory 
Psychology course.  Participants with a history of neurological or psychiatric illness were 
excluded from the study (n=2).  Data from six participants were discarded due to excessive 
paroxysmal artifact in the EEG signal (n = 6) or poor electrode impedances (n = 2), and three 
participants were excluded for procedural non-compliance during the EEG recording for the 
Cued Image Task [sleeping (n = 1), eating (n = 1), rushing (n =1)].  The remaining 52 
participants [(29 (58%) female; 2 undeclared] gave informed consent prior to participation in 
accordance with the Institutional Review Board. 
Psychometric Measures 
Trait Mindfulness.  Two widely used measures were administered to capture individual 
differences in trait mindfulness.  Central to most definitions of mindfulness in the western 
scholarly literature is the increased quality of present-focused attention and awareness.   
However, many other distinct facets (e.g. nonjudgment, the ability to describe experiences) have 
been incorporated in several existing measures of mindfulness, largely stemming from the wide 
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utilization of mindfulness as tool in psychotherapeutic contexts (Goodman, Quaglia, & Brown, 
2013).  The Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003) and the Act 
with Awareness Subscale of the Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer, Smith, 
Hopkins, Krietmeyer, & Toney, 2006) are robust measures of dispositional mindfulness that 
directly capture conceptualization of the mindfulness construct in way that is consistent with our 
theoretical approach.  For this reason, I decided to measure mindfulness using these measures, 
rather than many of the other psychometric instruments that take distinct approaches to the 
construct. 
The Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003; sample α = .85) 
captures individual differences in the tendency to be attentive to and aware of the present 
moment using 15 items.  Responses are indicated on a 6-point Likert-type scale (almost always 
to almost never) to items such as "I find it difficult to stay focused on what’s happening in the 
present" and "I snack without being aware that I’m eating."  Higher scores on the MAAS 
indicate higher mindfulness.  Several independent analyses attest to the validity and 
unidimensional factor structure of the MAAS (Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 
2006; Brown & Ryan, 2003; Carlson & Brown, 2005; Cordon & Finney, 2008; MacKillop & 
Anderson, 2007).  A second mindfulness measure -- The Five-Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire 
(FFMQ; Baer et al., 2006; sample α = .94) -- captures 5 distinct skills used during mindfulness 
practice in 39-items, and uses a 1 (never or very rarely true) to 5 (very true or always true) 
Likert type scale.  Of interest to the present study is the Acting with Awareness subscale (sample 
α = .89), as it most closely reflects our conceptualization of mindfulness as open and receptive 
awareness.  Higher scores on the FFMQ indicate higher levels of mindfulness.   
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Uncertainty Distress.  Two scales were administered to capture individual differences in 
distress evoked from states of uncertainty.  The Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Buhr & 
Dugas, 2002; sample α = .93) was administered to measure individual differences in affective 
responses to situations with uncertain outcomes.  The 27-item IUS assesses the degree to which 
people endorse notions that uncertainty is stressful and upsetting,  uncertainty leads to the 
inability to act, uncertain events are negative and should be avoided, and uncertainty is unfair, all 
using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all characteristic of me) to 5 (entirely 
characteristic of me).   The 48-item Uncertainty Response Scale (URS; Greco & Roger, 2001; 
sample α = .81) was administered to capture individual differences in the way people cope with 
uncertainty across three domains (emotional responses to uncertainty, cognitive responses to 
uncertainty, and the desire to change uncertainty). The scale has high internal consistency and 
test-retest reliability and has been validated using psychological and physiological measures 
sensitive to uncertainty threat.  The present study will focus on the emotional responses to 
uncertainty subscale.   
Anxiety.  Three measures were administered to assess maladaptive personality traits 
related to anxious responses to uncertainty.   Participants completed the Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990; sample α = .94) to assess 
clinically significant aspects of worry, such as the generality of worry across time and situations, 
and the inability to control the worrying process. Responses to each of the 16-item PSWQ items 
are indicated on a 1 (not typical of me at all) to 5 (very typical of me) Likert-type scale.  The 
neuroticism subscale of the NEO-FFI (Costa and McCrae, 1992; sample α = .78) was 
administered to assess dispositional anxiety, hostility, depression, impulsiveness and 
vulnerability using a 5-point scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree).  Higher scores on this 
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scale indicate higher neuroticism.  Depressive symptomology was measured using the 20-item 
Beck Depression Inventory (Beckham & Leber, 1985; sample α = .88).   
Stimulus Materials 
 Images used in the present study were selected from the International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 2008) and were identical to those used by Grupe & 
Nitschke (2011). The most aversive images specific to each gender were selected separately on 
the basis of having the most unpleasant valence (M = 2.31) and highest arousal (M = 6.09) 
ratings based on publish norms (Lang et al., 2008)1. These pictures generally included pictures of 
mutilated bodies or violent attack scenes.  Neutral images were selected on the basis of having 
neutral valence and arousal ratings and consisted primarily of photographs of everyday 
household objects.  Participants were randomized to receive one of three pseudorandom 
presentation orders to control for order effects. Each stimulus set contained 4 blocks of 27 
images from their gender-respective stimulus pool.  Each stimulus block was matched to contain 
similar valence and arousal ratings for aversive and neutral images (see Table 1).  Although the 
same picture sets were used for each gender, the stimulus orders varied which IAPS slides 
followed certain vs. uncertain cues. To ensure each of the stimulus orders were statistically 
equivalent, a 6 (Stimulus Orders) × 4 (Stimulus Type: certain aversive, certain neutral, uncertain 
                                                          
1 The IAPS Slides administered for each gender and stimulus category were:  
Male Aversive: 1300, 1930, 2053, 2120, 2141, 2205, 2730, 2800, 2900, 3000, 3015, 3030, 3051, 3053, 3060, 3063, 
3071, 3100, 3101, 3102, 3110, 3120, 3130, 3140, 3150, 3160, 3170, 3220, 3230, 3261, 3266, 3301, 3400, 3500, 
3530, 3550, 6010, 6020, 6022, 6190, 6244, 6250, 6313, 6350, 6370, 6560, 6570, 6830, 8230, 9040, 9140, 9220, 
9594, 9921.  Male Neutral: 1390, 1500, 1620, 1670, 2190, 2210, 2372, 2383, 2487, 2514, 2575, 2749, 2830, 2840, 
2870, 2880, 4532, 5201, 5300, 5390, 5395, 5410, 5471, 5510, 5520, 5530, 5532, 5535, 5551, 5600, 5740, 5900, 
5991, 6150, 6900, 7002, 7004, 7006, 7041, 7100, 7130, 7140, 7160, 7170, 7205, 7211, 7217, 7224, 7233, 7283, 
7490, 7500, 7705, 7950.  Female Aversive: 1300, 1930, 2053, 2120, 2730, 2900, 3015, 3030, 3060, 3071, 3100, 
3102, 3110, 3120, 3140, 3150, 3170, 3180, 3220, 3230, 3261, 3301, 3400, 3550, 6010, 6020, 6022, 6190, 6213, 
6244, 6250, 6313, 6350, 6370, 6550, 6560, 6834, 9040, 9050, 9140, 9220, 9250, 9252, 9253, 9300, 9410, 9433, 
9490, 9561, 9571, 9594, 9910, 9911, 9921.  Female Neutral: 1500, 1620, 1670, 2190, 2200, 2372, 2381, 2383, 2570, 
2749, 2840, 2880, 5201, 5300, 5395, 5410, 5471, 5510, 5530, 5534, 5535, 5551, 5600, 5720, 5900, 5991, 6150, 
7004, 7006, 7009, 7020, 7025, 7031, 7035, 7040, 7080, 7090, 7100, 7140, 7160, 7170, 7185, 7205, 7217, 7233, 
7235, 7500, 7545, 7550, 7580, 7595, 7705, 7900, 7950. 
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Table 1.  Mean normative valence and arousal ratings for each pseudo-random stimulus order 
 
              Neutral Uncertain-Neutral Aversive Uncertain-Aversive   
    Valence Arousal Valence Arousal Valence Arousal Valence Arousal   
Male 
         
 
Order 1 5.45 (.82) 3.41 (.82) 5.47 (.82) 3.43 (.79) 2.27 (.70) 6.03 (.87) 2.32 (.71) 6.26 (.77) 
 
 
Order 2 5.47 (.92) 3.43 (.85) 5.41 (.54) 3.38 (.71) 2.28 (.78) 6.11 (.88) 2.31 (.50) 6.12 (.77) 
 
 
Order 3 5.47 (.85) 3.40 (.81) 5.43 (.75) 3.44 (.79) 2.33 (.77) 6.09 (.90) 2.20 (.57) 6.15 (.71) 
 Female 
         
 
Order 1 5.46 (.78) 3.15 (.71)   5.59 (1.06) 3.17 (.74) 2.39 (.65) 6.06 (.84) 2.45 (.71) 6.08 (.64) 
 
 
Order 2 5.54 (.89) 3.18 (.71) 5.45 (.86) 3.10 (.73) 2.41 (.67) 6.09 (.76) 2.41 (.70) 6.02 (.83) 
   Order 3 5.46 (.78) 3.14 (.69) 5.53 (.98) 3.19 (.77) 2.40 (.63) 6.09 (.82) 2.41 (.75) 6.02 (.67)   
 
Note.  Each pseudo-random trial order contained 32 neutral slides and 32 aversive slides preceded by respective certainty cues. 
Sixteen aversive slides and 16 neutral slides were preceded by uncertainty cues.  Each rating is indicated on a 0 to 9 scale.
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aversive, uncertain neutral) Between Subjects Factorial ANOVA was conducted on the 
normative valence and arousal ratings to verify that each of the stimulus sets were statistically 
equivalent.  As expected, there were no main effect for stimulus order [F(5, 575) = .39, p = .86, 
η² = .004] and no significant order × stimulus type interaction [F(15, 575) = .08, p = .99, η² 
=.002] on valence.  The model testing arousal also indicated no significant main effect for 
stimulus order [F(5, 575) = 1.10, p = .36, η² = .01], nor an order × stimulus type interaction, 
F(15, 575) = .27, p = .99, η² = .01.    This suggests statistical equivalence between the stimulus 
categories across normative valence and arousal ratings that accompany the IAPS stimulus set 
(Lang et al., 2008). 
Procedure 
Each participant was randomized to receive one of three gender-specific pseudorandom 
trial orders while they completed the battery of individual difference measures. Following the 
administration of self-report measures, each participant was fitted to a Stretch-Lyrca EEG cap 
(Neuroscan Quikcap®) and received verbal instructions about how to complete a Cued Image 
Task on the computer.  The task was administered using similar parameters as prior studies 
(Grupe & Nitschke, 2011; Sarinopoulos et al., 2010), in which participants observe one of three 
types of anticipatory cues (neutral, aversive, or uncertain) before the presentation of an aversive 
or neutral image.  In between the cue and the image stimulus, participants are asked to rate how 
much they expected the subsequent stimulus to be pleasant vs. unpleasant, and after the image is 
displayed they were asked to rate the valence of the picture, or of their mood state.  
Trials began with the visual presentation of a 2 second cue image in the center of the 
computer monitor that indicated to participants the valence (aversive or neutral) of an upcoming 
picture.  Three different types of anticipatory cues were displayed: an “X” cue, which always 
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indicated the upcoming picture would be unpleasant (e.g. a mutilated body), an “O” cue, which 
always indicated an upcoming picture would be neutral (e.g., a spoon), and a “?” cue, which 
indicated uncertainty about the type of picture that would be displayed.   Exactly 50% of the 
images following uncertainty cues were neutral, and 50% were aversive.  Participants received 
on-screen instructions explaining the relations between cues and pictures, but were not informed 
that the “?” cues preceded the exact same number of unpleasant and neutral images.  An 
illustration of each of the four types of trial sequences is depicted in Figure 2. 
Immediately following the presentation of a cue, participants were presented with an 
expectancy rating scale.  The prompt “Expect Aversive Picture?” appeared above a visual Likert-
type scale with values ranging from 1 (expect neutral) to 9 (expect aversive), and the mid-point 
value of 5 labeled as ‘uncertain.’  Participants used left and right arrow buttons on an external 
button box to navigate an indicator arrow to their chosen expectancy rating value, and then 
pressed an enter button to confirm their expectancy rating.  The scale remained on the screen 
until participants indicated a response. 
The expectancy rating scale was be followed by a random interstimulus interval between 
4 to 10 seconds and then a neutral or unpleasant image appeared centrally on the screen for a 
duration of 1 second.  Each picture was between 5 to 7 seconds, after which a mood or picture 
valence rating scale (only one rating per trial) appeared.  Both scales were be labeled as follows: 
-4 = “unpleasant/negative,” 0 = “neutral,” +4 = “pleasant/happy.”  50% of the time participants 
were asked to rate their mood, and 50% of the time they were asked to rate the previous image.  
Participants indicated their rating using the identical procedure used for the expectancy rating.  A 
1 to 5 second intertrial interval will followed the rating scales.  Each interstimulus and intertrial 
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Figure 2.  Trial structure for each type of trial in the Cued Image Task.   
Note.  Each row represents a different type of trial.  The pictures presented are exemplars of those that appeared during the task, but do 
not belong to the IAPS picture set.  Cue types: ‘X’ = Aversive; ‘O’ = Neutral; “?” = Uncertain. 
AVERSIVE 
IMAGE 
NEUTRAL 
IMAGE 
NEUTRAL 
IMAGE 
AVERSIVE 
IMAGE 
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interval consisted of a black background with a centrally presented yellow crosshair, on which 
the participants were instructed to fixate. 
Participants completed a total of four blocks, each block contained 8 neutral images and 8 
aversive images preceded by certainty cues (‘O’ and ‘X’, respectively). An additional 4 aversive 
and 4 neutral images were preceded by uncertainty cues (‘?’).  Over the entire course of the 
study, participants viewed 32 aversive and 32 neutral images following certainty cues, and 32 
images following uncertainty cues (16 aversive and 16 neutral images).  Randomized within each 
block were 4-5 trials that presented cues which were not followed by an image. At the 
conclusion of each block 3-4 images appeared without being preceded by an anticipatory cue.  
Each participant took approximately 12 minutes per block, and had the opportunity for a short 
break in-between blocks.  Following the Cued Image Task, each participant completed a post-
experiment questionnaire that contained a short measure of covariation bias.  Participants were 
asked: “What percentage of the question mark cues were followed by aversive events?”  Upon 
completion of these measures, the experimenter removed the EEG sensor cap, and then debriefed 
and dismissed the participant. 
EEG recording and signal processing 
EEG was recorded using 36 sintered Ag/AgCl electrodes mounted in a Quik Cap 
(Neuroscan; El Paso, TX).  Electrode positions were based on the 10-20 international system 
with a forehead ground and two monopolar references placed on the left and right 
mastoids.  Continuous EEG was digitized at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz using a NuAmps 
Express digital amplifier (Neuroscan; El Paso, TX).  Frequencies above 30Hz were removed 
using an online low-pass filter.  The electro-oculogram (EOG) was recorded with monopolar 
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electrodes located below and on the outer canthus of each eye.  Offline, the monopolar EOG 
channels were combined into bipolar channels.   
EEGLAB 12.0 (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) and Matlab (Mathworks, 
www.mathworks.com) were used for offline EEG data processing.  Bad channels were detected 
and removed with the automatic detection algorithms provided by EEGLAB.  Continuous back-
to-back epochs (1s) were generated from the continuous EEG signal.  Epochs containing 
nonstereotypical artifacts were detected and rejected using native EEGLAB artifact detection 
algorithms sensitive to abnormal values, distributions, spectra, and linear trends.  After rejecting 
epochs contaminated with paroxysmal artifacts, independent components analysis (ICA) using 
the infomax algorithm was used to correct remaining artifacts in the continuous EEG signal.  
High-pass filtering above .1 Hz has been shown to reduce ERP amplitudes (Luck, 2005), but 
ICA decomposition works most effectively on data that has been filtered over .5 Hz.  To 
overcome this problem I followed the method outlined by Debener, Thorne, Schneider, and 
Viola (2010). Data containing stereotypical artifacts (e.g. blinks, eye movements, EKG) were 
high-pass filtered at 1hz offline to improve ICA decomposition, and then native EEGlab 
algorithms for epoch rejection (joint probability and kurtosis) were used to remove additional 
offending artifacts from the derived continuous ICA component activity.  ICA was then 
conducted a second time on the remaining clean back-to-back epochs to improve the quality of 
the ICA decomposition and derive more ICA components that account for neural sources.  The 
ICA weights from this second pass were then re-referenced to a common average reference and 
imported back into the original unfiltered continuous EEG data. Data epochs of interest were 
then extracted from the continuous EEG signal to capture the SPN (0 – 4000ms expectancy 
response) and LPP (-1000 to 1500ms picture stimulus) components.  Epochs of interest were 
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baseline corrected and ICA components representing artifact were detected and pruned from the 
continuous EEG signal using MARA, an algorithm designed to detect and subtract artifactual 
ICA components from the underlying raw EEG signal (Winkler, Haufe, & Tangermann, 2011). 
Finally, epochs with signal that exceeded +/- 75 µv were removed.  Grand average, artifact-free 
raw data epochs were then exported for analysis using SAS. 
Statistical Analysis 
 Multiple steps were taken to ensure data met normality assumptions during the data 
analysis process.  To check for violations of normality, skewness and kurtosis statistics were 
examined for all self-report, task-based, and ERP measures. Variables with skewness and 
kurtosis values that exceeded +/- 1.00 were considered to be in violation of the normality 
assumption, and frequency tables were then examined to identify offending values.  Extreme 
observations were winsorized (Dixon & Tukey, 1968), meaning that outliers (i.e. higher than the 
97th percentile and below the 3rd percentile) were replaced by a value nearer to the next highest 
value.  
To account for the nested structure of the data, multilevel linear models with restricted 
maximum likelihood estimation (REML; Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992) were conducted using SAS 
PROC MIXED (Singer, 1998).  Compound symmetry (TYPE=CS) was verified as the 
covariance structure with the lowest (best) goodness-of-fit indices (-2LL, AIC, BIC) across 
models with distinct outcome measures, as compared to Unstructured, Diagonal, Variance 
Components, and Autoregressive covariance structures.  Independent mixed models were tested 
to explore any main and interactive effects between cue type and/or stimulus type, and 
psychological traits (dispositional mindfulness, uncertainty distress, and anxiety-related traits) on 
the primary dependent measures of interest (expectancy, picture, and mood ratings; SPN and 
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LPP amplitude).  Independent variables representing cue type (0 = neutral; 1 = aversive; and 2 = 
uncertain) and stimulus type (0 = certain neutral; 1 = certain aversive; 2 = uncertain neutral; 3 = 
uncertain aversive) were identified as categorical variables using the CLASS statement (Singer, 
1998).  SAS treats variables included in the CLASS statement as categorical predictors and 
creates internal dummy variables to represent the levels of the variable. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
Did participants understand the nature of the stimulus cues?  To examine whether 
participants understood the nature of the stimulus cues, a one-way repeated measures ANOVA 
was conducted to compare participants online expectancy ratings following neutral (“O”), 
aversive (“X”), and uncertainty (“?”) cues.  It was expected that participants would self-report 
higher expectations for aversive images (higher expectancy ratings) following aversive stimulus 
cues than neutral for uncertain and neutral cues.  Additionally, expectancy ratings for uncertain 
cues were expected to be higher than neutral cues. The model was significant, F(2, 102)  
= 361.09, p < .0001, ηp² = .88.  Participants expected aversive images to follow from “X” cues 
(M = 7.66, s.d. = .90) more than “O” cues (M = 2.19, s.d. = 1.01) and “?” cues (M = 5.70, s.d. = 
.854); uncertain cues elicited higher expectancy ratings than neutral cues (both ps < .0001). This 
pattern of participant expectancy ratings suggests that participants understood the nature of the 
cues.   
Specific aim 1:  Uncertainty and self-reported appraisal.   
Grupe & Nitschke (2011) found that self-reported mood and picture ratings for aversive 
images were higher when preceded by uncertainty compared to certainty cues.  To gain a more 
complete perspective on the nature of uncertainty and stimulus valence on self-reported 
appraisal, analyses were conducted to compare the main and interactive effects of stimulus cue 
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and stimulus valence on self-reported mood and picture ratings.  Both mood and picture ratings 
were made on a -4 (“unpleasant/negative”) to +4 (“pleasant/happy”) scale with the midpoint (0) 
marked as “neutral”.  The means and standard deviations for affect and stimulus ratings across 
cue type and stimulus type are depicted in Table 2.  
 
Table 2.  Means and standard deviations for affect and stimulus ratings by cue type and stimulus 
type. 
 
 
 
Stimulus Cue and Valence 
  
Certain 
Neutral 
  
Uncertain 
Neutral 
  
Certain 
Aversive 
  
Uncertain 
Aversive  
 Measure 
  
M (SD)   M (SD)   M (SD)   M (SD) 
Affect Ratings 
 
.61 (.61) 
 
.60      (.69) 
 
-2.29 (.97) 
 
-2.11 (1.06) 
Picture Ratings
 
.72 (.60)  .52 (.56)  -2.40 (.74)  -2.64 (.79) 
 
Notes.  Ratings were made on a scale from -4 (unpleasant/negative) to +4 (pleasant/happy) with a 
midpoint of 0 labeled “neutral.” 
 
Question 1.1: When aversive and neutral images are preceded by uncertainty cues 
do they elicit more negative appraisals (higher unpleasant affect) after exposure to the 
image than neutral and aversive images preceded by certainty cues?  To test whether 
aversive and neutral images preceded by uncertainty cues elicited more negative appraisals 
(unpleasant affect) after image exposure than when aversive and neutral images were preceded 
by certainty cues, a 2 (stimulus valence: neutral, aversive) × 2 (cue type: certain, uncertain) 
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on self-reported affect ratings.  As expected, the 
model indicated a highly significant main effect for image valence [F(1, 51) = 236.80, p < .0001, 
ηp²=.82], such that participants reported more unpleasant affect following aversive images (M = -
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2.196, s.d. = .14) compared to neutral images (M = .61, s.d. = .09).  This result suggests that the 
stimuli influenced self-reported state affect in a way consistent with the valence of the emotional 
picture content.  There was a not a significant main effect for cue [F(1, 51) = 4.00, p = .051, ηp² 
= .07], nor a significant cue × stimulus valence interaction [F(1, 51) = 2.79, p = .10, ηp²= .05], 
which indicates that uncertainty did not amplify unpleasant affect following the display of the 
emotional stimuli.  
Question 1.2: When aversive and neutral images are preceded by uncertainty cues do they 
elicit more negative appraisals (higher unpleasant stimulus ratings) after exposure to the 
image than neutral and aversive images preceded by certainty cues?  To examine whether 
aversive and neutral images preceded by uncertainty cues elicited more negative perceptual 
appraisals (unpleasant image ratings) following image exposure than aversive and neutral images 
preceded by certainty cues, an analogous 2 (stimulus valence: neutral, aversive) × 2 (cue type: 
certain, uncertain) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on self-reported image ratings.  
As with the prior analysis on mood ratings, there was a main effect for stimulus valence, F(1, 51) 
= 470.162, p < .0001, ηp² = .90. Participants self-reported perception of aversive images (M = -
2.52, s. d. = .10) were more unpleasant than neutral images (M = .62, s.d. = .07).  This suggests 
participants’ perceptions of the images were consistent with the valence of the emotional images.  
There was also highly significant main effect of cue type [F(1, 51) = 16.54, p = .0002, ηp² = .25].  
Images were rated as more unpleasant when they were preceded by uncertain (M = -1.06, s.d. = 
.06) compared to certain cues (M = -.842, s.d. = .06).  This indicates that uncertainty can alter the 
appraisal of emotional stimuli by increasing perceptions of unpleasantness.  There was not a 
significant stimulus valence × cue type interaction [F(1, 51) = .19, p = .66, ηp²= .004], which 
suggests the amplification of unpleasantness by uncertainty did not depend on whether the 
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stimulus was neutral or aversive. Specific Aim 2:  Uncertainty and cortical measures of 
stimulus appraisal.   
The second specific aim of the present study was to determine whether emotional 
appraisal as indexed by the LPP is largest for aversive  and neutral stimuli presented following 
uncertainty about the nature of an emotional image stimulus, compared to when participants 
know an upcoming emotional image stimulus will be aversive or neutral.  Before conducting this 
test it was necessary to conduct a region of interest analysis to determine whether the LPP 
component is present and sensitive to the emotional valence at electrode locations and time 
periods consistent with past research.  Following the region of interest analysis, mixed models 
will be tested to formally evaluate the questions from specific aim 2. 
Preliminary Region of Interest Analysis on the Late Positive Potential.  Visual 
inspection of the ERP waveforms across electrode sites and stimulus conditions revealed that the 
LPP began, on average, ~500ms after stimulus onset and continued, on average, until ~2500ms 
after onset.  This signal window is generally consistent with past studies using emotional visual 
stimuli (e.g., Cuthbert et al., 2000; Hajcak MacNamara, Foti, & Keil, 2011; Weinberg and 
Hajcak, 2011, Foti et al., 2010; Schupp et al., 2000).   Figure 3 displays the scalp distribution of 
grand average LPP waveforms for each stimulus condition across a -100 ms (pre-stimulus) to 
2500 ms (post-stimulus) recording period.  Fifteen electrode sites of interest were divided into 
two independent spatial factors (anteriority and laterality) and one factor representing the early, 
middle, and late time windows of the LPP (signal window).  Following the recommendations of 
Luck (2005), the cue and valence measures were collapsed into one variable (stimulus condition) 
to ease interpretation and minimize experimentwise error rate by reducing the number of 
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Figure 3.  Scalp distribution of grand average LPP waveforms depicting each stimulus condition 
across a -100 ms (pre-stimulus) to 2500 ms (post-stimulus) recording period.
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individual p-value computations (and potentially spurious 4 and 5-way interactions). Once a 
region of interest is statistically isolated, subsequent models will be conducted with stimulus 
condition variable separated into the cue and valence factors. 
To examine the effects of electrode location, signal window, and stimulus condition on 
LPP amplitude a 5 [anteriority: frontal  (F3, Fz, F4), fronto-central (FC3, FCz, FC4), central (C3, 
Cz, C4), centro-parietal (CP3, CPz, CP4), parietal (P3, Pz, P4)] ×3 [laterality: left (F3, FC3, C3, 
CP3, P3), midline (Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz), right (F4, FC4, C4, CP4, P4)] ×3 (signal window; 
500-1000 ms, 1500-2000 ms, 2001-2500 ms) × 4 (stimulus condition: certain-neutral, certain-
aversive, uncertain-neutral, uncertain-aversive ) repeated measures mixed model using restricted 
maximum likelihood estimation (REML) (e.g., Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992) was tested.  Means 
and standard deviations for average LPP amplitudes during each time window for left-
hemisphere, midline, and right-hemisphere electrode sites are depicted in Tables 3-5, 
respectively.  Parameter estimates for the full model are depicted in Table 6.  Figure 4 depicts the 
ERP waveforms associated with neutral and aversive images preceded by certain and uncertain 
cues at the site CPz in the early, middle, and late signal windows. Figure 5 displays the scalp 
topographies at 100ms intervals depicting the time course of the differences in LPP amplitude 
between aversive and neutral stimuli.  Figure 6 depicts the same information, but for the 
difference between aversive stimuli preceded by uncertain cues and aversive stimuli preceded by 
certain cues. 
Main effects.  There were significant main effects for anteriority [F(4, 204) = 297.84, p 
<.0001], laterality [F(2, 102) = 14.40, p < .0001], signal window [F(2, 102) = 79.48, p < .0001], 
and stimulus condition [F(3, 153) = 112.14, p < .0001].  The main effect of anteriority indicated, 
as expected, that LPP amplitude significantly increased at each level of anteriority as electrode 
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Table 3.  Means and standard deviations for LPP amplitudes (µv) for each stimulus condition 
across early, middle, and late signal windows at left-hemisphere electrode positions 
  
Left 
  
Certain 
Neutral (0) 
  
Certain 
Aversive 
  
Uncertain 
Neutral 
  
Uncertain 
Aversive  
  
Grand 
Mean 
                    M (SD)   M (SD)   M (SD)   M (SD)   M (SD) 
  
              
Frontal 
 
F3 
        Window 
 
0.20 (4.00) 
 
0.48 (4.48) 
 
-0.48 (4.73) 
 
0.64 (4.95) 
   
500-1000 ms
 
-2.20 (3.57) 
 
-1.67 (4.24) 
 
-2.11 (3.90) 
 
-2.06 (4.45) 
 
-2.01 (4.03) 
1500-2000 ms
 
1.57 (3.74) 
 
1.88 (4.29) 
 
0.79 (4.95) 
 
2.11 (5.04) 
 
1.58 (4.53) 
2001-2500 ms
 
1.25 (3.60) 
 
1.24 (4.16) 
 
-0.10 (4.88) 
 
1.88 (4.26) 
 
1.07 (4.28) 
 
              
Fronto-central 
 
FC3 
        Window 
 
0.87 (3.40) 
 
1.77 (4.02) 
 
0.53 (4.00) 
 
1.05 (4.60) 
   
500-1000 ms
 
-1.14 (2.66) 
 
0.09 (3.42) 
 
-0.83 (3.82) 
 
-0.39 (3.94) 
 
-0.57 (3.50) 
1500-2000 ms
 
2.03 (3.27) 
 
3.04 (4.12) 
 
1.44 (3.93) 
 
2.23 (4.63) 
 
2.18 (4.03) 
2001-2500 ms
 
1.72 (3.34) 
 
2.17 (3.95) 
 
0.97 (3.95) 
 
1.31 (4.89) 
 
1.55 (4.07) 
 
              
Central 
 
C3 
        Window 
 
1.28 (2.86) 
 
2.38 (4.02) 
 
1.18 (4.12) 
 
2.60 (4.09) 
   
500-1000 ms
 
0.54 (2.18) 
 
1.87 (3.57) 
 
0.79 (3.66) 
 
1.78 (3.73) 
 
1.25 (3.37) 
1500-2000 ms
 
1.86 (2.99) 
 
3.02 (4.24) 
 
1.77 (4.17) 
 
3.44 (4.33) 
 
2.52 (4.01) 
2001-2500 ms
 
1.42 (3.23) 
 
2.26 (4.22) 
 
0.98 (4.51) 
 
2.56 (4.11) 
 
1.81 (4.07) 
  
              
Centro-Parietal 
 
CP3 
        Window 
 
2.54 (3.13) 
 
3.83 (3.77) 
 
2.44 (3.75) 
 
4.36 (3.85) 
   
500-1000 ms
 
3.16 (2.97) 
 
5.02 (3.55) 
 
3.20 (2.82) 
 
5.32 (3.58) 
 
4.17 (3.38) 
1500-2000 ms
 
2.63 (3.28) 
 
3.74 (3.82) 
 
2.54 (3.96) 
 
4.40 (3.80) 
 
3.33 (3.78) 
2001-2500 ms
 
1.82 (3.07) 
 
2.73 (3.65) 
 
1.57 (4.23) 
 
3.35 (4.00) 
 
2.37 (3.80) 
 
              
Parietal 
 
P3 
        Window 
 
2.68 (3.27) 
 
3.83 (4.20) 
 
3.26 (3.64) 
 
3.62 (4.89) 
   
500-1000 ms
 
4.70 (3.45) 
 
6.29 (4.20) 
 
4.97 (3.62) 
 
6.33 (4.71) 
 
5.57 (4.06) 
1500-2000 ms 
 
1.99 (2.54) 
 
2.89 (3.73) 
 
2.73 (3.29) 
 
2.61 (4.17) 
 
2.56 (3.48) 
2001-2500 ms 
 
1.35 (2.80) 
 
2.30 (3.56) 
 
2.08 (3.43) 
 
1.90 (4.67) 
 
1.91 (3.67) 
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Table 4.  Means and standard deviations for LPP amplitudes (µv) for each stimulus condition 
across early, middle, and late signal windows at midline electrode positions. 
 
  
Mid-line 
  
Certain 
Neutral (0) 
  
Certain 
Aversive 
  
Uncertain 
Neutral 
  
Uncertain 
Aversive  
  
Grand 
Mean 
                    M (SD)   M (SD)   M (SD)   M (SD)   M (SD) 
  
              
Frontal 
 
Fz 
        Window 
 
-0.20 (3.69) 
 
0.90 (4.22) 
 
0.50 (4.05) 
 
0.50 (4.85) 
   
500-1000 ms
 
-2.26 (3.30) 
 
-0.91 (4.20) 
 
-1.20 (3.88) 
 
-1.27 (4.91) 
 
-1.41 (4.12) 
1500-2000 ms
 
1.20 (3.50) 
 
2.27 (4.12) 
 
1.42 (3.75) 
 
2.21 (4.66) 
 
1.77 (4.03) 
2001-2500 ms
 
0.45 (3.38) 
 
1.33 (3.74) 
 
1.27 (4.04) 
 
0.57 (4.40) 
 
0.91 (3.90) 
 
              
Fronto-central 
 
FCz 
        Window 
 
0.24 (4.07) 
 
1.55 (4.58) 
 
0.33 (4.26) 
 
1.61 (5.57) 
   
500-1000 ms
 
-2.06 (3.57) 
 
-0.70 (4.95) 
 
-1.70 (4.34) 
 
-0.97 (5.84) 
 
-1.36 (4.75) 
1500-2000 ms
 
1.78 (3.77) 
 
3.24 (4.21) 
 
1.74 (3.79) 
 
3.76 (4.95) 
 
2.63 (4.27) 
2001-2500 ms
 
0.99 (3.89) 
 
2.12 (3.61) 
 
0.94 (3.93) 
 
2.04 (4.91) 
 
1.52 (4.12) 
 
 
              
Central 
 
Cz 
        Window 
 
1.64 (3.31) 
 
3.53 (4.13) 
 
1.37 (3.79) 
 
4.05 (5.07) 
   
500-1000 ms
 
0.48 (3.02) 
 
2.13 (4.39) 
 
0.30 (3.71) 
 
2.37 (5.01) 
 
1.32 (4.18) 
1500-2000 ms 
 
2.58 (3.25) 
 
4.86 (4.15) 
 
2.19 (3.65) 
 
5.56 (4.92) 
 
3.80 (4.26) 
2001-2500 ms 
 
1.88 (3.34) 
 
3.61 (3.42) 
 
1.61 (3.82) 
 
4.23 (4.86) 
 
2.83 (4.04) 
                
Centro-Parietal 
 
CPz 
        Window 
 
2.95 (3.51) 
 
4.62 (4.10) 
 
2.88 (3.82) 
 
5.93 (4.85) 
   
500-1000 ms
 
3.10 (2.92) 
 
4.62 (4.39) 
 
2.84 (3.88) 
 
5.30 (4.94) 
 
3.97 (4.20) 
1500-2000 ms
 
3.41 (3.78) 
 
5.26 (4.22) 
 
3.37 (3.93) 
 
6.66 (4.50) 
 
4.67 (4.31) 
2001-2500 ms
 
2.35 (3.74) 
 
3.99 (3.63) 
 
2.42 (3.67) 
 
5.84 (5.09) 
 
3.65 (4.29) 
 
              
Parietal 
 
Pz 
        Window 
 
2.96 (4.01) 
 
5.19 (4.23) 
 
2.78 (4.38) 
 
5.84 (5.55) 
   
500-1000 ms
 
4.96 (3.36) 
 
6.99 (4.26) 
 
4.68 (3.47) 
 
7.63 (5.17) 
 
6.07 (4.29) 
1500-2000 ms 
 
2.35 (3.88) 
 
4.79 (4.22) 
 
2.21 (4.39) 
 
5.35 (5.77) 
 
3.68 (4.80) 
2001-2500 ms 
 
1.57 (4.01) 
 
3.79 (3.61) 
 
1.44 (4.60) 
 
4.54 (5.32) 
 
2.83 (4.61) 
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Table 5.  Means and standard deviations for LPP amplitudes (µv) for each stimulus condition 
across early, middle, and late signal windows at right-hemisphere electrode positions. 
 
  
Right 
  
Certain 
Neutral (0) 
  
Certain 
Aversive 
  
Uncertain 
Neutral 
  
Uncertain 
Aversive  
  
Grand 
Mean 
                    M (SD)   M (SD)   M (SD)   M (SD)   M (SD) 
  
              
Frontal 
 
F4 
        Window 
 
-0.02 (4.15) 
 
0.73 (4.74) 
 
0.33 (4.41) 
 
0.67 (5.06) 
   
500-1000 ms
 
-2.67 (3.41) 
 
-1.86 (4.20) 
 
-2.23 (3.61) 
 
-2.11 (4.64) 
 
-2.22 (3.98) 
1500-2000 ms
 
1.45 (3.70) 
 
2.28 (4.39) 
 
1.78 (3.96) 
 
2.29 (4.41) 
 
1.95 (4.11) 
2001-2500 ms
 
1.15 (4.02) 
 
1.76 (4.57) 
 
1.44 (4.51) 
 
1.82 (4.99) 
 
1.54 (4.51) 
 
              
Fronto-central 
 
FC4 
        Window 
 
0.43 (3.74) 
 
1.84 (4.36) 
 
0.62 (4.20) 
 
2.18 (4.90) 
   
500-1000 ms
 
-1.30 (3.55) 
 
0.00 (4.49) 
 
-1.27 (2.92) 
 
-0.16 (4.41) 
 
-0.68 (3.91) 
1500-2000 ms
 
1.35 (3.44) 
 
3.10 (4.13) 
 
1.62 (4.39) 
 
3.51 (4.38) 
 
2.39 (4.18) 
2001-2500 ms
 
1.25 (3.68) 
 
2.43 (3.89) 
 
1.50 (4.51) 
 
3.18 (5.10) 
 
2.09 (4.37) 
 
              
Central 
 
C4 
        Window 
 
1.98 (2.92) 
 
2.78 (3.19) 
 
1.24 (3.62) 
 
3.85 (3.97) 
   
500-1000 ms
 
0.84 (2.22) 
 
1.51 (3.61) 
 
0.44 (3.10) 
 
2.59 (3.78) 
 
1.34 (3.32) 
1500-2000 ms
 
2.68 (2.81) 
 
3.90 (2.91) 
 
2.05 (3.58) 
 
4.62 (3.81) 
 
3.31 (3.43) 
2001-2500 ms
 
2.43 (3.32) 
 
2.99 (2.52) 
 
1.28 (4.00) 
 
4.34 (4.08) 
 
2.74 (3.69) 
  
              
Centro-Parietal 
 
CP4 
        Window 
 
2.61 (3.28) 
 
3.89 (4.09) 
 
2.82 (3.91) 
 
5.00 (4.61) 
   
500-1000 ms
 
3.19 (3.48) 
 
4.71 (4.16) 
 
3.38 (3.79) 
 
5.50 (4.30) 
 
4.19 (4.03) 
1500-2000 ms
 
2.46 (3.21) 
 
4.05 (4.18) 
 
2.75 (3.66) 
 
5.06 (4.58) 
 
3.58 (4.05) 
2001-2500 ms
 
2.18 (3.11) 
 
2.91 (3.78) 
 
2.33 (4.25) 
 
4.44 (4.95) 
 
2.97 (4.15) 
 
              
Parietal 
 
P4 
        Window 
 
2.58 (3.26) 
 
3.73 (4.02) 
 
2.91 (4.18) 
 
4.36 (5.09) 
   
500-1000 ms
 
4.24 (3.20) 
 
5.72 (4.32) 
 
4.52 (3.70) 
 
6.27 (4.87) 
 
5.19 (4.13) 
1500-2000 ms
 
1.85 (2.72) 
 
2.94 (3.59) 
 
2.24 (4.01) 
 
3.54 (4.70) 
 
2.64 (3.85) 
2001-2500 ms
 
1.63 (3.24) 
 
2.55 (3.39) 
 
1.97 (4.42) 
 
3.28 (5.22) 
 
2.36 (4.16) 
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Table 6.  Parameter estimates modeling the scalp distribution of LPP amplitudes (µv) across 
signal window and stimulus condition. 
 
Effect      df F    p 
Anteriority (4, 204) 297.84 < .0001 
Laterality (2, 102) 14.40 < .0001 
Signal window (2, 102) 79.48 < .0001 
Stimulus condition  (3, 153) 112.14  .0001 
Anteriority × Laterality (8, 408) 3.26  .0013 
Anteriority × Signal window (8, 408) 103.86 < .0001 
Laterality × Signal window (4, 204) 4.88  .0009 
Anteriority × Stimulus condition (12, 612) 4.60 < .0001 
Laterality × Stimulus condition (6, 306) 4.24  .0004 
Signal window × Stimulus condition (6, 306) 0.82  .5553 
Anteriority × Laterality × Signal window (16, 814) 1.22  .2458 
Anteriority × Laterality × Stimulus condition (24, 1222) 1.61  .1815 
Anteriority × Signal window × Stimulus condition (24, 1224) 0.28  .9998 
Laterality × Signal window × Stimulus condition (12, 612) 0.35  .9797 
Anteriority × Laterality × Signal window × 
Stimulus condition 
(48, 2436) 0.19  1.000 
     
Note.  Levels of anteriority were frontal, fronto-central, central, centro-parietal, and parietal.  
Levels of laterality were left hemisphere, midline, and right hemisphere.  Levels of signal 
window were early (500ms – 1000ms), middle (1500ms – 2000ms), and late (2001-2500ms).  
Levels of stimulus condition were certain-neutral, certain-aversive, uncertain-neutral, and 
uncertain-aversive.  Tukey-Kramer adjusted p-values are presented. 
 
 
sites became more posterior (all ps < .0001).  The main effect of laterality indicated that 
electrodes on the left-side of the midlines had significantly lower LPP amplitudes than midline 
and right-lateralized electrode sites (ps < .0006). Midline and electrodes to the right of the 
midline were not significantly different from each other (p = .87).  The main effect of signal 
window revealed significant differences across all three windows.   The middle signal window 
(1500-1000 ms) had significantly more positive LPP amplitudes than the early (500-1000 ms)  
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Figure 4.  Grand average LPP waveforms elicited by neutral and aversive images preceded by 
certain and uncertain stimulus cues at electrode CPz during the early, middle, and late signal 
windows. 
 
 
and late signal windows (2001-2500 ms); the late signal window had significantly more positive 
LPP amplitudes than the early signal window (both ps < .0001).  The main effect of stimulus 
condition replicated past research indicating LPP amplitude is sensitive to unpleasant, arousing 
emotional images (Cuthbert et al., 2000; Hajcak MacNamara, Foti, & Keil, 2011; Weinberg and 
Hajcak, 2011, Foti et al., 2010; Schupp et al., 2000).  Irrespective of cue type, aversive images 
(certain: M = 2.74, s.d. = 4.39; and uncertain: M = 3.09, s.d. = 5.15) elicited significantly higher 
LPP amplitudes compared to neutral images (certain: M = 1.52, s.d. = 3.70; and uncertain 
images: M =1.52, s.d. = 4.22, all ps < .0001).  Importantly, aversive images preceded by 
uncertainty cues evoked significantly more positive deflections of LPP amplitude than aversive  
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Early Signal Window 
 
 
 
 
 
Middle Signal Window 
 
 
 
 
Late Signal Window 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Scalp topographies depicting differences in late positive potential amplitudes between 
aversive and neutral images at every 100 ms interval within the early, middle and late signal 
windows. 
Note.  Blue = negative amplitude; Red = positive amplitude. 
0.0 
+4.0 
+2.0 
-2.0 
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Early Signal Window 
 
 
 
Middle Signal Window 
 
 
Late Signal Window 
 
Figure 6.  Scalp topographies depicting differences in late positive potential amplitudes between 
aversive images elicited by uncertainty and certainty cues at every 100 ms during the early, 
middle and late signal windows. 
Note.  Blue = negative amplitude; Red = positive amplitude. 
 
+2.0 
+1.0 
0.0 
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images preceded by certainty cues (p = .01).  This suggests that stimulus uncertainty amplified 
the LPP amplitudes elicited by motivationally relevant aversive stimuli. No differences were 
observed between neutral stimuli when preceded by uncertainty and certainty cues (p = .77). 
Two-way interactions.  There was a significant anteriority × stimulus window 
interaction, F(8, 408) = 103.86, p < .0001.  LPP amplitudes during the early signal window (500-
1000 ms) were significantly less positive than the middle (1500-2000 ms) and late (2001-2500 
ms) signal windows across frontal, frontocentral, and central regions (all ps < .0001).  At central 
and centro-parietal the regions, the early and middle signal windows had higher amplitudes than 
the late window (all ps > .04), and the early window.  There was no difference in LPP amplitude 
during the early and middle signal windows.  At parietal sites, LPP amplitudes were larger 
during the early window, compared to the middle and late windows (all ps < .0001). 
A significant laterality × stimulus window interaction [F(4, 204) = 4.88, p = .0009] 
indicated that during the early signal window LPP amplitudes were largest at mid-line electrodes 
compared to left and right lateralized electrodes (all ps > .001).  The left and right hemispheres 
did not differ in LPP amplitude during the early window.   During the middle window, midline 
electrode sites had significantly higher LPP amplitudes than left and right-lateralize sites (both ps 
< .0001), and there was a significant hemispheric difference indicating larger LPP amplitudes at 
right lateralized electrodes (p = .005).  During the late window, this right sided preponderance 
was sustained: LPP amplitudes were larger at midline and right-side electrodes compared to left-
sided electrodes (both ps < .0001), but there was not a significant difference between midline and 
right-sided electrodes, p = .17.   
A significant anteriority × stimulus condition interaction indicated the effect of stimulus 
condition on LPP amplitude was different across levels of anteriority, F(12, 612) = 5.28,  p < 
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.0001.  At frontal sites, there were no significant differences in LPP amplitude due to stimulus 
condition (all ps > .58).  However, LPPs elicited by certain and uncertain aversive images had 
higher LPP amplitudes than certain and uncertain neutral images at each level of anteriority from 
fronto-central to parietal scalp regions (all ps < .0001).  At the centro-parietal midline there was 
evidence to suggest LPPs in response to aversive stimuli are amplified by uncertainty (see Figure 
4).  Across the centro-parietal leads, LPP amplitude elicited by aversive images were 
significantly larger when preceded by uncertainty cues (M = 5.10; s.d. = 4.50) compared to when 
they were preceded by certainty cues (M = 4.11, s.d. = 4.00, p = .01). This effect did not emerge 
at other scalp regions.  Certainty and uncertainty cues did not influence LPP responses to neutral 
images at any region.   
A significant laterality × stimulus condition interaction [F(6, 306) = 4.24, p = .0004) 
revealed that aversive images preceded by certain and uncertain cues were larger than neutral 
images across all electrode locations (all ps < .0003).  Neutral images were not different across 
cue type.  At right-lateralized scalp regions, aversive images preceded by uncertainty cues were 
significantly larger than those preceded by certainty cues, p = .05.  Three-way and four-way 
interactions were not significant (all ps > .18). 
In summary, these results are consistent with previous research that has indicated the 
greatest magnitude LPPs in response to emotional stimuli occur at centro-parietal and parietal 
regions during the processing of affective pictures (e.g., Cuthbert et al., 2000; Ferrari, Bradley & 
Lang, 2011; Hajcak, MacNamara, Foti & Keil, 2011; Schupp et al., 2000).  The results suggest 
that during the early stimulus window, LPP amplitude was maximal and most sensitive to 
stimulus condition at the centro-parietal midline (CPz).  During the middle window, the LPP 
began to take on a right-hemisphere preponderance at CP4, but was statistically equivalent with 
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CPz in amplitude and sensitivity to stimulus condition.  These results are consistent with the 
scalp distribution depicted in the Figure 3, and time course of the LPP as depicted in Figures 5 
and 6.  In what follows, models of the LPP will be tested at electrode sites CPz and CP4. 
 Questions 2.1 and 2.2:  Do certain and uncertain aversive images elicit larger LPP 
amplitudes than certain and uncertain neutral images?  Do uncertainty-cued aversive and 
neutral images elicit larger LPP amplitudes than certainty-cued aversive and neutral 
stimuli?  To formally address the questions from specific aim 2, whether aversive images 
elicited larger LPP amplitudes than neutral images (Question 2.1), and whether stimulus 
uncertainty elicited larger LPP amplitudes than stimulus certainty (Question 2.2), I conducted a 2 
(electrode site: CPz, CP4) × 3 (signal window: early, middle, late) × 2 (stimulus valence: neutral, 
aversive) × 2 (cue type: certain, uncertain) repeated measures mixed model using restricted 
maximum likelihood estimation, with all independent variables entered as repeated measures.  
Table 7 displays the parameter estimates for the full mixed model.  Means and standard 
deviations are available in Tables 4-6. 
 Main effects.  There was a significant main effect for electrode site [F(1, 51) = 8.27, p = 
.006], and Tukey-Kramer adjusted post-hoc comparisons indicated LPP amplitudes were higher 
at electrode site CPz than CP4, t(51) = 2.88, p = .006.  There were also significant main effects 
for Stimulus cue [F(1, 51) = 12.64, p = .0008] and Stimulus valence, F(1, 51) = 130.07, p < 
.0001.  As expected, stimuli preceded by uncertainty cues elicited significantly larger LPP 
amplitudes than when stimuli were preceded by certainty cues, t(51) = -3.56, p = .0008.  
Aversive stimuli elicited significantly larger LPP amplitudes than neutral stimuli [t(51) = -11.41, 
p < .0001], which was also expected. There was not a main effect of signal window, F (2, 102) = 
1.62, p = .20. 
  
72 
 
Table 7.  Parameter estimates modeling the effects of signal window, stimulus cue, and stimulus 
valence on LPP amplitudes (µv) at electrode sites CPz and CP4. 
 
 
Effect      df F    p 
Electrode (1, 51) 8.27  .0059 
Signal window (2, 102) 1.62  .2034 
Stimulus cue (1, 51) 12.64  .0008 
Stimulus valence (1, 51) 130.07 < .0001 
Electrode × Signal window (2, 102) 5.43  .0057 
Electrode × Stimulus cue (1, 51) 0.01  .9059 
Electrode × Stimulus valence (1, 51) 3.08  .0854 
Signal window × Stimulus cue (2, 102) 0.88  .4167 
Signal window × Stimulus valence (2, 102) 0.38  .6833 
Stimulus cue × Stimulus valence (1, 51) 10.16  .0024 
Electrode × Signal window × Stimulus cue (2, 102) 0.13  .8803 
Electrode × Signal window × Stimulus valence (2, 102) 0.62  .5418 
Electrode × Stimulus cue × Stimulus valence (1, 51) 0.46  .5011 
Signal window × Stimulus cue × Stimulus valence (2, 102) 0.45  .6404 
Electrode × Signal window × Stimulus cue × 
Stimulus valence 
(2, 102) 0.03  .9715 
     
Notes.  Levels of electrode were CPz and CP4.  Levels of signal window were early (500ms – 
1000ms), middle (1500ms – 2000ms), and late (2001-2500ms).  Levels of stimulus cue were 
certain and uncertain.  Levels of stimulus valence were aversive and neutral.  Tukey-Kramer 
adjusted p-values are presented. 
 
 
Two-way interactions.  There was a significant Electrode × Signal window interaction, 
F(2, 102) = 5.43, p = .006. Tukey-Kramer post-hoc tests indicated no differences in LPP 
amplitude between electrode sites CPz and CP4 during the early signal window [t(102) = -.87, p 
= .95], but during the middle [t(102) = 3.33, p = .001] and late signal windows [t(102) = 2.03, p 
= .045], LPP amplitudes were larger at CPz compared to CP4. 
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The significant main effects for stimulus cue and stimulus valence were qualified by a 
significant stimulus cue × stimulus valence interaction on LPP amplitude, F(1, 51) = 10.16, p = 
.002.  An examination of the simple effects of this interaction indicated that when stimuli were of 
neutral valence, there were no differences in LPP amplitude due to stimulus cue, t(51) = -.26, p = 
.99).  However, when stimulus valence was aversive, uncertainty cues elicited significantly 
larger LPP amplitudes than certainty cues, t(51) = -4.77, p < .0001.   
In sum, results these results provide robust support for specific aim 2.   Aversive stimuli 
elicited larger LPP amplitudes than neutral stimuli, and uncertainty cues elicited larger LPP 
amplitudes than certainty cues (i.e. main effects).  Consistent with past research, uncertainty cues 
were found to increase negative appraisals of unpleasant stimuli.  There were no other significant 
2-way, 3-way, or 4-way interaction terms (see Table 7). 
Specific aim 3.  Mindfulness and self-reported stimulus appraisal.    
The third specific aim of the present study was to determine whether trait mindfulness 
would predict more benign appraisals - less unpleasant affect and less unpleasant stimulus 
ratings - following the display of uncertain stimulus cues.  To provide additional support, traits 
that contrast with mindfulness, including uncertainty-distress and anxiety-related traits, were 
tested and expected to increase unpleasant affect and stimulus ratings following uncertainty-cued 
aversive and neutral images, compared to certainty-cued aversive and neutral images.   
Preliminary assessment of psychological trait relations.  Prior to conducting these 
tests, I examined the correlations between each of the individual difference measures to ensure 
all traits were related in the expected directions.  The MAAS and FFMQ were highly correlated 
(r51= .79, p < .0001), as were measures of uncertainty distress (the IUS and URS; r51 = .84, p < 
.0001). Anxiety-related traits were also intercorrelated as expected.  Neuroticism scores were 
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highly correlated with the BDI and the PSWQ (r51 = .61 and r51 = .62, respectively; ps < .0001), 
and the PSWQ was related to the BDI, r51 = .32, p = .02.  Correlations between measures of 
mindfulness with uncertainty-distress and anxiety-related traits are depicted in Table 8. As 
expected, the correlations between the MAAS, FFMQAW, and ACS attentional control were 
inversely related with measures of uncertainty distress (IUS and URS measures) and all three 
anxiety-related traits (NEO neuroticism, PSWQ, BDI depression).   
 
 
Table 8.  Correlations between measures of mindfulness, uncertainty distress, and anxiety 
related traits. 
 
Trait variables 
Uncertainty distress Anxiety 
IUS 
uncertainty 
URS 
emotion 
NEO-FFI 
neuroticism 
PSWQ 
worry 
BDI 
depression 
MAAS mindfulness -.61*** -.63*** -.60*** -.55*** -.57*** 
FFMQ awareness -.40* -.50** -.64*** -.54*** -.61*** 
      
 
Notes.  N = 52 (n = 50 for IUS and URS).  MAAS = Mindful Attention Awareness Scale; FFMQ 
= Five-Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire; ACS = Attention Control Scale; IUS = Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale; URS = Uncertainty Response Scale; NEO-FFI = Neuroticism Extroversion 
Openness-Five Factor Inventory; PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; BDI = Beck 
Depression Inventory. 
*P < 0.01, **P < 0.001, ***P < 0.0001 
 
 
Question 3.1: Does trait mindfulness predict lower unpleasant affect following 
uncertainty-cued aversive and neutral images compared to certainty-cued aversive and 
neutral images?  To directly test whether trait mindfulness predicted lower unpleasant affect 
following uncertainty-cued aversive and neutral images compared to certainty-cued aversive and 
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neutral images, I conducted a 2 separate  2 (cue type: 0 = certain, 1 = uncertain) × 2 (stimulus 
valence: 0 = neutral, 1 = aversive) repeated measures mixed models with restricted maximum 
likelihood estimation, with each model covarying one measure of mindfulness.  
In both models testing whether MAAS and FFMQAW mindfulness would reduce 
unpleasant affect following emotional stimulus exposure, there were no significant effects 
besides the main effect for stimulus valence described earlier when testing specific aim 1 (all ps 
> .39). That is, aversive images elicited higher self-reported unpleasant affect compared to 
neutral images, and uncertainty cues elicited more unpleasant affect than certainty cues, but there 
were no significant main or interaction effects for MAAS or FFMQAW mindfulness.  This 
suggests that there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that mindfulness ameliorates negative 
affect following stimulus exposure. 
Question 3.2.  Does trait mindfulness predict lower unpleasant stimulus ratings 
following uncertainty-cued aversive and neutral images compared to certainty-cued 
aversive and neutral images?  Analogous mixed models to those tested in Question 3.1 were 
conducted to determine whether mindfulness may reduce unpleasant perceptions of the images, 
as indicated in post-stimulus picture ratings.  That is, 2 separate 2 (cue type: 0 = certain, 1 = 
uncertain) × 2 (stimulus valence: 0 = neutral, 1 = aversive) repeated measures mixed models 
with restricted maximum likelihood estimation were conducted, with each model covarying one 
measure of mindfulness.  There were significant main effects for cue type [F(1, 49) = 5.09, p = 
.03] and stimulus valence [F(1, 49) = 1116.94, p < .0001], but there were no significant main 
effects for the MAAS or FFMQAW (ps > .12), nor any significant interaction effects (all ps > 
.26).  In sum, there was no evidence to suggest that dispositional mindfulness ameliorated the 
influence of stimulus valence and cue-type on post-stimulus picture ratings. 
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Question 3.3.  Do traits that contrast with mindfulness (measures of uncertainty 
distress and anxiety-related traits) predict higher unpleasant affect following uncertainty-
cued aversive and neutral images compared to certainty-cued aversive and neutral images?  
To assess whether traits that contrast with mindfulness would predict higher unpleasant affect 
following uncertainty-cued aversive and neutral images compared to certainty-cued aversive and 
neutral images, repeated measures mixed models with restricted maximum likelihood estimation 
were conducted similar to those above.  Five independent 2 (cue type: certainty, uncertainty) × 2 
(stimulus valence: neutral, aversive) mixed models, were conducted with one trait entered as a 
covariate in each model.  The first two models covaried measures of uncertainty distress (the IUS 
and URS, respectively), and the latter three models covaried anxiety related traits (NEO 
neuroticism, PSWQ worry, and BDI depression, respectively). 
The first two mixed models covarying measures of uncertainty distress (IUS intolerance 
of uncertainty and URS emotional responses to uncertainty) yielded no significant main effects 
or interactions on post-stimulus affect ratings (all ps > .27).  Likewise, there were no significant 
main or interaction effects for NEO-FFI neuroticism on post-stimulus affect ratings (ps > .10).  
The latter two models testing PSWQ worry and BDI depression on affect ratings yielded no 
significant main effects (ps > .25), but there was a significant PSWQ worry × stimulus valence 
interaction [F(1, 138) = 9.98, p = .002] and a significant BDI depression × stimulus valence 
interaction with post-stimulus affect ratings, F(1, 144) = 3.75, p = .05.  
Figure 7 depicts the interaction between stimulus valence and PSWQ worry on post-
stimulus affect ratings, and Figure 8 depicts the interaction between stimulus valence and BDI 
depression and on post-stimulus affect ratings.  The slopes of the regression lines predicting 
post-stimulus mood ratings with PSWQ worry were significantly different for neutral and  
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Figure 7.  Interaction between stimulus valence and PSWQ worry on post-stimulus affect 
ratings.   
Note.  PSWQ Worry scores were group-mean centered.  Mood Rating (-4 = unpleasant/negative; 
0 = neutral; 4 = pleasant/happy). 
 
 
aversive images.  As is evident in Figure 7, post-stimulus affect ratings following aversive 
pictures became more unpleasant as PSWQ worry scores increased.  However, post-stimulus 
mood ratings following neutral images became more positive as PSWQ worry scores increased.  
This similar pattern was found for BDI depression.  This evidence suggests that heightened  
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Figure 8. Interaction between stimulus valence and BDI depression on post-stimulus affect 
ratings.   
Note.  BDI depression scores were group-mean centered.  Mood Rating (-4 = 
unpleasant/negative; 0 = neutral; 4 = pleasant/happy). 
 
 
predispositions of worry and depression are related to greater unpleasant affect following the 
display of aversive stimuli, compared to neutral stimuli. 
Question 3.4.  Do traits that contrast with mindfulness predict higher unpleasant 
stimulus ratings following uncertainty-cued aversive and neutral images compared to 
certainty-cued aversive and neutral images?  To examine whether traits that contrast with 
mindfulness would predict higher unpleasant stimulus ratings following uncertainty-cued 
aversive and neutral images compared to certainty-cued aversive and neutral images, an 
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analogous sequence of 5 repeated measure mixed models was conducted on post-stimulus picture 
ratings.  Each of the five 2 (cue type: certainty, uncertainty) × 2 (stimulus valence: neutral, 
aversive) repeated measures mixed models, were conducted with one trait entered as a covariate 
in each model.  The first two models covaried measures of uncertainty distress (the IUS and 
URS, respectively), and the latter three models covaried anxiety related traits (NEO neuroticism, 
PSWQ worry, and BDI depression, respectively). 
There were no significant main or interaction effects with IUS intolerance of uncertainty 
or URS emotional responses to uncertainty on picture ratings (all ps > .14).  There were also no 
main or interaction effects for BDI depression or NEO-FFI neuroticism (all ps > .11). The model 
testing PSWQ worry indicated no significant main effect for worry, but there was a significant 
PSWQ worry × stimulus valence interaction on post-stimulus picture ratings, F(1, 138) = 9.49, p 
= .003.   
Figure 9 depicts the interaction between stimulus valence × PSWQ Worry on post- 
stimulus picture ratings.  Consistent with the model tested on affect ratings in Question 3.3, the 
slopes of the regression lines predicting post-stimulus picture ratings were significantly different 
for neutral and aversive valence categories.  Post-stimulus picture ratings for aversive stimuli 
were more unpleasant as PSWQ increased, but post-stimulus picture ratings for neutral stimuli 
became more positive as PSWQ increased. 
In summary, the results of tests related to specific aim 3 indicated that there was no 
evidence to suggest that dispositional mindfulness blunted self-reported negative appraisals in 
response to the emotional images, with no significant effects of dispositional mindfulness on  
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Figure 9.  Interaction between stimulus valence and PSWQ worry on post-stimulus picture 
ratings.   
Note.  PSWQ Worry scores were group-mean centered.  Mood Rating (-4 = unpleasant/negative; 
0 = neutral; 4 = pleasant/happy). 
 
 
post-stimulus self-reported affect or post-stimulus self-reported image ratings.  However, two 
anxiety-related traits – PSWQ worry and BDI depression – did account for significant variability 
in emotional appraisal processes.  A heightened predisposition to worry, as captured by the 
PSWQ worry scale, was predictive of significantly higher self-reported post-stimulus unpleasant 
affect and image ratings, and higher levels of BDI depression was associated with greater self-
reported post-stimulus unpleasant affect following aversive images. 
Specific aim 4.  Mindfulness and a cortical measure of stimulus appraisal.   
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The fourth specific aim of the present study was to determine whether dispositional 
mindfulness was predictive of attenuated LPP responses to aversive emotional stimuli relative to 
neutral stimuli under conditions of uncertainty and certainty, during an early time period (500-
1000ms) of the LPP.  To address questions 4.1 and 4.2, I conducted a sequence of 2 (electrode 
site: CPz, CP4) × 3 (signal window: early, middle, late) × 2 (stimulus valence: neutral, aversive) 
× 2 (cue type: certain, uncertain) repeated measures mixed model using restricted maximum 
likelihood estimation, with each of the individual difference variables sensitive to mindfulness 
(Question 4.1) and traits that contrast with mindfulness (Question 4.2) entered as a covariate in 
separate models.  Means and standard deviations are available in Tables 3-7. 
Question 4.1.  Is trait mindfulness associated with lower deflections of the LPP 
following aversive images relative to neutral images when preceded by uncertainty and 
certainty cues?  To address whether trait mindfulness was associated with lower deflections of 
the LPP following aversive images relative to neutral images when preceded by uncertainty and 
certainty cues, two mixed models were conducted (factors specified above) with each model 
covarying MAAS and FFMQAW measures, respectively.  Figure 10 depicts the average LPP 
waveforms evoked by each stimulus condition across all three stimulus windows for participants 
higher and lower in MAAS mindfulness (as derived by a median split) at electrode sites CPz and 
CP4. 
MAAS mindfulness on LPP amplitude.  Significant parameter estimates for the model 
testing the effect of MAAS dispositional mindfulness on signal window, stimulus cue and 
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Figure 10.  Grand average LPP waveforms at electrode locations CPz and CP4 elicited by certain 
and uncertain aversive and neutral visual stimuli, shown separately for high and low MAAS 
mindfulness groups created by a median split. 
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Table 9.  Significant parameter estimates modeling the effects of MAAS mindfulness, signal 
window, stimulus cue, and stimulus valence on LPP amplitudes (µv) at electrodes CPz and CP4. 
 
 
Effect      Df F    p 
Electrode (1, 51) 8.32  .0057 
Electrode × Signal window (2, 102) 5.49  .0054 
Stimulus cue (1, 51) 12.72  .0008 
Stimulus valence (1, 51) 130.91 < .0001 
Stimulus cue × Stimulus valence (1, 51) 10.23  .0024 
MAAS (1, 50) 5.22  .0266 
MAAS × Stimulus valence (1, 1150) 18.78 < .0001 
     
Notes.  Levels of electrode were CPz and CP4.  Levels of signal window were early (500ms – 
1000ms), middle (1500ms – 2000ms), and late (2001-2500ms).  Levels of stimulus cue were 
certain and uncertain.  Levels of stimulus valence were aversive and neutral.  Tukey-Kramer 
adjusted p-values are presented. 
 
 
stimulus valence at electrodes CPz and CP4 are depicted in Table 9.  Model parameters not 
involving mindfulness were consistent with those previously reported in Question 2.1, so the 
present results will focus on mindfulness-related effects of interest.  There was a significant main 
effect of MAAS dispositional mindfulness, F(1, 50) =  5.22, p = .02.  In contrast to my 
expectations and past research on mindfulness and the LPP (Brown et al., 2013), higher levels of 
dispositional mindfulness were associated with larger deflections of the LPP.  There was also a 
significant MAAS × stimulus valence interaction, F(1, 1150) = 18.78, p < .0001.  Figure 11 
displays the interaction between MAAS dispositional mindfulness and stimulus valence on LPP 
amplitude.  The slopes of the regression lines predicting LPP amplitude by MAAS were 
significantly different due to the valence of the stimulus.  For aversive stimuli, higher levels of 
MAAS dispositional mindfulness predicted more positive deflections of the LPP.  For neutral  
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Figure 11.  Interaction between stimulus valence and MAAS mindfulness on LPP amplitude 
(µv) at electrode sites CPz and CP4 across all three signal windows. 
 
 
stimuli, slope of the line predicting LPP amplitude by mindfulness was significantly less 
positive. There were no other significant interaction effects involving the MAAS. 
FFMQAW mindfulness on LPP amplitude.  A second analogous model was conducted to 
examine the effect of FFMQAW mindfulness on LPP amplitude, and the findings were consistent 
with the model testing the MAAS.  Significant parameter estimates for the model testing the 
effect of FFMQAW dispositional mindfulness on signal window, stimulus cue and stimulus 
valence at electrodes CPz and CP4 are depicted in Table 10.  There was a significant main effect 
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of FFMQAW mindfulness, F(1, 50) =  13.00, p = .0007.  As with the MAAS, higher levels of 
FFMQAW mindfulness were associated with larger deflections of the LPP.  There was also a 
significant FFMQAW × stimulus valence interaction, F(1, 1127) = 10.93, p = .001.  Figure 12 
displays the interaction between FFMQAW dispositional mindfulness and stimulus valence.  The 
slopes of the regression lines predicting LPP amplitude by FFMQAW were significantly different 
due to the valence of the stimulus.  For aversive stimuli, higher levels of FFMQAW dispositional 
mindfulness predicted more positive deflections of the LPP.  For neutral stimuli, the slope of the 
line predicting LPP amplitude by FFMQAW mindfulness was significantly less positive. There 
were no other significant interaction effects involving the FFMQAW. 
 
 
Table 10.  Significant parameter estimates modeling the effects of FFMQAW mindfulness, signal 
window, stimulus cue, and stimulus valence on LPP amplitudes (µv) at electrodes CPz and CP4. 
 
 
Effect      Df F    p 
Electrode (1, 50) 7.38  .0009 
Electrode × Signal window (2, 100) 1.68  .1923 
Stimulus cue (1, 50) 12.28  .0010 
Stimulus valence (1, 50) 127.80 < .0001 
Stimulus cue × Stimulus valence (1, 50) 9.64  .0031 
FFMQAW (1, 50) 13.00  .0007 
FFMQAW × Stimulus valence (1, 1127) 10.93 < .0010 
     
Notes.  Levels of electrode were CPz and CP4.  Levels of signal window were early (500ms – 
1000ms), middle (1500ms – 2000ms), and late (2001-2500ms).  Levels of stimulus cue were 
certain and uncertain.  Levels of stimulus valence were aversive and neutral.  Tukey-Kramer 
adjusted p-values are presented. 
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Figure 12.  Interaction between stimulus valence and FFMQAW mindfulness on LPP amplitude 
(µv) at electrode sites CPz and CP4 across all three signal windows. 
 
 
Correlations between mindfulness and LPP amplitude.  Table 11 shows the pattern of 
correlations for MAAS and FFMQAW mindfulness at electrode site CPz.  The effects for stimulus 
condition were consistent with earlier models: uncertain and certain-cued aversive stimuli 
elicited significantly larger deflections of the LPP compared to neutral images (ps < .0001).  LPP 
amplitudes were also significantly greater when aversive images were preceded by uncertainty 
compared to certainty cues (ps < .0001).  Both the MAAS and FFMQAW were predictors of  
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Table 11.  Correlations between LPP amplitude (µv) and mindfulness at electrode site CPz. 
 
 
Certain 
Neutral 
Uncertain 
Neutral 
Certain  
Aversive 
Uncertain 
Aversive 
MAAS mindfulness     
     Early (500-1000 ms) .24  .25 .30* .30* 
     Middle (1500-2000 ms) -.06 .08 .08 .14 
     Late (2001-2500 ms) .03 .06 .13 .20 
     Full window   .05 .12 .17 .21 
FFMQ awareness     
     Early .17 .14 .18 .18 
     Middle .03 .11 .14 .18 
     Late .14 .21 .22 .29* 
     Full window .15 .15 .11 .22 
    
Notes.  N = 52.  MAAS = Mindful Attention Awareness Scale; FFMQ = Five-Factor 
Mindfulness Questionnaire Act with Awareness .  *P < 0.05 
 
 
positive LPP amplitude during the early window, indicating that higher mindfulness was 
associated with larger deflections of the LPP, and for the MAAS this positive relation was 
particularly strong for certain and uncertain aversive stimuli compared to neutral stimuli. 
Question 4.2.  Do traits that contrast with mindfulness predict higher LPP 
deflections elicited by aversive images relative to neutral images when preceded by 
uncertainty and certainty cues?  To determine whether traits that contrast with mindfulness 
predict higher LPP deflections elicited by aversive images relative to neutral images when 
preceded by uncertainty and certainty cues, 5 models were conducted similar to the two above 
that tested mindfulness, with each model covarying one psychological trait.  A sequence of 2 
(electrode site: CPz, CP4) × 3 (signal window: early, middle, late) × 2 (stimulus valence: neutral, 
aversive) × 2 (cue type: certain, uncertain) repeated measures mixed models using restricted 
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maximum likelihood estimation were tested, with each of the 5 individual difference variables 
sensitive to uncertainty distress and anxiety-related traits entered into separate models as 
covariates.  
IUS intolerance of uncertainty on LPP amplitude.  The model testing IUS intolerance of 
uncertainty indicated no main effect for the IUS, F(1, 48) = 0.94, p = .34.  However, there was a 
significant IUS × stimulus valence interaction, F(1, 1104) = 9.40, p = .0022. Table 12 depicts all 
the significant parameter estimates for the model and Figure 13 displays the interaction between 
IUS intolerance of uncertainty and stimulus valence.  The slopes of the regression lines 
predicting LPP amplitude by IUS intolerance of uncertainty were significantly different due to  
 
 
Table 12.  Significant parameter estimates modeling the effects of IUS intolerance of uncertainty, 
signal window, stimulus cue, and stimulus valence on LPP amplitudes (µv) at electrodes CPz 
and CP4. 
 
 
Effect      df F    p 
Electrode (1, 49) 10.20  .0025 
Electrode × Signal window (2, 98) 4.64  .0118 
Stimulus cue (1, 49) 12.89  .0008 
Stimulus valence (1, 49) 126.21 < .0001 
Stimulus cue × Stimulus valence (1, 49) 10.49  .0022 
IUS × Stimulus valence (1, 1104) 9.40  .0022 
     
Notes.  Levels of electrode were CPz and CP4.  Levels of signal window were early (500ms – 
1000ms), middle (1500ms – 2000ms), and late (2001-2500ms).  Levels of stimulus cue were 
certain and uncertain.  Levels of stimulus valence were aversive and neutral.  Tukey-Kramer 
adjusted p-values are presented. 
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the valence of the stimulus.  For aversive stimuli, higher levels of IUS intolerance of uncertainty 
were associated with smaller deflections of the LPP.  For neutral stimuli, slope of the line 
predicting LPP amplitude was significantly more positive, with higher IUS intolerance of 
uncertainty scores predicting larger deflections of the LPP.  Thus, IUS intolerance for 
uncertainty was predictive of LPP amplitude in the direction opposite of both measures of 
mindfulness.  
 
 
 
Figure 13.  Interaction between stimulus valence and IUS intolerance of uncertainty on LPP 
amplitude (µv) at electrode sites CPz and CP4 across all three signal windows. 
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URS emotional responses to uncertainty on LPP amplitude.  The model testing URS 
emotional responses to uncertainty indicated no significant main effect for the URS [F(1, 48) = 
1.74, p = .19], but there were significant URS × Electrode [F(1, 1104) = 7.69, p = .006] and URS 
× stimulus valence interactions, F(1, 1104) = 5.68, p = .02.  No other interaction effects with the 
URS were significant.  Table 13 depicts all the significant parameter estimates for the model.  
 
 
Table 13.  Significant parameter estimates modeling the effects of URS emotional responses to 
uncertainty, signal window, stimulus cue, and stimulus valence on LPP amplitudes (µv) at 
electrodes CPz and CP4. 
 
Effect      df F    p 
Electrode (1, 49) 10.18  .0025 
Electrode × Signal window (2, 98) 4.65  .0118 
Stimulus cue (1, 49) 12.86  .0008 
Stimulus valence (1, 49) 126.00 < .0001 
Stimulus cue × Stimulus valence (1, 49) 10.47  .0022 
URS × Electrode (1, 1104) 7.69  .0057 
URS × Stimulus valence (1, 1104) 5.68  .0173 
     
Notes.  Levels of electrode were CPz and CP4.  Levels of signal window were early (500ms – 
1000ms), middle (1500ms – 2000ms), and late (2001-2500ms).  Levels of stimulus cue were 
certain and uncertain.  Levels of stimulus valence were aversive and neutral.  Tukey-Kramer 
adjusted p-values are presented. 
 
 
Decomposing the URS × Electrode interaction indicated that the URS was more strongly 
related to LPP amplitudes at CPz, compared to CP4.  The URS × stimulus valence interaction 
indicated similar effects to those of IUS intolerance of uncertainty.  Figure 14 displays the 
interaction between URS emotional responses to uncertainty and stimulus valence.  The slopes of  
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Figure 14.  Interaction between stimulus valence and URS emotional responses to uncertainty on 
LPP amplitude (µv) at electrode sites CPz and CP4 across all three signal windows. 
 
 
the regression lines predicting LPP amplitude URS emotional responses to uncertainty were 
significantly different due to the valence of the stimulus.  For aversive stimuli, higher levels of 
IUS intolerance of uncertainty were associated with smaller deflections of the LPP.  For neutral 
stimuli, slope of the line predicting LPP amplitude was significantly more positive, with higher 
IUS intolerance of uncertainty scores predicting larger deflections of the LPP. 
NEO neuroticism on LPP amplitude.  The model testing NEO neuroticism indicated no 
significant main effect for the neuroticism [F(1, 50) = 0.97, p = .33], but there was a  significant 
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neuroticism × stimulus valence interaction, F(1, 1150) = 10.40, p = .001.  No other interaction 
effects with the neuroticism were significant.  Significant parameter estimates are displayed in 
Table 14 and the interaction between NEO neuroticism and stimulus valence is depicted in 
Figure 15.  Consistent with findings from models testing measures of uncertainty distress, the 
slopes of the regression lines predicting LPP amplitude from with neuroticism were significantly 
different.  For aversive stimuli, higher levels of neuroticism predicted smaller deflections of the 
LPP.  For neutral stimuli, slope of the line predicting LPP amplitude was significantly more 
positive, with higher neuroticism scores predicting larger deflections of the LPP.   
 
Table 14.  Significant parameter estimates modeling the effects of NEO neuroticism, signal 
window, stimulus cue, and stimulus valence on LPP amplitudes (µv) at electrodes CPz and CP4. 
 
Effect      df F    p 
Electrode (1, 51) 8.24  .0060 
Electrode × Signal window (2, 102) 5.42  .0058 
Stimulus cue (1, 51) 12.60  .0008 
Stimulus valence (1, 51) 129.62 < .0001 
Stimulus cue × Stimulus valence (1, 51) 10.13  .0025 
NEO neuroticism × Stimulus valence (1, 1150) 10.40  .0013 
     
Notes.  Levels of electrode were CPz and CP4.  Levels of signal window were early (500ms – 
1000ms), middle (1500ms – 2000ms), and late (2001-2500ms).  Levels of stimulus cue were 
certain and uncertain.  Levels of stimulus valence were aversive and neutral.  Tukey-Kramer 
adjusted p-values are presented. 
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Figure 15.  Interaction between stimulus valence and NEO neuroticism on LPP amplitude (µv) at 
electrode sites CPz and CP4 across all three signal windows. 
 
 
PSWQ worry on LPP amplitude.  The model covarying PSWQ worry indicated no 
significant main or interaction effects involving worry (all ps > .16). 
BDI depression on LPP amplitude.  The model testing BDI depression indicated no 
significant main effect for depression [F(1, 50) = 0.93, p = .34], but there were significant 
depression × electrode [F(1, 1150) = 8.41, p = .004], and depression × electrode × valence 
interactions, F(1, 1150) = 6.37, p = .0118 .  No other interaction effects with the depression were 
significant.  Significant parameter estimates are displayed in Table 15.  The differences in slopes 
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between neutral and aversive stimuli by BDI depression were significantly different at electrodes 
CPz and CP4.  Plots depicting this depression × electrode × stimulus valence interaction are 
depicted in Figure 16.  At electrode CPz, there was not a significant depression × stimulus 
valence interaction, F(1, 550) = .35, p = .56.  That is, the slopes of the regression lines predicting 
LPP amplitude by BDI depression were not difference across the two stimulus valences.  At the 
right-sided electrode site CP4, however, the BDI depression × stimulus valence interaction was 
highly significant [F(1, 550) = 12.62, p = .0004], which indicates the slopes of the regression 
lines predicting LPP amplitude by BDI depression were significantly different for neutral 
compared to aversive stimuli.  For aversive stimuli, higher BDI depression scores were 
associated with smaller deflections of the LPP.  For neutral stimuli, higher BDI depression scores 
were associated with larger deflections of the LPP.   
 
Table 15.  Significant parameter estimates modeling the effects of BDI depression, signal 
window, stimulus cue, and stimulus valence on LPP amplitudes (µv) at electrodes CPz and CP4. 
 
Effect      Df F    p 
Electrode (1, 51) 8.28  .0058 
Electrode × Signal window (2, 102) 5.44  .0057 
Stimulus cue (1, 51) 12.67  .0008 
Stimulus valence (1, 51) 130.33 < .0001 
Stimulus cue × Stimulus valence (1, 51) 10.18  .0024 
BDI depression × Electrode (1, 1150) 8.41  .0038 
BDI depression × Electrode × Stimulus valence (1, 1150) 6.37  .0118 
     
Notes.  Levels of electrode were CPz and CP4.  Levels of signal window were early (500ms – 
1000ms), middle (1500ms – 2000ms), and late (2001-2500ms).  Levels of stimulus cue were 
certain and uncertain.  Levels of stimulus valence were aversive and neutral.  Tukey-Kramer 
adjusted p-values are presented. 
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Figure 16.  Interaction between stimulus valence and BDI depression on LPP amplitude (µv) at 
electrode sites CPz and CP4 across all three signal windows. 
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Summary of findings addressing Specific Aim 4.  In contrast to my expectations and 
past research (Brown et al., 2013), trait mindfulness as measured by both the MAAS and 
FFMQAW were directly related to LPP amplitude, such that higher levels of dispositional 
mindfulness were associated with larger deflections of the LPP elicited by aversive picture 
content.  There were no significant effects due to the stimulus window, however, the correlation 
between the MAAS and FFMQAW measures had the most robust relations with LPP amplitude 
during the early stimulus window.  Two measures of uncertainty distress (IUS intolerance of 
uncertainty and URS emotional responses to uncertainty) and two measures of anxiety-related 
traits (NEO neuroticism and BDI depression) predicted opposite patterns of association with  
mindfulness and predicted lower LPP amplitudes elicited by aversive stimuli relative to neutral 
stimuli.  There were no significant interactive effects between psychological traits and stimulus 
cue on LPP amplitude, which suggests there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that these 
psychological traits modulate the effect of stimulus uncertainty on a neural marker of emotional 
stimulus appraisal. 
 Specific Aim 5.  Uncertainty and Self-reported Stimulus Anticipation.   
The fifth aim of the present research was to replicate demonstrate a priori and online 
covariation biases amplify unpleasant affect and stimulus ratings following the display of 
unpleasant stimuli under conditions of uncertainty.  Before examining this question, I conducted 
preliminary tests to demonstrate the presence of covariation biases.  Then I examined whether a 
priori and online covariation biases predicted higher self-reported unpleasant affect (Question 
5.1) and higher self-reported unpleasant image ratings (Question 5.2) following the presentation 
of neutral and aversive images under conditions of uncertainty, relative to certainty.  The 
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correlations between each measure of covariation bias and post-stimulus affect and picture 
ratings are depicted in Tables 16 and 17, respectively. 
 
Table 16.  Correlations between covariation biases and post-stimulus affect ratings. 
Covariation bias   CN   CA    UN   UA 
A priori -.09 -.23 -.07 -.25 
Online .17 .23 .07 .15 
Post-experiment .07 -.33* .13 -.31* 
      
Notes.  n = 48 for post-experiment covariation bias).  CN = certain-neutral; CA = certain 
aversive; UA = uncertain aversive. 
*P < 0.05 
 
 
Table 17.  Correlations between covariation biases and post-stimulus picture ratings. 
Covariation bias   CN   CA   UN   UA 
A priori .10 -.23 .08 -.23 
Online -.03 .14 .06 .22 
Post-experiment .10 -.33* .04 -.20 
    
Notes.  N = 52 (n = 48 for post-experiment covariation bias).  CN = certain-neutral; CA = certain 
aversive; UA = uncertain aversive. 
*P < 0.05 
 
 
Preliminary analysis: Did participants demonstrate a priori, online, and a posteriori 
covariation biases?  To demonstrate the presence of a priori and online covariation biases,  two 
one-sample t-tests were conducted comparing expectancy ratings to the first “?” cue and online 
expectancy ratings (the mean expectancy rating following all but the first uncertain cue) to a 
value of 5, which was the mid-point on the rating scale labeled as “uncertain.”  On average, 
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participants were more likely to expect aversive images following the first uncertain cue [(M = 
5.56, s.d. = 1.70), t(51) = 2.37, p=.022, ηp² = .09], which indicates the presence of an a priori 
covariation bias to associate uncertainty with aversion.  Evidence for an online expectancy bias 
was also found.  When participants were presented with uncertainty cues they expected aversive 
images would follow significantly more than their actual rate of 50% (M = 5.70, s.d. = .85), t(51) 
= 5.88, p < .0001, ηp² = .40.  To test whether participants baseline a priori covariation biases 
were amplified as they proceeded through the experiment, a priori and online covariation biases 
were compared using a paired-samples t-test; the test was not significant, t(51) = -.553, p = .58.  
To assess post-experiment covariation bias participants were asked to estimate the percentage of 
“?” cues that were followed by aversive pictures after they completed the experiment.  A one-
sample t-test was conducted comparing these retrospective estimates to their actual rate of 
appearance (50%), but there wasn’t sufficient evidence of a post-experiment covariation bias.2  
Participants’ post-experiment judgments (M = 53.83, s.d. = 15.17) were not different from a rate 
of 50%, t(47) = 1.731, p = .09, ηp² = .06.  The lack of post-experiment covariation bias is 
consistent with the findings of Grupe et al. (2011).  However, these and other authors (Amin & 
Lovibond, 1998) have found significant relations between online and post-experiment estimates 
of covariation bias.  The present study replicated this finding (r48 = -.30, p = .04).  This relation 
suggests that the magnitude of online covariation bias to expect aversive images to follow 
uncertainty cues was associated with heightened retrospective estimates of the proportion of 
uncertain cues followed by aversive pictures. 
Question 5.1.  Do anticipations, or expectations to associate uncertain cues with 
unpleasant outcomes (a priori and online covariation bias) predict more unpleasant affect 
                                                          
2 Five participants did not respond to the post-experiment covariation bias item, leaving a sample 
of n=48 for analysis. 
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after neutral and aversive image exposure under conditions of uncertainty relative to 
certainty?  To test whether a priori and online covariation biases would increase unpleasant 
affect after exposure to aversive and neutral pictures following uncertainty, relative to certainty, 
two multilevel models were conducted using restricted maximum likelihood estimation in SAS 
PROC MIXED.  In the first model, stimulus cue (certain, uncertain) and stimulus valence 
(neutral, aversive) were entered as repeated measures and the continuous measure of a priori 
covariation bias (the expectancy rating following the very first uncertainty cue) was entered into 
the model as a covariate.  The second model was identical to the first, except online covariation 
bias (the average expectancy rating following all but the first uncertainty cue) was entered as a 
covariate.  A third model was also tested to explore whether a posteriori covariation bias would 
be associated with self-reported affect ratings.  Pearson product-moment correlations between 
each measure of covariation bias and post-stimulus mood ratings are depicted in Table 16. 
A priori covariation bias on self-reported affect.  The model testing a priori covariation 
bias on self-reported affect indicated a significant main effect of stimulus valence [F(1, 49) = 
35.72, p < .0001.  Affect ratings were significantly more unpleasant following aversive images 
(M = -2.27, s.d. = 0.95) compared to neutral images (M = 0.60, s.d. = 0.65).  The main effect for 
stimulus cue and the stimulus cue × stimulus valence interaction terms were not significant (both 
ps > .60).  There was a significant main effect for a priori covariation bias [F(1, 48) = 5.13, p = 
.03]. Higher levels of a priori covariation bias were predictive of higher unpleasant affect, 
irrespective of cue and valence.  There were no significant interactions involving a priori 
covariation bias (all ps > .16).  The results of the present analysis suggest that higher levels of a 
priori covariation bias were associated with a general tendency to self-report more unpleasant 
  
100 
 
affect, but there was not sufficient evidence to conclude that a priori covariation bias influenced 
affect differently due to the nature of the emotional picture content or the stimulus cue. 
Online covariation bias on self-reported affect.  The model testing online covariation 
bias on self-reported affect indicated, as before, a significant main effect of stimulus valence, 
F(1, 49) = 6.22, p =.02.  Affect ratings were significantly more unpleasant following aversive 
images (M = -2.27, s.d. = 0.95) compared to neutral images (M = 0.60, s.d. = 0.65).  No other 
main or interaction effects were significant (all ps > .46).  These latter results suggest that online 
covariation bias did not account for a significant proportion of the variability in self-reported 
affect. 
A posteriori covariation bias on self-reported affect.  The model testing a posteriori 
covariation bias on self-reported affect, indicated a significant main effect of stimulus valence 
[F(1, 46) = 23.27, p < .0001].  The main effects for stimulus cue and a posteriori covariation 
bias, and the stimulus cue × stimulus valence interaction terms were not significant (all ps > .57).  
There was a significant a posteriori covariation bias × stimulus valence interaction, F(1, 125) = 
5.82, p = .02]. As is evident by the pattern of correlations depicted in Table 16, higher levels of a 
posteriori covariation bias were significantly related to higher unpleasant affect for aversive 
stimuli.  However, a posteriori covariation bias was not a significant predictor of affect following 
neutral stimuli.  There were no other significant interaction terms involving a priori covariation 
bias (all ps > .87).  The results of the present analysis suggest that higher levels of a posteriori 
covariation bias were associated with heightened unpleasant affect following aversive picture 
content, but there was not sufficient evidence to conclude that a priori covariation bias 
influenced affect differently due to the nature of the stimulus cue. 
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Question 5.2.  Do expectations to associate uncertain cues with unpleasant outcomes 
(a priori and online covariation bias) predict more unpleasant image ratings after neutral 
and aversive image exposure under conditions of uncertainty relative to certainty? 
Analogous models to those conducted in Question 5.1 were tested here to address whether a 
priori and online covariation bias would predict more unpleasant image ratings after neutral and 
aversive image exposure under conditions of uncertainty relative to certainty.  In the first model, 
stimulus cue (certain, uncertain) and stimulus valence (neutral, aversive) were entered as 
repeated measures and the continuous measure of a priori covariation bias was entered into the 
model as a covariate.  The second model was identical to the first, except online covariation bias 
was entered as a covariate.  A third model was also tested to explore whether a posteriori 
covariation bias would predict self-reported image ratings.  Pearson product-moment correlations 
between each measure of covariation bias and post-stimulus picture ratings are depicted in Table 
17. 
A priori covariation bias on self-reported image ratings.  The model testing a priori 
covariation bias on self-reported image ratings indicated a significant main effect for stimulus 
valence [F(1, 49) = 60.46, p < .0001], but no main effects for stimulus cue or a priori covariation 
bias (both ps > .26).  Aversive images (M = -2.57, s.d. = 0.75) were perceived as significantly 
more unpleasant than neutral images (M = 0.62, s.d. = 0.59).  There was also a significant a 
priori covariation bias × stimulus valence interaction, F(1, 144) = 4.25, p = .04.  The slopes of 
the regression lines predicting picture ratings from a priori covariation bias depended on the 
valence of the image.  Higher levels of a priori covariation bias were predictive of more 
unpleasant image ratings following aversive stimuli, but the slope of the relationship between a 
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priori covariation bias and images ratings was different for neutral images.  For neutral images, 
higher covariation bias was associated with less unpleasant stimulus ratings. 
Online covariation bias on self-reported image ratings.  The model testing online 
covariation bias on self-reported perceptions of the pictures indicated a significant main effect of 
stimulus valence, F(1, 49) = 6.22, p =.02.  No other main or interaction effects were significant 
(all ps > .46).  This latter result suggests that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that online 
covariation bias influences self-reported image ratings. 
A posteriori covariation bias on self-reported image ratings.  The model testing a 
posteriori covariation bias on self-reported image ratings indicated a significant main effect of 
stimulus valence [F(1, 46) = 49.94, p < .0001.  The main effects for stimulus cue and a posteriori 
covariation bias, and the stimulus cue × stimulus valence interaction terms were not significant 
(both ps > .35).  There was a significant a posteriori covariation bias × stimulus valence 
interaction, F(1, 135) = 5.21, p = .02]. Higher levels of a posteriori covariation bias were 
associated with higher unpleasant perceptions of aversive stimuli.  However, a posteriori 
covariation bias was associated with less unpleasant perceptions of neutral stimuli.  There were 
no other significant interaction terms involving a posteriori covariation bias (all ps > .46).  The 
results of the present analysis suggest that higher levels of a posteriori covariation bias were 
associated with heightened perceptions of the pictures as unpleasant following aversive picture 
content, but there was not sufficient evidence to conclude that a priori covariation bias 
influenced affect differently due to the nature of the stimulus cue. 
Summary of findings addressing Specific Aim 5.  The results of the present analyses 
suggest that heightened a priori covariation bias was associated with a general tendency to self-
report more unpleasant affect, and heightened perceptions of unpleasantness following the 
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display of aversive images.  There was not sufficient evidence to conclude that online 
covariation bias modulated self-reported appraisals.  Higher levels of a posteriori covariation 
bias were associated with heightened unpleasant affect and stimulus perceptions for aversive 
stimuli.  There was not sufficient evidence to conclude that a priori covariation, online, or a 
posteriori covariation biases were associated with differences in self-reported appraisals due to 
the nature of the stimulus cues.    
Specific Aim 6:  Uncertainty and a cortical measure of stimulus anticipation.   
The sixth specific aim of the present study was to determine whether emotional 
anticipation as indexed by the SPN is largest for certain-aversive and uncertain stimulus cues 
compared to certain-neutral stimulus cues.  Before conducting this test it was necessary to 
conduct a region of interest analysis to determine whether the SPN component was present and 
sensitive to cue type at electrode locations consistent with past research.  Following the region of 
interest analysis, mixed models will be tested to formally evaluate the question from Specific 
Aim 6. 
Preliminary Region of Interest Analysis on the SPN.   
 Visual inspection of the SPN waveforms averaged separately for each cue type indicated 
maximal differences due to cue type across frontal and fronto-central regions of the scalp (see 
Figure 17). This observed frontal scalp distribution is consistent with past studies that have 
examined the modulation of SPN amplitudes during the anticipation of emotional images 
(Klorman & Ryan, 1980; Moser et al., 2009; Takeuchi et al., 2005) and threat of shock (Böcker 
et al., 2001).  of emotional picture stimuli.  
 To examine the effects of electrode location, and stimulus condition on SPN amplitude, a 
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Figure 17.  Scalp distribution of grand averaged SPN waveforms elicited by each stimulus cue 
across a 1000 ms (post-expectancy rating) to 4000 ms (earliest image onset) recording period. 
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3 [anteriority: frontal  (F3, Fz, F4), central (C3, Cz, C4), parietal (P3, Pz, P4)] × 3 [electrode 
position: left (F3, C3,  P3), midline (Fz, Cz, Pz), right (F4, C4, P4)] × 3 (cue type: certain-
neutral, certain-aversive, uncertain)  repeated measures mixed model was tested using restricted 
maximum likelihood estimation (REML; e.g., Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992).  
The model indicated a significant main effect of anteriority on SPN amplitude [F(2, 102) 
= 38.59, p < .0001].  Tukey-Kramer adjusted post-hoc comparisons revealed that the SPN 
became significantly more negative as electrode locations progressed in posteriority from frontal 
(M = 1.34, s.d. = 3.93) through central (M = .43, s.d. = 3.44), to parietal sites (M = -.72, s.d. = 
3.71; ps < .0006 for all paired comparisons), a finding consistent with past research on the scalp 
distribution of the SPN during emotional stimulus anticipation (Brunia, van Boxtel, & Böcker, 
2012). There were no main effects for laterality [F(2, 102) = .21, p =.13] or cue type [F(2, 102) = 
.67, p = .52), and there was not a significant anteriority × cue type interaction, F(4, 204) = 2.06, 
p = .09.  
Given the apparent differences due to cue type in frontal regions depicted in Figures 17 
and 18, and on the basis of past research indicating a similar scalp distribution of SPN during 
anticipation of emotional stimuli (Klorman and Ryan, 1980; Böcker et al., 2001; Takeuchi et al., 
2005), a  multilevel model was conducted in which the anteriority factor was restricted to frontal 
(F3, Fz, F4) and fronto-central (FC3, FCz, FC4) leads.  The model indicated a significant main 
effect for laterality, F(2, 102) = 4.86, p = .01.  SPN amplitudes were more negative at the 
midline (M = .96, s.d. = 3.47) compared to the left-hemisphere (M =1.80, s.d. = 4.35; p = .01), 
but there were no other significant differences (ps > .07).  There was not a significant effect of 
effect of anteriority on the SPN, F(1, 51) = .02, p = .89.  Of central importance to the present 
study, there was a significant main effect of cue type, F(2, 102) = 5.50, p = .005. Uncertainty 
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cues (M = .79, s.d. = 3.68) elicited significantly greater (i.e., lower amplitude) SPN deflections 
than aversive (M = 1.55, s.d. = 3.80) and neutral cues (M = 1.61, s.d. = 4.02; ps < .02). In 
contrast to past research, deflections of the SPN in response to aversive and neutral cues were 
not different from each other, p =.97.  Anteriority × cue type, laterality × cue type, and 
anteriority × laterality × cue type interactions were not significant, all ps > .62.  Subsequent 
analyses testing the modulation of SPN amplitude will be conducted at anterior midline sites Fz 
and FCz, where cue effects on SPN amplitudes were visually and statistically maximal, a finding 
consistent with past studies of the SPN during emotional anticipation (Klorman and Ryan, 1980; 
Böcker et al., 2001; Takeuchi et al., 2005).  Waveforms at these electrode sites are depicted in 
Figure 19.  
Question 6.1.  Do uncertain and certain-aversive stimulus cues elicit larger (less 
positive) deflections of the SPN compared to certain-neutral stimulus cues?  To specifically 
test Question 6.1, a 3 (cue type: certain-neutral, certain-aversive, uncertain) × 2 (electrode: Fz, 
FCz) repeated measures mixed model was conducted on SPN amplitude.  There was not a main 
effect for electrode site [F(1, 51) = 0.05, p = .83] nor cue type [F(2, 102) = 1.96, p = .15], nor 
was there an electrode × cue type interaction, F(2, 102) = 0.20, p = .82.  This suggests there is 
not sufficient evidence to conclude that the SPN was present and modulated by cue type at the 
electrodes consistent with the region of interest analysis and past research on the SPN during 
emotional anticipation.  Subsequent specific aims that test the modulation of the SPN by 
psychological traits (Specific Aim 8) will not be tested.  
Specific aim 7:  Mindfulness and self-reported stimulus anticipation.   
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Figure 18.  Grand average SPN waveforms at electrodes Fz and FCz elicited by neutral, 
aversive, and uncertain stimulus cues. 
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The seventh specific aim of the present study was to explore whether trait mindfulness 
would predict lower levels of a priori covariation bias and lower online expectancies for aversive 
images to follow from uncertain (online covariation bias) and aversive cues, relative to neutral 
cues.  Pearson product-moment correlations between psychological traits and a priori and online 
covariation biases are depicted in Table 18. 
 
 
Table 18.  Correlations between psychological traits and a priori and online covariation biases. 
Psychological trait A priori 
Online 
uncertain 
Online 
aversive 
Online 
neutral 
A posteriori 
MAAS mindfulness -.09 -.10 -.29* .14 .07 
FFMQ awareness -.12 .02 -.29* .11 -.04 
IUS uncertainty -.16 .28* .02 .11 -.07 
URS emotion .05 .28* -.04 .04 -.05 
NEO-FFI neuroticism -.05 .13 .08 .08 -.01 
BDI depression .00 -.03 .10 -.01 -.01 
PSWQ worry .16 .12 .18 -.07 -.03 
     
Notes.  N = 52 (n = 50 for IUS and URS).  MAAS = Mindful Attention Awareness Scale; FFMQ 
= Five-Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire;  IUS = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale; URS = 
Uncertainty Response Scale; NEO-FFI = Neuroticism Extroversion Openness-Five Factor 
Inventory; PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory.  *P < 
0.05 
 
 
Question 7.1.  Does trait mindfulness predict lower expectancies for the first 
uncertainty cue to be followed by an aversive image (less a priori covariation bias)?  To 
address question 7.1 2 simple regression models were tested.  For the first model a priori 
covariation bias was regressed onto MAAS mindfulness, and for the second model a priori 
covariation bias was regressed onto FFMQAW mindfulness.  Together, the models indicated that 
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the MAAS [β = -.09, t(50) = -0.64, p = .52] and the FFMQ mindfulness measures [β = -.12, t(49) 
= -0.87, p = .39] did not account for a significant proportion of the variability in a priori 
covariation bias.  These results suggest that trait mindfulness does not predict a smaller baseline 
tendency to associate uncertainty with aversive outcomes (i.e., less a priori covariation bias). 
Question 7.2.  Does trait mindfulness predict lower online expectations for aversive 
pictures to follow from uncertain (less online covariation bias) and certain-aversive cues 
relative to neutral cues?  To examine the question as to whether trait mindfulness would predict 
lower (less unpleasant) expectancy ratings in response to uncertain and aversive cues relative to 
neutral cues, two repeated measures mixed models were conducted (one for each trait 
mindfulness measure) using restricted maximum likelihood estimation (REML) multilevel 
models. Cue type (neutral, aversive, uncertain) was entered as a repeated measure and MAAS 
and FFMQAW measures of trait mindfulness were entered as covariates in separate models.  
MAAS.  The model testing the MAAS revealed a significant main effect for cue type 
[F(2, 96) = 353.42, p < .0001].  Uncertainty and aversive cues elicited significantly higher 
expectations for aversive outcomes than neutral cues, and aversive cues elicited significantly 
higher expectations for aversive outcomes than uncertainty cues (all ps < .0001). The main effect 
of the MAAS [F(1, 48) = 3.25, p = .08],  and the MAAS × cue type interaction did not reach 
significance, F(2, 96) = 2.01, p =.14.  While the interaction term in the model was not 
significant, an examination of the correlations depicted in Table 18 indicate mindfulness was 
significantly associated with lowered expectations for aversive stimuli to follow after aversive 
cues (r52 = -.29, p = .04) but not uncertain cues (r52 = -.10, p =.50) or neutral cues (r52 = .14, p 
=.32).  
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FFMQAW.  The analogous model testing the FFMQAW indicated similar pattern of results. 
There a significant main effect for cue type, but there was not a significant main effect for the 
FFMQAW [F(1, 47) = .81, p = .37] or a FFMQAW × cue type interaction, F(2, 94) = 1.61, p = .20.   
As depicted in Table 18, the FFMQAW was consistent with the MAAS in that it was significantly 
associated with lower expectations of aversion following aversive cues(r51 = -.29, p =.04), but 
not uncertain (r51 = .02, p =.89) or neutral cues (r51 = .11, p =.46). 
Question 7.3.  Do traits that contrast with mindfulness predict higher expectancies 
for the first uncertainty cue to be followed by an aversive image (higher a priori 
covariation bias)?  To address question 7.2 five separate simple regression models were tested.  
The first two models regressed a priori covariation bias on IUS intolerance for uncertainty and 
URS emotional responses to uncertainty, respectively (measures of uncertainty distress).  The 
latter three models regressed a priori covariation bias onto NEO neuroticism, BDI depression, 
and PSWQ worry, respectively (anxiety related traits).  The first two models testing uncertainty 
distress indicated that IUS intolerance of uncertainty [β = -.16, t(48) = -1.15, p = .25] and URS 
emotional responses to uncertainty [β = .05, t(48) = 0.34, p = .73] were not significant predictors 
of a priori covariation bias.  The latter three regression models testing anxiety related traits 
indicated that NEO neuroticism [β = -.05, t(50) = 0.37, p = .72], BDI depression [β = .00, t(50) = 
-0.01, p = .99], and PSWQ worry [β = .16, t(48) = 1.12, p = .27] were not significant predictors 
of a priori covariation bias.  These results suggest that measures of uncertainty distress and 
anxiety-related traits were not associated with baseline tendencies to associate uncertainty with 
aversive outcomes (a priori covariation bias). 
Question 7.4.  Do traits that contrast with mindfulness predict higher online 
expectations for aversive pictures to follow from uncertain and certain-aversive cues 
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relative to neutral cues (more online covariation bias)?  To examine the question as to 
whether traits that contrast with mindfulness predict higher (more unpleasant) expectancy ratings 
in response to uncertain and aversive cues relative to neutral cues, five repeated measures mixed 
models were conducted using restricted maximum likelihood estimation (REML). Cue type 
(neutral, aversive, uncertain) was entered as a repeated measure and measures of uncertainty 
distress (IUS intolerance of uncertainty and URS emotional responses to uncertainty) and 
anxiety-related traits (NEO neuroticism, BDI depression, and PSWQ worry) were entered as 
covariates in separate models.  
IUS intolerance of uncertainty.  The model testing IUS intolerance of uncertainty 
revealed a significant main effect for cue type [F(2, 92) = 324.82, p < .0001], consistent with the 
models conducted above for mindfulness.  Uncertainty and aversive cues elicited significantly 
higher expectations for aversive outcomes than neutral cues, and aversive cues elicited 
significantly higher expectations for aversive outcomes than uncertainty cues (all ps < .0001). 
There was also a main effect of IUS intolerance of uncertainty [F(1, 46) = 8.14, p = .007], which 
indicated higher levels of IUS intolerance of uncertainty predicted higher expectations for 
aversive outcomes. The IUS intolerance of uncertainty × cue type interaction did not reach 
significance, F(2, 92) = 0.59, p =.55.   
URS emotional responses to uncertainty.  The model testing URS emotional responses 
to uncertainty revealed an identical main effect for cue type [F(2, 92) = 324.82, p < .0001] 
consistent with the analogous models reported above mindfulness. The main and interactive 
effects of URS emotional responses to uncertainty were not significant [F(1, 46) = 3.18, p = .08 
and F(2, 92) = 0.79, p = .46, respectively].  While the interaction term in the model was not 
significant, an examination of the correlations depicted in Table 18 indicates a pattern of 
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correlations identical to IUS intolerance of uncertainty.   URS emotional responses to uncertainty 
was significantly associated with higher expectations for aversive stimuli to follow after 
uncertain cues (r50 = .28, p = .04) but not aversive cues (r50 = -.04, p =.79) or neutral cues (r50 = 
.04, p =.79). 
NEO Neuroticism.  The model testing NEO neuroticism revealed an identical main effect 
for cue type [F(2, 92) = 324.82, p < .0001] consistent with the analogous models reported above 
mindfulness. The main and interactive effects of NEO neuroticism on expectancy ratings was 
significant [F(1, 48) = 4.11, p = .04.  Higher levels of neuroticism were associated with the 
general tendency to expect aversive outcomes following the stimulus cues. The NEO neuroticism 
× cue type interaction was not significant, F(2, 96) = 0.25, p = .78.  Together, the results of the 
present analysis suggest that higher levels of NEO neuroticism predicted heighten overall 
expectations for aversive outcomes throughout the experiment. 
BDI Depression.  As in prior models, the model testing BDI depression revealed a main 
effect for cue type [F(2, 96) = 345.86, p < .0001].  The main and interactive effects of BDI 
depression on expectancy ratings were not significant [F(1, 48) = 1.05, p = .31 and F(2, 96) = 
0.74, p = .48, respectively].  An examination of the correlations depicted in Table 18 indicates 
that BDI depression was not significantly associated with online expectancy ratings following 
any of the stimulus cues (all ps > .48).  
PSWQ Worry.  The model testing PSWQ worry indicated, again, a main effect for cue 
type [F(2, 92) = 328.00, p < .0001]. The main and interactive effects of PSWQ worry were not 
significant [F(1, 46) = 1.87, p = .18 and F(2, 92) = 1.30, p = .28, respectively].  An examination 
of the correlations depicted in Table 18 indicates that PSWQ worry was not significantly 
associated with online expectancy ratings following any of the stimulus cues (all ps > .22).  
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Summary of findings related to Specific Aim 7.   Several tests were conducted to 
explore whether trait mindfulness would predict lower levels of a priori covariation bias and 
lower online expectancies for aversive images to follow from uncertain (online covariation bias) 
and aversive cues, relative to neutral cues. Measures of trait mindfulness did not predict a priori 
covariation bias, and neither were any of the traits that contrast with mindfulness.  However, 
both measures of trait mindfulness were associated with lower expectations for unpleasant 
outcomes following aversive cues.  Both measures of uncertainty distress were associated with 
heightened expectations for unpleasant stimuli to follow after uncertainty cues, and NEO 
neuroticism was associated with a general tendency to expect aversive outcomes, irrespective of 
the type of stimulus cue. 
Specific Aim 8:  Mindfulness and a cortical measure of stimulus anticipation. 
 The eighth aim of the present study was to explore whether trait mindfulness would be 
associated with lower deflections of the SPN in response to aversive and uncertain cues, relative 
to neutral cues.  However, tests conducted during Specific Aim 6 indicated there was not 
sufficient evidence to suggest that stimulus cues modulated the SPN, which was a precondition 
to test whether mindfulness would modulate the effect of stimulus cue on SPN amplitude.   
Discussion 
The present study tested whether uncertainty about the nature of a forthcoming emotional 
stimulus would increase anticipation for unpleasant outcomes (covariation bias) and amplify 
post-stimulus appraisals of emotional stimuli as unpleasant, as captured by self-report and 
cortical measures of emotional anticipation and appraisal.  The primary purpose of the study was 
to examine whether dispositional mindfulness, relative to traits that contrast with mindfulness, 
would modulate the effect of uncertainty on these markers of anticipation and appraisal.  
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Evidence was found that replicated and extended prior research on the effects of 
anticipatory uncertainty for both emotional anticipation and appraisal processes.  Regarding 
appraisal processes, pre-stimulus cues that left participants uncertain about the nature of the 
forthcoming stimulus were found to increase self-reported perceptions of neutral and aversive 
stimuli as unpleasant (Specific Aim 1).  This self-reported evidence of unpleasant appraisal 
following anticipatory uncertainty was corroborated by cortical evidence that indicated the 
combination of uncertainty and aversiveness of stimuli increased the amplitude of the LPP, an 
ERP marker of post-stimulus emotional appraisal (Specific Aim 2).  There was not sufficient 
evidence to indicate that dispositional mindfulness influenced self-reported appraisal processes, 
but the predisposition to worry, a trait contrasting with mindfulness, was associated with 
heightened unpleasant appraisals, as indicated by post-stimulus self-reports of state affect and 
stimulus perceptions (Specific Aim 3).  Individual differences in depression were also associated 
with heightened unpleasant affect following the display of aversive stimuli (Specific Aim 3). 
Dispositional mindfulness and anxiety-related traits were found to modulate the LPP in opposing 
directions, but the direction of this modulating influence was inconsistent with my expectations, 
and with past research on the influence of individual differences in LPP variability (Specific Aim 
4).   
Regarding stimulus anticipation, participants demonstrated biased expectations for 
uncertainty to be associated with aversive outcome at baseline (a prior covariation bias) and 
throughout the task (online covariation bias).  A priori covariation bias predicted a general trend 
for higher unpleasant affect and greater unpleasant perceptions of the emotional stimulus 
content, as indicated by self-report (Specific Aim 5). A posteriori covariation bias predicted 
heightened unpleasant affect following the display of aversive stimuli, as well as heightened 
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perceptions of aversive stimuli as unpleasant (Specific Aim 5).  There was not sufficient 
evidence to suggest the presence of an SPN component, a cortical marker of emotional 
anticipation (Specific Aims 6 and 8).  However, two measures of dispositional mindfulness were 
associated with reduced expectations for unpleasant outcomes following aversive cues (Specific 
Aim 7).  In contrast, two measures of uncertainty-distress were associated with greater 
expectations for unpleasant stimuli to follow after uncertainty cues (online covariation bias), and 
neuroticism was related to general expectations for emotional stimuli to be aversive (Specific 
Aim 7).   
Specific Aim 1: Uncertainty and self-reported appraisal.   
Past research has demonstrated that unpredictable threats amplify unpleasantness 
compared to the same threats when they are predictable (Bar-Anan, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2009; 
Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004; Grupe & Nitschke, 2011; Hirsch & Inzlicht, 2008; Kimmel, 1967; 
Nader & Belleine, 2007; Sarinopoulos et al., 2010), and findings from the present research were 
generally consistent with this body of evidence.  Past research that has used an identical cued 
image task demonstrated higher levels of unpleasant affect and unpleasant stimulus perceptions 
following the display of aversive images preceded by uncertainty cues relative to certainty 
cues.  Results from the present study did not provide evidence indicating heightened negative 
affect following the display of uncertainty cues (Question 1.2), but evidence was found for a 
strong general effect of uncertainty on stimulus perceptions.  Participants perceived both neutral 
and aversive images as being more unpleasant, that is, irrespective of the image valence, when 
the stimulus was preceded by uncertainty cues compared to certainty cues. (Question 1.2).   
Simply restricting information about the nature of an upcoming emotional stimulus was 
enough to distort participants’ perceptions of the stimuli as more unpleasant, irrespective of their 
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valence.  While past research has found that uncertainty amplifies unpleasant perceptions of 
aversive stimuli, the findings from the present study suggest a more general effect that extends to 
both neutral and aversive stimuli.  This highlights the dramatic influence informational 
uncertainty can have on downstream perceptual appraisal, and suggests that uncertainty during 
the anticipation of potentially unpleasant future outcomes can distort the way those outcomes are 
perceived, even when they are innocuous.   
On the other hand, there is a possible alternative interpretation for results of specific aim 
1.  When participants have foreknowledge about the nature of the upcoming stimulus, they are in 
a better position to prepare for and regulate their emotional responses (Gross, 1998; Hirsch & 
Inzlicht, 2008).  From this perspective, it may not be that uncertainty amplifies unpleasant 
experiences, but that providing information that an upcoming event will be aversive allows for 
better preparation and regulation when faced with emotionally challenging events.  In other 
words, it may not be that uncertainty amplifies unpleasantness, but that certainty promotes more 
regulated, benign appraisals (Gross, 1998).  To test this possibility, future research should 
examine whether varying degrees of informational content about the nature of forthcoming 
emotional stimuli influences post-stimulus appraisal processes.  As it stands, the present findings 
are consistent with a substantial body of evidence that indicates uncertainty can amplify the 
negative impact of emotional stimuli (Bar-Anan, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2009; Dickerson & 
Kemeny, 2004; Grupe & Nitschke, 2011; Hirsch & Inzlicht, 2008; Kimmel, 1967; Nader & 
Belleine, 2007; Sarinopoulos et al., 2010). 
Specific Aim 2. Uncertainty and a cortical measure of stimulus appraisal. 
The second specific aim of the present study was to determine whether emotional 
appraisal as indexed by the LPP is larger for aversive and neutral stimuli presented following 
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uncertainty about the nature of an emotional image stimulus, compared to when participants 
know an upcoming emotional image stimulus will be aversive or neutral.  First, the present study 
replicated past research by providing evidence that the LPP was modulated by unpleasant, highly 
arousing emotional picture stimuli at electrode sites consistent with past research using 
emotional picture stimuli (Cuthbert et al., 2000; Hajcak MacNamara, Foti, & Keil, 2011; 
Weinberg and Hajcak, 2011, Foti et al., 2010; Schupp et al., 2000).  Past research using galvanic 
skin conductance responses (Grupe & Nitschke, 2011) and neuroimaging measures 
(Sarinopoulos et al., 2010) have demonstrated that stimulus uncertainty can amplify 
physiological arousal to aversive emotional stimuli, and the present research extended this work 
using a cortical marker of emotional stimulus appraisal.  LPP amplitudes elicited by aversive 
stimuli were amplified when the valence of a forthcoming stimulus was uncertain, relative to 
when the image valence was known in advance with certainty.   
This finding that the LPP is modulated by stimulus valence and uncertainty is consistent 
with emerging evidence that suggests that LPP amplitudes are increased when participants are 
exposed to ambiguous (uncertain) compared to unambiguous emotional facial expressions (Tritt, 
Peterson, & Inzlicht, under review).  However, there is an important difference between the 
manipulation of uncertainty in the present study, and in the work of Tritt, Peterson, & Inzlicht 
(under review).  While the present study examined the influence of uncertainty during stimulus 
anticipation without changing the stimulus content, the study by Tritt et al. (under review) 
manipulated the stimulus content itself to evoke uncertainty.  This difference could have distinct 
influences on psychological processes. The present study showed how uncertainty during 
anticipation of a stimulus can have downstream psychological consequences for stimulus 
appraisal, and thus assesses the influence of informational uncertainty on the psychological 
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context in which stimuli are perceived.  Tritt et al.’s (under review) manipulation examined how 
uncertainty about the nature of an emotional stimulus itself can exert an immediate influence on 
appraisal processes.  Despite this difference, the consistent effect of uncertainty on LPP 
amplitude found in both studies highlights how robust the influence of uncertainty can be on 
cortical markers of emotional appraisal.  Together, this evidence from these two studies suggests 
that different types of uncertainty can bias cortical markers of appraisal in similar ways, by either 
influencing the psychological context in which unambiguous emotional stimuli are perceived, or 
by directly manipulating the ambiguity of stimulus content.  Further, by directly examining the 
influence of an ambiguous stimulus on the LPP, participants were not given the opportunity to 
regulate their responses, and the findings of Tritt et al. (under review) lend support to the theory 
that uncertainty indeed amplifies unpleasant appraisals, rather than certainty providing an 
opportunity to regulate emotional responses and promote more benign appraisals. 
Specific Aim 3.  Mindfulness and Self-reported Appraisal 
 Considerable research has demonstrated that dispositional mindfulness is associated with 
more benign appraisals of aversive stimuli (Arch & Craske, 2006; Brown & Ryan, 2003; 
Modinos, Ormel, & Aleman, 2010).  The third aim of the present study was to determine whether 
trait mindfulness would predict more benign appraisals of emotional stimuli when participants 
were uncertain about the nature of the forthcoming stimulus, relative to when they were 
certain.  Evidence was not found to suggest that mindfulness reduced self-reported unpleasant 
affect (Question 3.1) or unpleasant stimulus perceptions (Question 3.2) following emotional 
stimulus exposure.  However, evidence was found that self-reported affect and appraisals were 
sensitive to other individual differences.  Two anxiety-related individual difference measures 
were related to increased unpleasant appraisals, though these traits were not related to stimulus 
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certainty.  The predisposition to engage in ruminative, uncontrollable worry, as indexed by the 
PSWQ, was associated with higher levels of unpleasant affect (Question 3.3) and unpleasant 
perceptions of the images (Question 3.4) following stimulus exposure, but this effect did not 
depend on the certainty of the stimuli. Similarly, higher levels of depressive symptoms were 
associated with greater self-reported unpleasant affect following aversive images.  These effects 
are consistent with past research linking greater levels of worry and depression with the 
experience of negative affect (Brown, Chorpita, & Barlow, 1998; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988). 
Specific Aim 4.  Mindfulness and a Cortical Measure of Stimulus Appraisal. 
The fourth specific aim was to determine whether dispositional mindfulness would 
predict attenuated LPP responses to aversive emotional stimuli relative to neutral stimuli under 
conditions of uncertainty and certainty, during an early time period (500-1000ms) of the LPP. 
Past research has provided evidence that mindfulness attenuates LPP responses to motivationally 
salient pleasant and unpleasant emotional picture stimuli in a similar time period (Brown et al., 
2013), while traits that contrasted with mindfulness amplified LPP responses.  The present study 
found that dispositional mindfulness indeed modulated the LPP, and measures of uncertainty 
distress and anxiety-related traits modulated the LPP in an opposite direction of mindfulness, but 
the direction of these effects were in the opposite direction of what was expected, and were 
inconsistent with the findings of past research on mindfulness and the LPP (Brown et al., 2013; 
Sobolewski et al., 2011). Dispositional mindfulness, as measured by two psychometric 
instruments, was predictive of higher LPP amplitudes in response to certain and uncertain 
aversive emotional stimuli at centro-parietal electrodes (CPz and CP4).  Dispositional 
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mindfulness was not associated with LPP amplitude differences due to stimulus certainty 
(Question 4.1).    
Future research is needed to clarify why mindfulness amplified the LPP in response to 
aversive stimuli in the present study, but one potential reason is that the experimental paradigms 
used in both studies are not directly comparable, and one primary difference may have 
influenced the relations between mindfulness and the LPP.  In the study by Brown et al. (2013), 
participants passively viewed images without receiving any cueing information about the nature 
of the upcoming image content.  In the present study, participants learned about the nature of the 
upcoming stimuli from pre-stimulus cues. Given the high degree of sensitivity of cortical 
measures, this may be an important distinction that has implications for future research.   
As discussed above in Specific Aims 1 and 3, it is likely the information conveyed by the 
stimulus cue could change the psychological context during stimulus anticipation and influence 
the processes involved in downstream appraisal.  For example, the stimulus cues could influence 
how participants deployed their attention prior to and during the display of a stimulus, and this 
difference would likely be reflected by changes in the LPP, given the strong relation between this 
ERP component and attention.  Past research on mindfulness and emotion regulation has 
suggested that mindfulness may promote a greater willingness to stay with, rather than avoid 
aversive emotional experiences (Arch & Craske, 2006).  Indeed, this is theorized to be one of the 
most important benefits of mindfulness in clinical settings because mindfulness is thought to 
facilitate exposure and minimize avoidance of unpleasant experience (Follette et al., 2006; 
Greeson et al., 2009).  Additionally, this heightened ability to stay with difficult experiences, 
such as psychological suffering, mortality, and uncertainty, is a central goal of mindfulness from 
the perspective of ancient wisdom traditions (Anālayo, 2003; Davis and Thompson, in press). 
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While entirely speculative, it is theoretically defensible that participants lower in mindfulness 
would be more likely to avoid and divert their attention away when information cues them that 
an upcoming emotional stimulus could be potentially unpleasant.  On the other hand, a higher 
degree of mindfulness would facilitate a greater willingness to stay with a potentially unpleasant 
experience.  If this were the case, mindfulness would be expected to promote higher LPP 
amplitudes in response to aversive and uncertain unpleasant stimuli, while traits that contrast 
with the open and receptive nature of mindfulness would promote reduced LPP amplitudes, and 
this is precisely what was observed in the present study.  Future research should directly examine 
the effect of stimulus cueing information on variability in the LPP response by comparing ERP 
averages for trials that provide cueing information against trials that do not provide cueing 
information. This change would contribute to understanding the influence of cueing information 
on the LPP, and would elucidate how such information may modulate the subsequent processing 
of emotional stimuli. 
Another relevant finding from the present study involves the time-course of the effect of 
mindfulness on LPP amplitude.  While there was not a significant effect of signal window on 
LPP amplitude in any of the models, dispositional mindfulness had its most robust influence on 
the LPP during the early stimulus window (500-1000ms), as indicated by a significant 
correlation with LPP amplitude during only the early signal window.   That mindfulness exerted 
the most potent influence on the LPP at an early time period is interesting in the light of prior 
research on the LPP and emotion regulation.  The LPP is sensitive to changes in attention and to 
changes in stimulus meaning (see Hajcak, 2013), but consistent with the process model of 
emotion regulation (Gross, 1998), regulation strategies that modify attention influence the LPP 
much earlier than more effortful regulation strategies which involve modifying stimulus meaning 
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(MacNamara, Oschner, & Hajcak; Thiruchselvam et al., 2011). More specifically, modulation of 
the LPP by reappraisal instructions has been consistently prominent for approximately 1000ms 
post stimulus presentation, while attention regulation strategies modulate the LPP as early as 
300ms. Mindfulness operates at the level of attention, so as an emotion regulation strategy, 
mindfulness was expected to modulate the LPP earlier than more effortful downstream types of 
emotion regulation that focus on modifying stimulus meaning (e.g. reappraisal). 
Traits that contrasted with mindfulness predicted an opposite pattern of association with 
the LPP, though again, in the opposite of the hypothesized direction. Two measures of 
uncertainty distress (IUS intolerance of uncertainty and URS emotional responses to uncertainty) 
and two measures of anxiety-related traits (NEO neuroticism and BDI depression) predicted 
attenuated LPP amplitudes elicited by aversive stimuli relative to neutral stimuli.  As with 
mindfulness, these psychological traits interacted with stimulus valence, and not the stimulus 
cue, which suggests there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that individual differences in 
mindfulness and traits that contrast with mindfulness modulated the effect of stimulus 
uncertainty on a neural marker of emotional stimulus appraisal. 
Specific Aim 5.  Uncertainty and Self-reported Anticipation. 
The fifth aim of the present research was to replicate past research that has demonstrated 
a priori and online covariation biases amplify unpleasant affect and stimulus ratings following 
the display of unpleasant stimuli under conditions of uncertainty, relative to certainty.  The 
results of the present analysis suggest that heightened a priori covariation bias was associated 
with a general tendency to self-report more unpleasant affect (Question 5.1), and heightened 
perceptions of unpleasantness following the display of aversive images (Question 5.2).  There 
was not sufficient evidence to conclude that online covariation bias modulated self-reported 
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appraisals (Questions 5.1 and 5.2).  Higher levels of a posteriori covariation bias were associated 
with heightened unpleasant affect and stimulus perceptions for aversive stimuli.  The effects of 
covariation bias measures on self-reported appraisals did not depend on whether the stimulus cue 
was certain or uncertain. 
Prior to the aforementioned analyses assessing the influence of covariation biases on 
post-stimulus appraisals, evidence was found to suggest that participants’ indeed demonstrated 
both a priori and online covariation biases, tendencies to associate uncertainty with aversive 
outcomes.  Participants associated uncertainty with the presentation of aversive pictures at 
baseline (a priori covariation bias), and as they progressed through the experimental task (online 
covariation bias). These findings are consistent with previous research using similar 
experimental paradigms (Grupe & Nitschke, 2011).  At the outset of the experiment, participants 
had no knowledge of the actual probability that an aversive image would appear following their 
first exposure to an uncertainty cue. However, on average, participants’ self-reports indicated 
expectations that more aversive images would follow after the presentation of uncertainty cues. 
Participants continued to associate uncertainty with aversiveness as they progressed through the 
experimental task, demonstrating an online covariation bias.   
There was not significant evidence to suggest that participants’ retrospective (post-
experiment) estimates of the relationship between uncertain cues and aversive pictures was over 
the actual rate of 50%, though past research has also failed to find this effect (Grupe & Nitschke, 
2011).  In fact, the overwhelming majority of studies that have examined post-experiment 
covariation assessments have found results using phobics or high anxiety populations (deJong et 
al., 1992), whereas relatively few studies have found effects among a convenience sample of 
normative college students (Witvliet & Vrana, 2000).  One likely reason the post-experiment (a 
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posteriori) measure of covariation bias did not reach significance is due to the high degree of 
variability in these post-experiment estimates (estimates ranged from 20%-80%), a finding noted 
in similar studies (Grupe & Nitschke, 2011).    
Another aspect of the present work that was consistent with prior studies is the finding 
that the magnitude of online covariation bias predicted participant’s post-experiment covariation 
bias estimates (Amin & Lovibond, 1998; Grupe & Nitschke, 2011).  The relation between online 
expectancy ratings and post-experiment estimates suggests that heightened expectations to 
associate uncertainty with aversive stimuli are linked with biases in memory about what actually 
occurred.  When the experiment ended and participants had been exposed to every cue-picture 
combination - that is, when the full facts about the actual probability of uncertainty-aversive 
pairings was in, the tendency to anticipate that uncertainty would lead to aversive outcomes was 
linked with a greater degree of retrospective bias about the frequency that uncertainty was paired 
with aversive stimuli.   Said differently, not only did uncertainty during anticipation distort 
perceptions of stimuli as unpleasant (Specific Aim 1), but higher tendencies to anticipate 
unpleasant outcomes following uncertainty also distorted retrospective appraisals of the events 
that actually took place during the study.  This finding is further evidence that highlights the 
distorting influence uncertainty can have on downstream appraisal processes.  
Past research has linked covariation bias with the amplification of fear (De Jong et al., 
1993; 1995; Tomarken et al., 1989), and studies administering an identical paradigm to the one 
administered here found heightened amygdalae responses to aversive stimuli when preceded by 
uncertainty compared to certainty cues (Sarinopoulos et al., 2010).  Covariation biases develop 
from the experience of anxiety when confronted with negative events, and the magnitude of the 
anxiety that is elicited determines the strength of the covariation bias (Pauli, Wiedemann, 
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Dengler, & Kühlkamp, 2001). Results from the present study suggest that uncertainty was 
associated with aversiveness, which provides support for the idea that uncertainty can serve as a 
cue signaling something unpleasant. 
Specific Aim 6.  Uncertainty and a Cortical Measure of Anticipation. 
The sixth specific aim of the present study was to determine whether emotional 
anticipation as indexed by the SPN is largest for certain-aversive and uncertain stimulus cues 
compared to certain-neutral stimulus cues.  Evidence from region of interest analysis did not 
indicate significant evidence to conclude an SPN component was isolated in the present 
study.  While visual inspection of the SPN waveforms indicated the EEG signal was higher for 
uncertainty cues during the appropriate time window and at the electrode locations consistent 
with past research, there was no statistical evidence to suggest the SPN was modulated by the 
emotional information provided by the stimulus cues.  This failure to isolate the SPN precluded 
the examination of Specific Aim 8, which sought to examine the influence of mindfulness on 
variability in the SPN, so the planned analyses for these tests were not conducted. 
One possibility for this lack of effect is that the cued image task was not designed to 
measure the SPN, and I decided to assess the component post-hoc.  As such, there was a crucial 
barrier in the trial parameters that could have added considerable noise to the SPN measure.  
That is, the interstimulus interval (ISI) between the participant expectancy ratings and the onset 
of the emotional picture was a random interval ranging between 4 and 10 seconds, which is the 
period during which the SPN is captured.  Typically, the late component of the SPN is measured 
as the period just prior to a stimulus onset, and the period between a stimulus cue (S1) and the 
stimulus (S2) is static interval, rather than a random interval.  To overcome this I operationalized 
the SPN as the average EEG activity during a 200ms time period prior to the earliest possible 
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image onset (4 seconds), but it is likely that the random interstimulus interval during this 
anticipatory period contributed to the lack of significant finding of an SPN component.  
Subsequent research using this cued image task to explore questions relating to the SPN should 
implement a constant interstimulus interval between S1 and S2. 
Specific Aim 7:  Mindfulness and Self-reported Anticipation. 
Several tests were conducted to explore whether trait mindfulness would predict lower 
levels of a priori covariation bias and lower online expectancies for aversive images to follow 
from uncertain (online covariation bias) and aversive cues, relative to neutral cues. Measures of 
trait mindfulness were not predictive of a priori covariation bias, and neither were any of the 
traits that contrast with mindfulness (Question 7.1).  However, both measures of trait 
mindfulness were significantly correlated with lower expectations for unpleasant outcomes 
following aversive cues.  This finding is consistent with a previous study that found a state 
mindfulness induction reduced negativity bias and promoted more positive appraisals of novel 
stimuli during attitude formation (Kiken & Shook, 2011).   
Several traits that contrast with mindfulness were related to exaggerated covariation 
biases.  Two measures of uncertainty distress -- intolerance of uncertainty, and emotional 
responses to uncertainty-- were associated with heightened expectations for unpleasant stimuli to 
follow after uncertainty cues.  Neuroticism was associated with a general tendency to expect 
aversive outcomes, irrespective of the type of stimulus cue.  This finding is consistent with the 
nature of neuroticism as a personality trait associated with heightened interpretation of situations 
as threatening (Matthews & Deary, 1998) and is consistent with research relating covariation 
biases and clinical anxiety (Barlow, 2000; Borkovec, 2002) and heightened anxiety and fear 
(Davey & Dixon, 1995). 
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Limitations  
 This study was designed to examine the influence of uncertainty on self-reported and 
cortical measures of emotional stimulus anticipation and appraisal, and particularly the 
modulation of these effects by dispositional mindfulness.  The target sample size for the study 
was estimated at 60 participants (to achieve a power of .80), but data from 10 participants was 
not usable due to procedural non-compliance, or poor quality EEG signal, leaving a sample of N 
= 52 for analysis.  Thus, the study was statistically underpowered, which suggests the present 
study might have had a higher than ideal rate of type 2 errors.  That is, some the effects that 
didn’t reach statistical significance (e.g., marginally significant results) might have been detected 
with an adequate sample size.  
 Second, I am not aware of past research that has used this cued image task to investigate 
variability in LPP amplitudes elicited by emotional picture stimuli.  The presentation of cueing 
information on the LPP clearly influenced the amplitude of the LPP, but more research is 
necessary to uncover how pre-stimulus information influences psychological processes that 
modulate the LPP.  An important next step would be to include multiple types of certain and 
uncertain stimulus cues that convey information associated with varying degrees of stimulus 
probability as well as the degree of unpleasantness for stimulus outcomes. 
 Third, the present study was designed to examine the association between dispositional 
mindfulness and variability in LPP responses to emotional stimuli.  Attempts were made to 
increase confidence that the results were specific to mindfulness by also examining the influence 
of psychological traits antithetical to mindfulness.  However, it is possible that the correlational 
results described here could be due to a third variable, and future studies should be conducted 
using experimental manipulations of mindfulness, such as mindfulness training or state 
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inductions of mindfulness to determine whether observed relations between mindfulness and the 
LPP are causal in nature. 
Finally, the cued image task was not designed to measure the SPN appropriately in the 
current study, and the decision was made to assess the component after data had been collected 
with the paradigm.   In the present design, the interstimulus interval (ISI) between the participant 
expectancy ratings and the onset of the emotional picture was a random interval ranging between 
4 and 10 seconds, which is the period during which the SPN is captured.  To be consistent with 
previous studies that have investigated the SPN during emotional anticipation, the period 
between a stimulus cue (S1) and the stimulus (S2), which is the time period in which the SPN is 
isolated, should us a constant interval. 
Concluding Remarks. 
This study was designed to examine the influence of uncertainty on self-reported and 
cortical measures of emotional stimulus anticipation and appraisal, and the modulation of these 
effects by dispositional mindfulness.  The study replicated and extended prior research on the 
effects of anticipatory uncertainty for both emotional anticipation and appraisal processes. 
Uncertainty during stimulus anticipation was found to increase unpleasant stimulus perceptions, 
and this was corroborated with cortical evidence indicating that uncertainty increased LPP 
amplitudes elicited by emotional stimuli relative to the same stimuli presented under conditions 
of certainty.  Together these findings suggest informational uncertainty during anticipation can 
exert a potent downstream influence on emotional appraisal processes. 
Individual differences in depression and worry were associated with heightened 
unpleasant appraisals.  Evidence was not found to suggest dispositional mindfulness influenced 
self-reported appraisals, but mindfulness and several traits that contrast with mindfulness, were 
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found to modulate the LPP in opposing directions.  The direction of the modulating influence of 
these traits on the LPP was opposite of what was expected, and potentials explanations derived 
from mindfulness theory were discussed to inform future research.   
Participants demonstrated biased expectations for uncertainty to be associated with 
aversive outcomes, both at baseline (a prior covariation bias) and throughout the task (online 
covariation bias), and online covariation bias was associated with distorted retrospective (a 
posteriori) appraisals of the uncertainty-aversive pairings.    A priori covariation bias predicted a 
general trend for higher unpleasant affect and greater unpleasant perceptions of the emotional 
stimulus content, and a posteriori covariation bias predicted heightened unpleasant affect 
following the display of aversive stimuli, as well as heightened perceptions of aversive stimuli as 
unpleasant.   
Two measures of dispositional mindfulness were associated with reduced expectations 
for unpleasant outcomes following aversive cues, while traits that contrast with mindfulness 
were associated with greater online covariation bias, and general expectations for emotional 
stimuli to be aversive.  The evidence described in the present study contributes to a growing 
body of evidence linking uncertainty during anticipation with biased expectancies for aversion, 
and higher unpleasant stimulus appraisal, and advances our understanding of the important role 
that individual differences play in event-related neural variability. 
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Appendix A 
Mindful Attention Awareness Scale 
 
Day-to-Day Experiences                                 
 
Instructions: Below is a collection of statements about your everyday experience.  Using the 
1-6 scale below, please indicate how frequently or infrequently you currently have each 
experience.  Please answer according to what really reflects your experience rather than 
what you think your experience should be. Please treat each item separately from every 
other item. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Almost 
Always 
Very 
Frequently 
Somewhat 
Frequently 
Somewhat 
Infrequently 
Very 
Infrequently 
Almost 
Never 
 
 
1. I could be experiencing some emotion and not be conscious of  
    it until sometime later.  1       2       3       4       5       6  
 
2. I break or spill things because of carelessness, not paying  
   attention, or thinking of something else. 1       2       3       4       5       6  
 
3. I find it difficult to stay focused on what’s happening in the  
   present. 1       2       3       4       5       6  
 
4. I tend to walk quickly to get where I’m going without paying  
   attention to what I experience along the way. 1       2       3       4       5       6  
 
5. I tend not to notice feelings of physical tension or discomfort  
   until they really grab my attention. 1       2       3       4       5       6  
 
6. I forget a person’s name almost as soon as I’ve been told it  
   for the first time. 1       2       3       4       5       6  
 
7. It seems I am “running on automatic,” without much awareness  
   of what I’m doing. 1       2       3       4       5       6  
 
8. I rush through activities without being really attentive to them. 1       2       3       4       5       6  
 
9. I get so focused on the goal I want to achieve that I lose touch  
   with what I’m doing right now to get there. 1       2       3       4       5       6  
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1 2 3 4 5 6 
Almost 
Always 
Very 
Frequently 
Somewhat 
Frequently 
Somewhat 
Infrequently 
Very 
Infrequently 
Almost 
Never 
 
 
10. I do jobs or tasks automatically, without being aware of what  
     I'm doing. 1       2       3       4       5       6 
 
11. I find myself listening to someone with one ear, doing  
     something else at the same time. 1       2       3       4       5       6  
 
12. I drive places on ‘automatic pilot’ and then wonder why I went  
     there. 1       2       3       4       5       6  
 
13. I find myself preoccupied with the future or the past. 1       2       3       4       5       6  
 
14. I find myself doing things without paying attention. 1       2       3       4       5       6  
 
15. I snack without being aware that I’m eating. 1       2       3       4       5       6  
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Appendix B 
 
Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire 
 
FACETS OF EXPERIENCE 
Please rate each of the following statements using the scale provided.  Write the number in the blank 
that best describes your own opinion of what is generally true for you. 
  1  2  3  4  5 
   never or very          rarely      sometimes          often     very often or 
     rarely true           true           true                  true            always true 
 
_____ 1.  When I’m walking, I deliberately notice the sensations of my body moving. 
_____ 2.  I’m good at finding words to describe my feelings. 
_____ 3.  I criticize myself for having irrational or inappropriate emotions. 
_____ 4.  I perceive my feelings and emotions without having to react to them. 
_____ 5.  When I do things, my mind wanders off and I’m easily distracted. 
_____ 6.  When I take a shower or bath, I stay alert to the sensations of water on my  
                 body. 
_____ 7.  I can easily put my beliefs, opinions, and expectations into words. 
_____ 8.  I don’t pay attention to what I’m doing because I’m daydreaming, worrying, or 
                otherwise distracted. 
_____ 9.  I watch my feelings without getting lost in them. 
_____ 10. I tell myself I shouldn’t be feeling the way I’m feeling. 
_____ 11. I notice how foods and drinks affect my thoughts, bodily sensations, and  
                 emotions. 
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1  2  3  4  5 
   never or very          rarely      sometimes          often     very often or 
     rarely true           true           true                  true            always true 
 
_____ 12. It’s hard for me to find the words to describe what I’m thinking. 
_____ 13. I am easily distracted. 
_____ 14. I believe some of my thoughts are abnormal or bad and I shouldn’t think that  
                 way. 
_____ 15. I pay attention to sensations, such as the wind in my hair or sun on my face. 
_____ 16. I have trouble thinking of the right words to express how I feel about things 
_____ 17. I make judgments about whether my thoughts are good or bad. 
_____ 18. I find it difficult to stay focused on what’s happening in the present. 
_____ 19. When I have distressing thoughts or images, I “step back” and am aware of the  
                  thought or image without getting taken over by it. 
_____ 20. I pay attention to sounds, such as clocks ticking, birds chirping, or cars  
                 passing. 
_____ 21. In difficult situations, I can pause without immediately reacting. 
_____ 22. When I have a sensation in my body, it’s difficult for me to describe it because  
                  I can’t find the right words. 
_____ 23. It seems I am “running on automatic” without much awareness of what I’m  
                 doing. 
 _____24. When I have distressing thoughts or images, I feel calm soon after. 
_____ 25. I tell myself that I shouldn’t be thinking the way I’m thinking. 
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1  2  3  4  5 
   never or very          rarely      sometimes          often     very often or 
     rarely true           true           true                  true            always true 
 
_____ 26. I notice the smells and aromas of things. 
_____ 27. Even when I’m feeling terribly upset, I can find a way to put it into words. 
_____ 28. I rush through activities without being really attentive to them. 
_____ 29. When I have distressing thoughts or images I am able just to notice them  
                  without reacting. 
_____ 30. I think some of my emotions are bad or inappropriate and I shouldn’t feel  
                 them. 
_____ 31. I notice visual elements in art or nature, such as colors, shapes, textures, or  
                 patterns of light and shadow. 
_____ 32. My natural tendency is to put my experiences into words. 
_____ 33. When I have distressing thoughts or images, I just notice them and let them go. 
_____ 34. I do jobs or tasks automatically without being aware of what I’m doing. 
_____ 35. When I have distressing thoughts or images, I judge myself as good or bad,  
                  depending what the thought/image is about. 
_____ 36. I pay attention to how my emotions affect my thoughts and behavior. 
_____ 37. I can usually describe how I feel at the moment in considerable detail. 
_____ 38. I find myself doing things without paying attention. 
_____ 39. I disapprove of myself when I have irrational ideas. 
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Appendix C 
Attentional Control Scale 
 
TASK BEHAVIORS 
INSTRUCTIONS:  Please indicate how frequently you have the following experiences using 
the scale shown below. 
1 = almost never 
2 = sometimes 
3 = often 
4 = always 
 
____ 1. It’s very hard for me to concentrate on a difficult task when there are noises around. 
____ 2. When I need to concentrate and solve a problem, I have trouble focusing my 
attention. 
____ 3. When I am working hard on something, I still get distracted by events around me. 
____ 4. My concentration is good even if there is music in the room around me. 
____ 5. When concentrating, I can focus my attention so that I become unaware of what’s 
going on in the room around me. 
____ 6. When I am reading or studying, I am easily distracted if there are people talking in the 
same room. 
____ 7. When trying to focus my attention on something, I have difficulty blocking out 
distracting thoughts. 
____ 8. I have a hard time concentrating when I’m excited about something. 
____ 9. When concentrating I ignore feelings of hunger or thirst. 
____ 10. I can quickly switch from one task to another. 
____ 11. It takes me a while to get really involved in a new task. 
____ 12. It is difficult for me to coordinate my attention between the listening and writing 
required when taking notes during lectures. 
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1 = almost never 
2 = sometimes 
3 = often 
4 = always 
 
____ 13. I can become interested in a new topic very quickly when I need to. 
____ 14. It is easy for me to read or write while I’m also talking on the phone. 
____ 15. I have trouble carrying on two conversations at once. 
____ 16. I have a hard time coming up with new ideas quickly. 
____ 17. After being interrupted or distracted, I can easily shift my attention back to what I was 
doing before. 
____ 18. When a distracting thought comes to mind, it is easy for me to shift my attention away 
from it. 
____ 19. It is easy for me to alternate between two different tasks. 
____ 20. It is hard for me to break from one way of thinking about something and look at it 
from another point of view. 
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Appendix D 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale 
 
HOW I FEEL 
INSTRUCTIONS:  Please indicate the degree to which each of the following statements is 
characteristic of you as a person.  Indicate how you really feel, and not what you think the 
correct response is.  Please use the 5-point scale shown below. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
not at all 
characteristic of 
me 
 slightly 
characteristic of 
me 
moderately 
characteristic of 
me 
very  
characteristic of 
me 
entirely 
characteristic of 
me 
 
 
1. 
 
Uncertainty stops me from having a strong opinion. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
2. Being uncertain means that a person is disorganized. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Uncertainty makes life intolerable. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. It’s unfair having no guarantees in life. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. My mind can’t be relaxed if I don’t know what will happen 
tomorrow. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Uncertainty makes me uneasy, anxious, or stressed. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Unforseen events upset me greatly. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. It frustrates me not having all the information I need. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. Uncertainty keeps me from living a full life. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. One should always look ahead so as to avoid surprises. 1 2 3 4 5 
11. A small unforseen event can spoil everything, even with the best 
planning. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
not at all 
characteristic of 
me 
 slightly 
characteristic of 
me 
moderately 
characteristic of  
me 
 
 
very characteristic 
of me 
entirely 
characteristic of 
me 
12. When it’s time to act, uncertainty paralyses me. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. Being uncertain means that I am not first rate. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. When I am uncertain I can’t go forward. 1 2 3 4 5 
15. When I am uncertain, I can’t function very well. 1 2 3 4 5 
16. Unlike me, others seem to know where they are going with their lives. 1 2 3 4 5 
17. Uncertainty makes me vulnerable, unhappy, or sad. 1 2 3 4 5 
18. I always want to know what the future has in store for me. 1 2 3 4 5 
19. I can’t stand being taken by surprise. 1 2 3 4 5 
20. The smallest doubt can stop me from acting. 1 2 3 4 5 
21. I should be able to organize everything in advance. 1 2 3 4 5 
22. Being uncertain means that I lack confidence. 1 2 3 4 5 
23. I think it’s unfair that other people seem to be sure about their future. 1 2 3 4 5 
24. Uncertainty keeps me from sleeping soundly. 1 2 3 4 5 
25. I must get away from all uncertain situations. 1 2 3 4 5 
26. The ambiguities in life stress me. 1 2 3 4 5 
27. I can’t stand being undecided about my future. 1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix E 
Uncertainty Response Scale 
EVERYDAY LIFE 
INSTRUCTIONS: Following are some statements which regard different ways of reacting to 
situations.  Please read each one carefully and circle the one alternative which you feel is 
most like you.  The alternatives are as follows: 
1 = Never 
2 = Sometimes 
3 = Often 
4 = Always 
 
1. I tend to give up easily when I don’t clearly understand a situation. 1 2 3 4 
2. I find the prospect of change exciting and stimulating. 1 2 3 4 
3. When I go shopping, I like to have a list of exactly what I need. 1 2 3 4 
4. Sudden changes make me feel upset. 1 2 3 4 
5. There is something exciting about being kept in suspense. 1 2 3 4 
6. I feel better about myself when I know that I have done all I can to plan 
my future accurately. 
1 2 3 4 
7. When making a decision, I am deterred by the fear of making a mistake. 1 2 3 4 
8. The idea of taking a trip to a new country fascinates me. 1 2 3 4 
9. When uncertain, I act very cautiously until I have more information 
about the situation. 
1 2 3 4 
10. When the future is uncertain, I generally expect the worst to happen. 1 2 3 4 
11. I like going on holidays with nothing planned in advance. 1 2 3 4 
12. I like to have things under control. 1 2 3 4 
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1 = Never 
2 = Sometimes 
3 = Often 
4 = Always 
 
13. Facing uncertainty is a nerve-wracking experience. 1 2 3 4 
14. Taking chances is part of life. 1 2 3 4 
15. When I feel uncertain about something, I try to weigh up rationally all 
the information I have. 
1 2 3 4 
16. I get worried when a situation is uncertain. 1 2 3 4 
17. I think you have to be flexible to work effectively. 1 2 3 4 
18. Before making any changes, I need to think things over thoroughly. 1 2 3 4 
19. Thinking about uncertainty makes me feel depressed. 1 2 3 4 
20. I feel curious about new experiences. 1 2 3 4 
21. I prefer to stick to tried and tested ways of doing things. 1 2 3 4 
22. Uncertainty frightens me. 1 2 3 4 
23. I like to think of a new experience in terms of a challenge. 1 2 3 4 
24. I like to have my weekends planned in advance. 1 2 3 4 
25. When I can’t clearly discern situations, I get apprehensive. 1 2 3 4 
26. A new experience is an occasion to learn something new. 1 2 3 4 
27. When I feel a situation is unclear, I try to do my best to resolve it. 1 2 3 4 
28. When I’m not certain about someone’s intentions towards me, I often 
become upset or angry. 
1 2 3 4 
29. I enjoy finding new ways of working out problems. 1 2 3 4 
30. I like to know exactly what I’m going to do next. 1 2 3 4 
31. When uncertain about what to do next, I tend to feel lost. 1 2 3 4 
32. New experiences can be useful. 1 2 3 4 
33. When facing an uncertain situation, I tend to prepare as much as 
possible and then hope for the best. 
1 2 3 4 
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 1 = Never 
2 = Sometimes 
3 = Often 
4 = Always 
 
    
34. I feel anxious when things are changing. 1 2 3 4 
35. New experiences excite me. 1 2 3 4 
36. I feel relieved when an ambiguous situation suddenly becomes clear. 1 2 3 4 
37. When a situation is unclear, it makes me feel angry. 1 2 3 4 
38. I think variety is the spice of life. 1 2 3 4 
39. When I feel uncertain, I try to take decisive steps to clarify the situation. 1 2 3 4 
40. I get really anxious if I don’t know what someone thinks about me. 1 2 3 4 
41. I think a mid-life career change is an exciting idea. 1 2 3 4 
42. I try to have my life and career clearly mapped out. 1 2 3 4 
43. I am hesitant when it comes to making changes. 1 2 3 4 
44. I enjoy unexpected events. 1 2 3 4 
45. I like things to be ordered and in place, both at work and at home. 1 2 3 4 
46. I easily adapt to novelty. 1 2 3 4 
47. I like to plan ahead in detail rather than leaving things to chance. 1 2 3 4 
48. Before I buy something, I have to view every sample I can find. 1 2 3 4 
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Appendix F 
NEO-Five Factor Inventory 
 
BEHAVIORAL STYLES 
Instructions: Please read each of the statements carefully. Using the 0 to 4 scale below, 
indicate to what extent you agree with each statement. 
 0 = If you strongly disagree or the statement is definitely false. 
 1 = If you disagree or the statement is mostly false. 
2 = If you are neutral on the statement, you cannot decide, or the 
      statement is equally true or false. 
 3 = If you agree or the statement is mostly true. 
 4 = If you strongly agree or the statement is definitely true. 
 
1. I often feel helpless and want someone else                   0 1 2 3 4 
 to solve my problems.   
 
2. Sometimes I feel completely worthless.  0 1 2 3 4 
 
3. I don't like to waste my time daydreaming. 0 1 2 3 4 
 
4. I don't consider myself especially "light-hearted." 0 1 2 3 4 
 
5. Sometimes when I am reading poetry or looking at  0 1 2 3 4 
 a work of art, I feel a chill or wave of excitement. 
 
6. I rarely feel fearful or anxious.  0 1 2 3 4 
 
7. I have a lot of intellectual curiosity. 0 1 2 3 4 
 
8. I am not a worrier. 0 1 2 3 4 
 
9. I often feel as if I'm bursting with energy. 0 1 2 3 4 
 
10. Once I find the right way to do something,  0 1 2 3 4 
 I stick to it. 
  
158 
 
 
 0 = If you strongly disagree or the statement is definitely false. 
 1 = If you disagree or the statement is mostly false. 
2 = If you are neutral on the statement, you cannot decide, or the 
      statement is equally true or false. 
 3 = If you agree or the statement is mostly true. 
 4 = If you strongly agree or the statement is definitely true. 
 
 
11. I often feel tense and jittery.  0 1 2 3 4 
 
12. I rarely feel lonely or blue. 0 1 2 3 4 
 
13. I often get angry at the way people treat me.  0 1 2 3 4 
 
14. I often enjoy playing with theories or  0 1 2 3 4 
 abstract ideas. 
 
15. I am a cheerful, high-spirited person. 0 1 2 3 4 
  
16. I am a very active person. 0 1 2 3 4 
 
17. I am intrigued by the patterns I find in art and nature. 0 1 2 3 4 
 
18.  I am seldom sad or depressed. 0 1 2 3 4 
 
19. I have little interest in speculating on the nature  0 1 2 3 4 
 of the universe or the human condition. 
 
20. I often feel inferior to others.                                            0 1 2 3 4 
 
21. I like to have a lot of people around me. 0 1 2 3 4 
 
22. I seldom notice the moods or feelings that  0 1 2 3 4 
 different environments produce. 
 
23. I am not a cheerful optimist. 0 1 2 3 4 
 
24. At times I have been so ashamed I just wanted to hide. 0 1 2 3 4 
 
25. I believe letting students hear controversial  0 1 2 3 4 
 speakers can only confuse and mislead them. 
 
26.  I usually prefer to do things alone. 0 1 2 3 4 
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 0 = If you strongly disagree or the statement is definitely false. 
 1 = If you disagree or the statement is mostly false. 
2 = If you are neutral on the statement, you cannot decide, or the 
      statement is equally true or false. 
 3 = If you agree or the statement is mostly true. 
 4 = If you strongly agree or the statement is definitely true. 
 
 
27. Too often, when things go wrong, I get discouraged  0 1 2 3 4 
 and feel like giving up. 
 
28. My life is fast-paced. 0 1 2 3 4 
 
29. I believe we should look to our religious authorities  0 1 2 3 4 
 for decisions on moral issues. 
 
30. I like to be where the action is. 0 1 2 3 4 
 
31. I would rather go my own way than  0 1 2 3 4 
 be a leader of others. 
 
32. Poetry has little or no effect on me. 0 1 2 3 4 
  
33. When I’m under a great deal of stress,  0 1 2 3 4 
 sometimes I feel like I’m going to pieces. 
      
34. I laugh easily. 0 1 2 3 4 
 
35. I often try new and foreign foods. 0 1 2 3 4 
 
36.  I really enjoy talking to people. 0 1 2 3 4 
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Appendix G 
 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire 
 
HOW I AM 
INSTRUCTIONS: Rate each of the following statements on a scale of 1 (“not at all typical of 
me”) to 5 (“very typical of me”).  Please do not leave any blank items. 
 
  Not at all    
typical 
of me 
 Very 
typical                    
of me 
 
1. If I do not have enough time to do 
everything, I do not worry about it. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. My worries overwhelm me. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. I do not tend to worry about things. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Many situations make me worry. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. I know I should not worry about things, 
but I just cannot help it. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. When I am under pressure I worry a lot. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. I am always worrying about something. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. I find it easy to dismiss worrisome 
thoughts. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. As soon as I finish one task, I start to worry 
about everything else I have to do. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. I never worry about anything. 1 2 3 4 5 
11. When there is nothing more I can do about 
a concern, I do not worry about it anymore. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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12. I have been a worrier all my life. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. I notice that I have been worrying about 
things. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. Once I start worrying, I cannot stop. 1 2 3 4 5 
15. I worry all the time. 1 2 3 4 5 
16. I worry about projects until they are done. 1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix H 
 
Beck Depression Inventory 
 
THOUGHTS, EMOTIONS, AND BEHAVIOR 
 
DIRECTIONS: On this questionnaire are groups of statements. Please read each group of statements 
carefully. Then choose the one statement in each group which best describes the way you have been 
feeling during the PAST WEEK, INCLUDING TODAY. Fill in the number on the scantron sheet to 
indicate your choice. Be sure to read all the statements in each group before making your choice.  
Question 1. 
1 I do not feel sad 
2 I feel sad 
3 I am sad all the time and I can’t snap out of it 
4 I am so sad or unhappy I can’t stand it 
Question 2. 
1 I am not particularly discouraged about the future 
2 I feel discouraged about the future 
3 I feel I have nothing to look forward to 
4 I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cannot improve 
Question 3. 
1 I do not feel like a failure 
2 I feel I have failed more than the average person 
3 As I look back on my life, all I can see is a lot of failures 
4 I feel I am a complete failure as a person 
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Question 4. 
1 I get as much satisfaction out of things as I used to 
2 I don’t enjoy things the way I used to 
3 I don’t get any real satisfaction out of anything anymore 
4 I am dissatisfied or bored with everything 
Question 5. 
1 I don’t feel particularly guilty  
2 I feel guilty a good part of the time 
3 I feel quite guilty most of the time 
4 I feel guilty all of the time 
Question 6. 
1 I don’t feel I am being punished 
2 I feel I may be punished 
3 I expect to be punished 
4 I feel I am being punished 
Question 7. 
1 I don’t feel disappointed in myself 
2 I am disappointed in myself 
3 I am disgusted with myself 
4 I hate myself 
Question 8. 
1 I don’t feel I am any worse than anybody else 
2 I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or mistakes 
3 I blame myself all the time for my faults 
4 I blame myself for everything bad that happens 
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Question 9. 
1 I don’t cry any more than usual 
2 I cry more now than I used to 
3 I cry all the time now 
4 I used to be able to cry, but now I can’t cry even though I want to 
Question 10. 
1 I am no more irritated by things than I ever am 
2 I am slightly more irritated now than usual 
3 I am quite annoyed and irritated a good deal of the time 
4 I feel irritated all the time now 
Question 11.  
1 I have not lost interest in other people 
2 I am less interested in other people than I used to be 
3 I have lost most of my interest in other people 
4 I have lost all of my interest in other people 
Question 12. 
1 I make decisions about as well as I ever could 
2 I put off making decisions more than I used to 
3 I have greater difficulty in making decisions than before 
4 I can’t make decisions at all anymore 
Question 13. 
1 I don’t feel that I look any worse than I used to 
2 I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive 
3 I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance that make me look unattractive 
4 I believe that I look ugly 
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Question 14. 
1 I can work about as well as before 
2 It takes an extra effort to get started at doing something 
3 I have to push myself very hard to do anything 
4 I can’t do any work at all 
Question 15. 
1 I can sleep as well as usual 
2 I don’t sleep as well as I used to 
3 I wake up 2-3 hours earlier than usual and find it hard to go back to sleep 
4 I wake up several hours earlier than I used to and cannot get back to sleep 
Question 16. 
1 I don’t get more tired than usual 
2 I get tired more easily than I used to  
3 I get tired from doing almost anything 
4 I am too tired to do anything  
Question 17. 
1 My appetite is no worse than usual 
2 My appetite is not as good as it used to be 
3 My appetite is much worse now 
4 I have no appetite at all anymore 
Question 18. 
1 I haven’t lost much weight, if any, lately 
2 I have lost more than five pounds 
3 I have lost more than ten pounds 
4 I have lost more than fifteen pounds 
Note: Choose “1” if you have been purposely trying to lose weight 
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Question 19. 
1 I am no more worried about my health than usual 
2 I am worried about physical problems such as aches and pains, or upset stomach, or  
   constipation 
3 I am very worried about physical problems, and it’s hard to think of much else 
4 I am so worried about my physical problems that I cannot think about anything else 
Question 20. 
1 I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex 
2 I am less interested in sex that I used to be 
3 I am much less interested in sex now 
4 I have lost interest in sex completely 
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Appendix I 
 
Medical History Information Form 
 
MEDICAL HISTORY INFORMATION FORM 
 
 
Section 1 
  
Please indicate if you currently or in the past have experienced any of the following:   
(If you check yes, state when) 
 
       When 
I. Neurological conditions: 
____Epilepsy   ________________________________________________________ 
____Head injury  ________________________________________________________ 
____Hemorrhage  ________________________________________________________ 
____Meningitis   ________________________________________________________ 
____Migraine   ________________________________________________________ 
____Multiple Sclerosis  ________________________________________________________ 
____Parkinson’s  ________________________________________________________ 
____Seizures    ________________________________________________________ 
____Stroke   ________________________________________________________ 
____Shingles   ________________________________________________________  
____Postherapeutic neuralgia ________________________________________________________ 
____Other   ________________________________________________________ 
 
 
II. Have you ever undergone any form of brain surgery? 
 
Yes No 
 
III. Are you currently taking any medications for a problem associated with a neurological condition, 
attention-related condition, or mental health condition? 
 
Yes No 
 
IV. Do you currently have problems with alcohol or drugs (excluding tobacco or social use of alcohol)?  
 
Yes No 
 
V. Are you currently in treatment for alcohol or drug use? 
    
Yes No 
 
VI. Are you currently being treated for a psychological or psychiatric condition? 
 
Yes No 
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VII. Have you ever experienced brain trauma (e.g., an accident that left you unconscious for more than 10 
      minutes)? 
 
Yes No 
 
 
Section 2 
 
I.  Current weight:  ___________   
 
II. Current height:  ___________ 
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Appendix J 
 
RESEARCH SUBJECT INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORM 
 
TITLE:  Psychological Correlates of Neurological Responses 
 
VCU IRB #: HM13858 
 
This consent form may contain words that you do not understand. Please ask the study staff to explain any 
words that you do not clearly understand. You may take home an unsigned copy of this consent form to 
think about or discuss with family or friends before making your decision 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY  
This study seeks to understand neurological patterns (brain waves) associated with several key 
psychological states. You are being asked to participate in this study because you are an undergraduate 
student at Virginia Commonwealth University. The research project will be conducted in one session 
lasting approximately 3 hours. Participation is voluntary, and all responses will remain strictly 
confidential. 
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AND YOUR INVOLVEMENT 
If you decide to be in this research study, you will be asked to sign this consent form after you have had 
all your questions answered and understand what will happen to you. You will then be asked to complete 
a form about your past medical history, and a series of psychological questionnaires that ask about 
various experiences you may have. After this you will be asked to sit quietly while non-invasive, painless 
neurological recordings are made using a sensor cap (similar to  a swim cap). This procedure does not 
alter or disrupt brain activity in any way. You will then be asked to sit quietly for eight periods of one 
minute.  After this we will ask you to play a game on the computer that involves looking at pictures on 
the computer screen, and answering questions about your experience viewing them, like how they 
influence your mood.  Some of the pictures are of everyday items and other pictures are of an unpleasant 
nature.  
 
This study will take approximately 3 hours to complete.  You do not have to answer any questions, or 
participate in any activities you do not wish to. You may withdraw from the study at any time, without 
penalty. We plan to enroll 60 VCU students in our study. 
 
Significant new findings developed during the course of the research which may relate to your 
willingness to continue participation will be provided to you. 
 
RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS 
The physical risks involved in this study are minimal and are related to wearing the sensor cap. We will 
use a snug-fitting cap that fits like a swim cap and is embedded with sensors that detect electrical brain 
activity on the surface of the scalp.  
 
If you choose to participate in this experiment, you will be asked to complete measures of your medical 
history, personality, and emotional well-being, you may also experience feelings of distress while 
participating in this study. You will also see a variety of pictures that have been judged to be neutral or 
unpleasant. The risks are not greater than the risks associated with daily living. However, if participating 
in this study causes you to feel upset or you become concerned about your psychological state or your 
current life situation, the study staff will provide you with contact information for resources available on 
campus that can help you address these issues, including: 
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 University Counseling Services, which offers free counseling for VCU students; phone 828-6200 
(Monroe Park Campus) or 828-3964 (Medical Campus). 
 University Student Health Services (also free for VCU students); phone 828-8828 (Monroe Park 
Campus) or 828-9220 (Medical Campus). 
 Center for Psychological Services and Development, which offers counseling services on a sliding fee 
scale; phone 828-8069. 
 
Should you need services other than those provided by VCU University Counseling Services or 
University Student Health Services, fees for such treatment will be billed to you or to appropriate third 
party insurance. 
 
BENEFITS TO YOU AND OTHERS 
You may not get any direct benefit from this study, but, the information we learn from people in this 
study may help us better understand the processes under study. 
 
COSTS 
There are no costs for participating in this study other than the time you will spend on the tasks and filling 
out questionnaires.  
 
ALTERNATIVES 
The alternative to participating in this study is to not participate. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
The data collected in this study will not be personally identifiable, as no name, birth date, or other 
potentially identifiable information will be collected. Data is being collected only for research purposes, 
identified only by an anonymous study ID number, and stored separately from the consent form in a 
locked research area. All information will be kept in password protected electronic files. Hard copy 
questionnaires will be kept in a locked file cabinet for 3 years after the study ends and will be destroyed at 
that time. Electronic files of the study data will be kept indefinitely. Access to all data will be limited to 
study personnel. A data and safety monitoring plan is established. 
 
We will not tell anyone the answers you give us; however, information from the study and the consent 
form signed by you may be looked at or copied for research or legal purposes by the sponsor of the 
research, or by Virginia Commonwealth University.  Personal information about you might be shared 
with or copied by authorized officials of the Federal Food and Drug Administration, or the Department of 
Health and Human Services (if applicable). What we find from this study may be presented at meetings or 
published in papers, but your name will not ever be used in these presentations or papers. 
 
IF AN INJURY OR ILLNESS HAPPENS 
Virginia Commonwealth University and the VCU Health System (also known as MCV Hospital) do not 
have a plan to give long-term care or money if you are injured because you are in the study.  If you are 
injured because of being in this study, tell the study staff right away. The study staff will arrange for 
short-term emergency care or referral if it is needed. Bills for treatment may be sent to you or your 
insurance. Your insurance may or may not pay for taking care of injuries that happen because of being in 
this study. 
 
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL 
You do not have to participate in this study. If you choose to participate, you may stop at any time 
without any penalty. You may also choose not to answer particular questions that are asked in the study. 
Withdrawal from the study will not affect you present or future University relationship. 
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Your participation in this study may be stopped at any time by the study staff without your consent. The 
reasons might include: 
 the study staff thinks it necessary for your health or safety; 
 you have not followed study instructions; 
 administrative reasons require your withdrawal. 
 
QUESTIONS 
In the future, you may have questions about your participation in this study. If you have any questions, 
complaints, or concerns about the research, contact: 
 
Kirk Warren Brown, PhD  
Virginia Commonwealth University 
808 W. Franklin Street, Room 202 
P.O. Box 982018 
Richmond, VA 23284 
Telephone:  804-828-6754 
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this study, you may contact: 
 
 Office for Research 
 Virginia Commonwealth University 
 800 East Leigh Street, Suite 113 
 P.O. Box 980568 
 Richmond, VA  23298 
 Telephone:  804-827-2157 
 
You may also contact this number for general questions, concerns or complaints about the research.  
Please call this number if you cannot reach the research team or wish to talk to someone else.  Additional 
information about participation in research studies can be found at 
http://www.research.vcu.edu/irb/volunteers.htm. 
 
CONSENT 
I have been given the chance to read this consent form. I understand the information about this study. 
Questions that I wanted to ask about the study have been answered. My signature says that I am willing to 
participate in this study.  I will receive a copy of the consent form once I have agreed to participate. 
  
 
Participant name printed   Participant signature  Date 
 
________________________________________________ 
Name of Person Conducting Informed Consent  
Discussion / Witness (printed) 
 
________________________________________________ ________________ 
Signature of Person Conducting Informed Consent   Date 
Discussion / Witness  
 
_______________________________________________ ________________ 
Principal Investigator Signature (if different from above)   Date 
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